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Abstract 
This dissertation examines how growth-promoting industrial policies failed to realize policy 
intentions but nonetheless produced rapid growth. The dissertation study is based on eighteen 
months of field research in China, during which data were collected from primary archival 
sources and in-depth interviews. The dissertation argues that even when the functioning of state 
institutions is deficient, industrial policy in a transitional economy can facilitate rapid growth by 
relieving the commitment problem and, along with other market institutional reforms, opening 
up a limited amount of market competition. The study demonstrates how industrial policy as a 
new mode of macroeconomic management to build the socialist market economy failed amid 
macro institutional reforms across government organizations, state-business, and central-local 
relations. Nonetheless, the state’s promulgation of industrial policy settled the “credible 
commitment problem” of doing business in China, while its market institutional reforms freed 
new types of business actors and local governments to form a coalition that challenged the 
dominant coalition of actors legitimized by the state. In authoritarian China where legal 
protection of private property rights is weak, industrial policy indirectly signaled that the central 
government’s whimsical and predatory behaviors would be significantly reduced in the 
designated industries. In addition to blocking the negative actions of the central government, 
industrial policy also showed the central government’s support for industrial promotion. Since 
embarking on the socialist market economy, the central government has exercised more 
consistent macroeconomic control thanks to a consolidated government organization structure, 
enhanced its fiscal capacity through fiscal reform, and strengthened its control over the central 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the largest shareholder. Ironically, this strengthened control 
by the central government unleashed market mechanisms that had been suppressed by the local 
 vii 
governments, eventually enabling expanded market behaviors by local governments, 
subprovincial local SOEs, and private actors. The rise of market competition between rival 
coalitions, although limited, in turn had the unintended effect of promoting rapid growth.  
 Previous literature generally assumes that well-functioning market mechanisms or state 
institutions are necessary for strong economic growth. Hence, the literature primarily emphasizes 
exogenous challenges arising from globalization, which would either globalize market 
mechanisms or weaken state capability. In contrast, this dissertation addresses how the 
endogenous processes of a transitioning economic system affect development outcomes. The 
dissertation also provides an empirical understanding of Chinese “state capitalism.” Chinese state 
capitalism succeeded in making selected state-owned enterprises into mega-enterprises, but these 
are still far from having an institutionalized and sustainable corporate governance structure. 
Furthermore, the private actors are tied to the central government to gain recognition as 
legitimate actors in the industry, while they are financially dependent on local governments. 
Because the private entrepreneurs in China’s auto industry are bound by two different level of 
constraints, they tend to be “allies of the state,” rather than posing a threat to the incumbent 
authoritarian regime.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The Puzzle of Chinese Automotive Industrialization 
When Ford named a Chinese private automaker, Geely, as a preferred Volvo bidder in fall 2009, 
the news surprised not only Westerners but also many Chinese. Due to China’s auto industry 
policy (AIP), which placed strict controls on market entry, Geely’s early endeavors to enter the 
automobile industry had run aground many times. The industry pariah of a decade earlier now 
became a super star. Once the news spread, local governments across China began to woo Geely 
by promising large investments in exchange for the promise to establish auto assembly plants in 
their areas. Geely, along with many other private and subprovincial auto firms including Chery, 
BYD, and Changcheng, had entered the auto industry only by breaching the central 
government’s auto industrial policy, but they had then become important growth engines that 
helped fulfill the AIP’s goals.  
 The major beneficiaries of the auto industrial policy, which are mostly large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), have increasingly relied on their foreign joint venture partners’ technology 
rather than becoming the “national champions” of independent development, production, and 
sales envisaged by the government. For example, according to the National Audit Office Report 
on the performance of the First Auto Works (FAW), the oldest auto firm in China, between 2008 
and 2010, the proportion of independent research and development (R&D) investment is low; the 
profitability of its independent brand cars is not strong; and the FAW Group’s profits come 
mainly from the joint venture (JV) subsidiaries (National Audit Office 2012). The performance 
of the other major beneficiaries of the AIP such as Dongfeng, Shanghai Auto, and Beijing Auto 
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is virtually identical. Rather than meeting the goals set by the AIP, they largely became parts 
suppliers for the JVs. This dissertation asks how the central government’s growth-promoting 
industrial policies failed to realize their intentions but nonetheless produced rapid growth outside 
the scope of the policies. 
Although the fact is not widely known in the West, China has been the world’s largest 
automobile producer since 2008. In 1984, in the early period of economic reform, only 5,207 
passenger cars were assembled in China. By 2014, the number was 19.9 million—29.45% of the 
approximately 69 million passenger cars produced in the world that year (OICA 2014). From the 
late 1980s, and especially after the “socialist market economy” (SME) was officially inaugurated 
in 1992–1993, China actively pursued state-led industrial policies for several “pillar” industries. 
The 1994 auto industrial policy was the country’s first sector-specific industrial policy. However, 
despite the auto industry’s long history of intense government intervention and exceptionally fast 
growth, the AIP has been considered one of the worst failures of industrial policy in China (Eun 
and Lee 2002; Huang 2002; Lu and Feng 2004; Zhao 2003). The auto industry is a powerful 
symbol of industrial modernization; scholars have called the automobile “the machine that 
changed the world” and the auto industry the “industry of industries” (Womack, Jones and Roos 
2007). It is simply impossible to think about economic modernization in early-twentieth century 
America, post-World War II Germany and Japan, or late-twentieth century South Korea without 
the automotive industry.  
China’s meteoric rise in the global economy over the past few decades has drawn 
extensive attention worldwide. Not only has China overtaken the United States as the world’s 
largest economy measured by GDP based on purchasing power parity, but it now leads in many 
important sectors including steel and high-technology exports as well as automobiles. 
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Scrutinizing the political economy of Chinese automobile industrialization will deepen our 
understanding of the mechanisms of rapid growth in a transitional economy in the era of 
neoliberal globalization. This dissertation explores the paradoxical success of China’s auto 
industry amid policy failures by examining how interactions between market transitional reforms 
and industrial policy have shaped the mode of market competition. 
 Although this dissertation investigates how market mechanisms have been introduced in 
transitional China, it is not concerned with evaluating whether the market or the state is more 
effective at creating rapid growth. The study does not deny market mechanisms’ welfare-
enhancing functions, but demonstrates that in a transitional country like China, even a failed 
policy intervention from the state can induce limited market competition by solving a “credible 
commitment problem.”1 In authoritarian China where legal protection of private property rights 
is weak, industrial policy indirectly signaled that the central government’s whimsical and 
predatory behaviors would be significantly reduced in the designated industries. In addition to 
blocking the negative actions of the central government, industrial policy also showed the central 
government’s support for industrial promotion. In neoclassical theory, where Adam Smith’s 
concept of the Economic Man, who has the innate “propensity to truck, barter and exchange one 
thing for another” is dominant, the retreat of the state from economic action is the solution that 
guarantees the proper functioning of market mechanisms. Led by Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]), 
                                                 
1 In their classical study on “credible commitment problem,” North and Weingast (1989, 808) succinctly present 
why the incumbent regime should be committed or bound by rules they made for economic growth to occur. They 
stress “This article focuses on political factors underpinning economic growth and the development of markets—not 
simply the rules governing economic exchange, but also the institutions governing how these rules are enforced and 
how they may be changed. A critical factor is the degree to which the regime or sovereign is committed to or bound 
by these rules. Rules the sovereign can readily revise differ significantly in their implications for performance from 
exactly the same rules when not subject to revision. The more like it is that the sovereign will alter property rights 
for his or her own benefit, the lower the expected returns from investment and the lower in turn the incentive to 
invest. For economic growth to occur the sovereign or government must not merely establish the relevant set of 
rights, but must make a credible commitment to them.” For a review about how authoritarian regimes overcome 
commitment problem, see Zheng 2014, 195–197. 
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however, many institutional scholars have thoroughly researched the possibility of 
complementary relations between the state and the market (Fligstein 2001; Vogel 1996). Much 
of the resulting work has considered the developmental state to be the answer to the question of 
how government intervention contributes to growth; in this literature, well-functioning state 
institutions are assumed to be a necessary condition for high growth.2 On this view, state 
intervention is conducive to high growth only when the state’s macro and micro institutions are 
at work and lead to disciplined competition between private business actors in a coordinated 
market (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990). In the case of the Chinese auto 
industry, however, state intervention through industrial policy seriously failed, because industrial 
policy as a new tool of macroeconomic control was implemented in tandem with macro 
institutional reforms. Although these consecutive institutional reforms across government 
organizations, state-business, and central-local relations were not mature enough to effectively 
implement the AIP, the result was greatly increased autonomy for firms and local governments. 
This dissertation argues that even when the functioning of state institutions is deficient, industrial 
policy in a transitional economy can facilitate rapid growth by relieving the commitment 
problem and, along with other market institutional reforms, open up a limited amount of market 
competition.  
“Industrial policy” in this dissertation is limited to policies that are issued by the central 
government with proactive intentions towards certain sectors. Similar to industrial policies in 
Japan and South Korea, the AIP in China aimed at consolidating the fragmented auto industry 
both through enforcing entry control ex ante and through promoting capacity reorganization ex 
post facto. Even after three decades of rationalization attempts, China still has around 120 auto 
assembly firms. The majority of them are operating far below the optimal level for economy of 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive review of institutions and growth in East Asia, see Haggard 2004.  
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scale. As a noted China scholar Yasheng Huang (2002, 539) said, the Chinese auto industry is 
“among the most fragmented in the world.” Along with strong entry control, the AIP also gave 
preferential treatment to a small number of designated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to nurture 
their transformation into internationally competitive “national champions.” China also pursued a 
“go-it-alone strategy” just as South Korea did initially, but this strategy was not effective in 
creating competitiveness and overcoming industry fragmentation. The stagnation of domestic 
auto development pushed a high demand for foreign passenger vehicles, which created 
significant pressure on the balance of payments and eventually fueled massive smuggling, 
especially during the early 1980s (Harwit 1995, 26–33). In this situation, import substitution 
strategy through the formation of joint ventures with global automobile companies became the 
basis of the AIP. The establishment of joint ventures (JVs) with multinational corporations 
(MNCs) was intended as an instrument to consolidate China’s auto sector while a small number 
of designated SOEs were expected to enhance their international competitiveness to become the 
hoped-for national champions.  
Chinese-style auto industrial policy, however, led to mixed results. As a whole, the auto 
market avoided encroachment by imported vehicles, but the central state’s intervention inflated 
automobile prices, which subsequently stimulated various new actors seeking high profit rates to 
enter the auto sector. Localization requirements intended to achieve import substitution increased 
local parts production dramatically, but also drove China’s major auto enterprises into focusing 
on developing parts supplies instead of developing independent models. Large SOEs that 
received massive benefits from preferential policies reaped profits from the JVs but remained far 
from realizing the goals set by the AIP. Meanwhile, various new actors were able to enter the 
auto industry by purchasing nontransferable “production licenses” from small and medium SOEs 
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that had spun off from other SOEs during the government-led transition to the socialist market 
economy. Ironically, the designated large SOEs that enjoyed preferential policies degenerated 
into parts producers for their JV partners, but the fledging domestic actors that violated industrial 
policy to access the lucrative auto sector eventually became important forces in export with their 
own brands. In other words, growth-promoting industrial policies failed to realize policy 
intentions but nonetheless produced rapid industrialization, although it took place outside the 
scope of the policies.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Previous literature tackles the puzzle of China’s paradoxical success in auto industrialization by 
taking one of two main approaches. The first approach denies the policy failures, considering 
policy implementation a “learning process.” For instance, Chu (2011, 1267) argued that the AIP 
was ineffective at first, but China’s central state has continued to improve it, adjusting the policy 
in response to local feedback. By emphasizing the improvement in policy quality over time, Chu 
implied that the Chinese government has been the primary engine of the auto industry’s fast 
growth. The problem with this explanation is that no matter how much better the central 
government has become at producing high-quality policy, the AIP is not a “proactive” but a 
“follow-up” industrial policy. New versions of the AIP have followed the industry’s performance, 
rather than leading the direction of development. The one salient feature of the industrial policy 
has been the deliberately setting prices wrong to draw excess investment that is then channeled 
to targeted sectors or firms. Because government selection necessarily resulted in winners and 
losers, strong state institutions that make the winners comply with the rules and keep the losers 
away from the targeted sectors are necessary (Amsden 1989). Yet this kind of monitoring 
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capacity is precisely what the Chinese AIP lacks.3 Furthermore, the critical test of strong state 
institutional capacity is whether the government maintains autonomy by insulating itself from 
pressures from vested interest groups (Haggard and Moon 1990). The Chinese central state has 
not been able to maintain such autonomy, but has been vulnerable to lobbies from central 
ministries and local states. (Kennedy 2005) For example, six companies were selected as sedan 
producers in a “big three and small three” scheme in the late 1980s. Later on, however, 
organizations previously engaged in the defense industry, such as the China Ordnance Industry 
Corporation and the Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation, also obtained sedan production 
permission. They were able to do so because fierce lobbying by the defense ministries and local 
states had seriously undermined the central government’s capacity to tightly maintain market 
entry control (Chu 2011; Ngo 2008). 
The second approach acknowledges China’s industrial policy failures. This school of 
thought suggests that institutional constraints such as “divided and decentralized bureaucratic 
arrangements” (Huang 2002), a “unique central-local government relationship” (Eun and Lee 
2002), “large information asymmetries,” and rampant corruption (Fuller 2016) impede effective 
industrial policy implementation in China. A study of variations in local auto industrial 
development across four different Chinese provinces (Thun 2006) applied a similar institutional 
logic. Huang’s (2002) study employed a comparative method to identify the most important 
institutional foundations that can explain the varying economic performances of China and South 
Korea, but directly linking institutions to economic performance can easily lead to the fallacy of 
second-order causation (Moon and Prasad 1994).  
                                                 
3 The literature on China’s industrial policy demonstrates that the Chinese state does not monitor firms effectively 
(Huang 2003; Moore 2002; Perkins 2001).  
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Instead of essentializing institutional characteristics and treating certain institutional 
aspects as a recipe that leads to an inevitable outcome,4 this dissertation considers institutions as 
“both a product of particular political coalitions and a structural force in reproducing particular 
patterns of political life over time” (Gingrich 2015, 76). While the developmental state literature 
tends to give more attention to the role of particular institutions in rapid economic growth 
(Johnson 1982), the welfare state literature considers the variation among welfare states as the 
outcome of different political processes in given societies (Esping-Andersen 1990). Confronting 
the paradoxical growth of China’s auto industry, I apply the political process approach that 
dominates the welfare state research to a question usually raised in developmental state literature. 
By taking political process seriously, this dissertation explicates how other macro institutional 
reforms that accompanied China’s implementation of the socialist market economy—central 
government reshuffles, central-local fiscal reforms, state-business relations—interacted with the 
AIP. The political process framework does not posit deterministic theories, however. Rather, it 
demonstrates how parts of institutions shape the scope of the political struggles that give form to 
economic life (Moon and Prasad 1994, 377–378). This framework opens analytical and empirical 
spaces for real politics, but the real stories of political struggles are contingent on the actors’ 
choices under institutional constraints. 
 
1.3 Background: Rapid Growth amid Failed Policies  
After the decision to establish a socialist market economy had been adopted at the third plenary 
session of the 14th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee on November 14, 1993, 
                                                 
4 Gore (2014) claimed that “laundry list method,” of which enumerate institutional characters, is the culprit of failure 
of applying developmental state concept outside of its origin countries. Furthermore, Haggard (2014) argued that the 
strong domestic institutions that is claimed to be necessary for fast economic growth are usually lacking in 
developing countries. If certain institutional factors are sufficient conditions for economic growth, then most 
developing countries who lacks these factors should remain in underdeveloped for good.     
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the State Council issued “Guidelines for National Industrial Policy during the 1990s” in April of 
1994. As a new macroeconomic tool, industrial policy targeted both agriculture and industry, but 
gave initial attention to a few “pillar” industries, such as machines, electronics, chemical and 
petroleum, auto manufacturing, and construction. The State Planning Commission (SPC) 
promulgated China’s first sector-specific industrial policy on February 19, 1994. In addition to 
this particular policy, which has the official title of “industrial policy” (chanye zhengce), the 
Chinese central government, especially in the capacity of the State Council, irregularly 
announces notices (tongzi) or decisions (jueding) on the auto industry. Additionally, the State 
Council regularly issues five-year plans or programs,5 each of which also has a particular 
program for individual sectors. In the most limited sense, the auto industrial policy only includes 
two policy statements: the SPC’s “1994 Auto Industrial Policy” and the National Development 
and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) “2004 Auto Industry Development Policy.” Although these 
are the two most significant statements, auto industrial policy overall is manifested through all of 
the diverse forms mentioned above (Anderson 2012, ch. 3).   
 At the beginning of the period of reform, increased auto imports were creating significant 
pressure on the balance of payments. The primary goal of the auto industrial policy initially was 
import substitution through the technical upgrading of a small number of large SOEs. A large 
potential domestic market is one of China’s great assets; hence, the Chinese state devised its AIP 
by combining import substitution with the establishment of joint ventures, and justified this 
strategy as “grant[ing] access to the domestic market in return for capital and technology” (yi 
shichang huan jishu; Liu and Yeung 2008, 527). By establishing joint ventures with 
                                                 
5 From the 11th Five-Year Program (11-5 program), the term “plan” (jihua), which connotes imperative targets, is 
replaced by the term “program” (guihua), which has nonimperative and indicative nuances. Besides the weaker level 
of obligation, programs from the 11-5 program on are intended to include not only economic policies, but social 
policies (“Tenth Five-Year Plan of the CCP Central Committee on National Economic and Social Development,” 
2005, adopted at the fifth plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee). 
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multinational corporations, the designated SOEs were expected to develop into internationally 
competitive companies. The JV-based auto industrial policy, however, led to mixed results. As a 
whole, the auto market avoided encroachment by imported vehicles, but this inflated automobile 
prices. Local governments’ localization requirements increased local parts production 
dramatically, but this also drove China’s major auto enterprises into focusing on developing as 
parts suppliers instead of developing independent models. By 2005, after a decade of Chinese-
style industrial policy, there were “28 separate joint ventures and wholly Chinese owned firms 
producing more than 120 models, with an average annual volume per model of fewer than 
30,000 units” (Noble, Ravenhill, and Doner 2005, 21). If we consider the minimum efficient 
scale, customarily fixed at 250,000 units per year for a single production run, the rationalization 
process still had a long way to go. 
China finally entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 after 15 years of 
haggling. Due to sharp reductions in tariffs and bans in some industrial policy measures, there 
were many worries about the auto industry (Harwit 2001; Noble, Ravenhill, and Doner 2005). 
Harwit (2001, 669) suggested three different scenarios for the impacts of the WTO on China’s 
auto industry. In the worst case, the Chinese markets would be swamped by imports and a series 
of bankruptcies would follow. The middle scenario was that the industry might maintain the 
status quo. The best case would be that domestic companies would overcome the challenges of 
WTO membership and rise to compete by producing world-class vehicles. The current situation, 
more than 10 years after China entered the WTO, is somewhere in between the middle and best 
case scenarios. While large SOEs remain the major partners of foreign multinational auto 
companies, newly emerging indigenous actors have started to increase their market shares, 
especially for low and middle price cars.   
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Figure 1-1 demonstrates investment trends in the automotive industry and its shares in 
total investments in the period of 1986–2010. Total net amounts invested in the auto industry 
have gone up. The industry’s share of total investments shows two humps, around 1994 and 
2004, the years that formal AIPs were issued. As the figure shows, the positive effects of these 
AIPs on investments did not last long. Furthermore, the effect of the second AIP on investment 
in the auto industry was smaller than that of the first.  
 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Amounts invested in the Chinese automotive industry: Trends and share of total 
investments, 1986–2010. 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2011 (2011, 13).  
 
 Table 1-1 and Figure 1-2 below demonstrate the binary structure of the automotive 
industry in China. Table 1-1 shows the country’s top 10 passenger vehicle companies and their 
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sales volume between 2004 and 2009. The top three, all JVs between SOEs and MNCs, did not 
change over this period. Despite these companies’ firm hold on their top-three status, late-
coming JVs and indigenous brands engaged in a heated competition to rank in the next highest 
positions. Three domestic makers, Chery, Geely, and BYD, made huge advances during the same 
period. Figure 1-2 also shows sedan market shares of output values by ownership type. State-
ownership and JVs, the two dominant ownership types, prevail with 60% of the total output 
value, although this is a decrease from 75% in 1998. Despite the headway made by private 
companies in sales volume shown in Table 1-1, their output values reached less than 3% in 2011.  
 
Table 1-1. China’s Top 10 Car Companies and Numbers of Sales, 2004–2009 (Sales unit: 1,000) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Maker Sales Maker Sales Maker Sales Maker Sales Maker Sales Maker Sales 
1 S-VW 354 S-GM 298 S-GM 413 S-GM 500 F-VW 499 S-VW 728 
2 F-VW 300 S-VW 245 S-VW 352 F-VW 456 S-VW 490 S-GM 708 
3 S-GM 223.8 F-VW 238 F-VW 345 S-VW 436 S-GM 455 F-VW 669 
4 G-
Honda 
185 B-
Hyundai 
234 Chery 305 Chery 381 F-
Toyota 
366 B-
Hyundai 
570 
5 B-
Hyundai 
144 G-
Honda 
203 B-
Hyundai 
290 G-
Honda 
295 Chery 356 D-
Nissan 
519 
6 Charade 130 Charade 190 G-
Honda 
260 F-
Toyota 
281 D-
Nissan 
351 Chery 484 
7 C-
Suzuki 
110 Chery 189 F-
Toyota 
223 D-
Nissan 
272 G-
Honda 
306 BYD 448 
8 Chery 93 D-
Nissan 
158 Geely 204 B-
Hyundai 
231 B-
Hyundai 
295 F-
Toyota 
417 
9 D-PSA 89 Geely 149 D-
Nissan 
203 C-Ford 218 Geely 222 G-
Honda 
365 
10 Geely 87 D-PSA 140 D-PSA 201 Geely 218 C-Ford 205 Geely 329 
Source: Hyundai Motors Co. (cited in Kim 2010, 130).  
Note: B-Hyundai (Beijing Hyundai), C-Ford (Chang’an Ford), C-Suzuki (Chang’an Suzuki), D-
Nissan (Dongfeng Nissan), D-PSA (Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen), F-VW (First Volkswagen), F-
Toyota (First Toyota), G-Honda (Guangzhou Honda), S-GM (Shanghai GM), S-VW (Shanghai 
Volkswagen). 
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Figure 1-2. Percentages of the Chinese automotive industry’s total output values by ownership 
type for 1998, 2002, 2005, and 2012. 
Source: Compiled by author from the China Automotive Industry Yearbook (China Automotive 
Technology and Research Center [CATARC] 1999, 2006, 2011).  
Note: Ownership types: (1) Domestically funded corporations: state-owned (guoyou), collective-
owned (jiti), shareholding cooperatives (gufen hezuo), joint ownership (lianying), limited 
liability corporations (youxian zeren gongsi), limited shareholding corporations (gufen youxian 
gongsi), private (siying); (2) HMT JVs: corporations with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan (Gang Ao Taishanng touzi gongsi); (3) JV: foreign funded enterprises (waishang touzi 
qiye). 
 
1.3.1 Rapid Growth 
China’s auto industry has recorded unprecedented high growth over the last two decades. Despite 
the long history of automotive manufacturing in China (Harwit 1994, 15–42; Editorial Office of 
History of China Automotive Industry 1996), the industry took off only very recently. In 1978, at 
the beginning of Chinese economic reform, the total number of automobiles produced was only 
149,062. During the first decade of the economic reform, the industry grew, but at a slow pace. 
As Figure 1-3 shows, the growth rate has accelerated since the beginning of the new century. 
China’s total car production including cars and commercial vehicles exceeded 20 million units in 
2014 and, as Figure 1-4 demonstrates, China surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest 
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automobile manufacturing country since 2009. The majority of the cars are still consumed in the 
Chinese domestic market, but the number and amount of automobile exports has recently started 
to grow. The total volume and amount of exports finally surpassed those of imports in 2005, 
although the gap is still small and dwindles almost to nothing from time to time. It is a 
remarkable achievement: only 20 years ago, in 1985, China imported 353,992 vehicles and 
exported 1,659. The number of imported products was equivalent to 79.8% of domestic products 
(total 443,377 units) in the same year. The Chinese auto industry was on the edge of 
encroachment by imports in the 1980s, but within two decades, China had started to export its 
own cars, albeit most are low-end products headed to developing markets. (See Table 1-2.)   
 
 
Figure 1-3. Motor vehicle production in China, 1993–2010. 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2011. 
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Figure 1-4. Annual car production in several key global markets, 1999–2009. 
Source: OICA Respondent Surveys (1999–2009). 
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Table 1-2. China’s Automobile Imports and Exports, 1991–2010 
Year Imports Exports 
 Number Amount 
(10,000 
USD) 
Number Amount 
(10,000 
USD) 
1991 98454 165992 - - 
1992 210087 353523 - - 
1993 310099 535143 - - 
1994 283060 471482 - - 
1995 158115 257549 - - 
1996 75863 250018 - - 
1997 49039 207821 14868 98784 
1998 40216 205789 13267 88343 
1999 35192 258018 10095 118727 
2000 42703 404750 27136 247854 
2001 71398 470326 26073 271227 
2002 127513 659985 21960 335890 
2003 171710 1483964 45777 802642 
2004 175480 1686001 75999 1241912 
2005 161324 1543392 164258 1677028 
2006 227773 2127410 343379 2890961 
2007 314130 2676775 614412 4126332 
2008 409769 3222993 681008 4762503 
2009 420696 3419834 370030 3835151 
2010 813345 5817052 566653 5413927 
2011 1038622 5598518 849808 7196508 
Source: History of China’s Automotive Industry 1991–2010 (2014, 401–402). 
 
1.3.2 Failed Policies 
Although the growth of China’s auto industry is impressive, it was realized completely outside of 
the government’s policy intentions. The Chinese government has implemented various policies 
designed to protect the industry since the 1980s with the goal of enabling the auto industry to 
establish itself as an important pillar industry (zhizhu canye) in the Chinese national economy. 
The SPC’s “1994 Auto Industrial Policy” (“Qiche gongye chanye zhengce”)6 was the first 
sector-specific industrial policy in statutory form. The NDRC’s “2004 Auto Industry 
                                                 
6 The full text in Chinese is available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/fbss/583597.htm  
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Development Policy” (“Qiche gongye fazhan zhengce”)7 was intended to help the industry 
accommodate the new policy environment that would accompany China’s entry into the WTO 
on 11 December 2001. While the details of the policy have changed, the ultimate goal of making 
the Chinese auto industry big and strong has remained consistent. Two specific characteristics 
commonly shared by advanced auto manufacturing countries have been the main objectives. The 
first was to set up the auto industry to realize economies of scale. According to the 1994 AIP, the 
Chinese auto industry had fallen ill with “scattered investment (san); disordered project approval 
(luan); overlapping imports of low-level products (di); and slow construction of designated 
plants and technology localization phase (man).” To remedy these problems, the auto industrial 
policy intended to strictly control market entry and foreign direct investment and to promote the 
designated auto manufacturers to form large business groups. The second goal was to participate 
in international competition through promoting independent development (zhizhu kaifa), 
production, and sales. The 1994 AIP anticipated that the designated auto manufacturers would 
build their capacity for independent innovation, which would lead to them exporting cars with 
their own intellectual property rights and brands.  
 After more than two decades, even though China has become the world’s largest 
automobile manufacturing country, the majority of Chinese auto firms are far from reaching even 
the minimum economy of scale (MES), which, in automobile manufacturing, is “around 250,000 
units at the plant level and for a single basic model type” (Huang 2002, 543). The AIP prioritized 
industrial consolidation, but as Figure 1-5 demonstrates, according to the data reported in the 
China Automotive Industry Yearbook, the total number of auto assemblers has stabilized at 
around 120. The internal data collected by the China Automotive Technology and Research 
Center (CATARC), however, revealed that the number of auto firms that assembled more than 
                                                 
7 Full Chinese text is available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/200506/t20050614_7501.html  
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one vehicle was much larger than the official number reported in the Yearbook (Marukawa 2013). 
As shown in Table 1-3, even in 2009, the year that China became the world’s largest 
manufacturer of autos, the average number of units produced was 98,016, still less than half 
needed for the MES. Only 25 firms out of the total 145 produced more than 200,000 vehicles.  
The number of loss-making firms has been continuously declined, but even in 2009, 39 firms out 
of the total 145 (about 37 per cent) are operating in deficit.  
 
 
Figure 1-5. Number of auto assemblers in China, 1980–2010. 
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Table 1-3. Number of Automobile Manufacturers in China Classified by Annual 
Production, 2001–2009 
Year 2001 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Annual 
production 
volume 
No. 
of 
firms 
No. of 
loss-
makers 
No. 
of 
firms 
No. of 
loss-
makers 
No. 
of 
firms 
No. of 
loss-
makers 
No. 
of 
firms 
No. of 
loss-
makers 
No. 
of 
firms 
No. of 
loss-
makers 
No. 
of 
firms  
No. of 
loss-
makers 
No. 
of 
firms  
No. of 
loss-
makers 
< 100  15 12 13 7 7 4 7 5 8 3 6 2 6 3 
101–1,000 38 22 34 14 32 17 28 17 22 10 19 11 14 7 
1,001–5,000 30 14 33 15 32 19 25 11 29 10 28 8 28 11 
5,001–     
10,000 
18 8 13 4 12 5 13 3 8 4 12 5 13 5 
10,001–  
50,000  
15 2 23 2 32 7 37 8 44 9 41 10 30 5 
50,001–  
100,000 
11 2 10 0 9 2 15 0 8 1 12 2 12 3 
100,001– 
200,000 
4 0 9 1 13 4 10 2 17 2 18 1 17 3 
> 200,000 4 0 7 0 10 1 18 0 19 0 18 0 25 2 
Average 
(units) 
20,095 37,471 51,634 69,159 70,107 80,684 98,016 
Total 135 60 142 43 147 59 153 46 155 39 154 39 145 39 
Source: The China Automotive Technology and Research Center (CATAR; cited in Marukawa 2013, 
175). 
Note: “Loss-makers” include firms with no profit. 
 
 In addition, Table 1-4 presents the concentration of auto firms. Previous studies have 
found that different concentration ratios in an industry are mainly caused by sectoral 
characteristics, such as production technology, scale economies, and the use of the product 
(Huang 2002, 544). Hence, same industrial sector tends to have similar concentration ratio, 
regardless of countries. In comparison to Brazil, Japan, and Korea during roughly comparable 
stages of automotive development, China is far behind, as the table shows. Furthermore, in the 
other countries, the trend was for the industry to become much more concentrated over time; 
however, in China, it became less concentrated after 1985 and only started to catch up at the end 
of the twentieth century.       
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Table 1-4. Automotive Industry Concentration Ratios: Four-Country Comparison (%) 
 One-firm ratio Two-firm ratio Three-firm ratio Market size 
(Unit: million) 
Brazil     
1959 24.8 42.7 60.6 0.42 
1970 56.1 74.3 91.2  
Japan     
1960 32.1 56.1 65.1 0.41 
1975 33.7 63.6 72.8 6.94 
Korea     
1975 54.6 77.7 96.4  
1986 71.3 88.6 97.9 0.97 (1987) 
China     
1985 19.2 38.0 43.0  
1992 13.1 26.0 32.1 1.07 
1994 13.5 26.6 35.7 1.16 
1996 13.9 27.5 37.8 1.41 
1998 14.7 25.4 34.4 1.60 
2001 17.9 30.3 41.5 2.36 
2003 19.3 37.3 47.9 4.39 
Source: Data on Japan, Korea, Brazil, and China between 1985 to 1998 are from Huang (2002, 
545). Data on China after 2001 are calculated from information available from the NDRC (2008, 
868), Chinese Auto Industry Association and Chinese Auto Industry Advisory Committee (2014, 
401).  
Note: The market size column provides production figures. 
 
 
 The policy also failed to meet the second goal of promoting independent development. 
The AIP primarily supported large SOEs, but these beneficiaries relied heavily on their foreign 
partners’ technology rather than becoming independent innovators. In 2004, FAW sold about a 
million cars including sedans and commercial vehicles. Only about half of these were sold with 
FAW brands. The other half carried foreign brands such as Volkswagen, Toyota, and Mazda. 
Passenger cars tend to be higher value-added products than commercial vehicles. Even in central 
SOEs, such as FAW, such high value-added products mostly relied on foreign technology. (See 
Table 1-5.) Among all new passenger car products in 2003, more than 70% employed imported 
foreign technology. The new cars that developed from independent technology are generally low 
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value-added vehicles (NDRC 2008, 701). Recently, the market shares of indigenous brand 
passenger cars have increased substantially, but the profit margins are meager compared to those 
of the foreign-brand cars.  
  
Table 1-5. Breakdown of the FAW Sales Portfolio, 2004  
Categories Sales Units 
(Unit: 10,000) 
medium and heavy truck 18.8 
light truck 7.6 
mini truck 9 
bus 1 
independent sedan 15 
Independent Total 51.3* 
FAW-VW 30 
FAW-Toyota 9.3 
FAW-Mazda 10.1 
Foreign Brands Total 49.4 
total 100.7 
Source: FAW Group, April 2005 (cited in NDRC 2008, 955). 
* This should be 51.4. Miscalculation is original. 
 
 During the late 1980s, a small number of SOEs were designated as passenger vehicle 
production plants: “three large” (sanda: First Auto, Dongfeng, and Shanghai Auto) and “three 
small” (sanxiao: Beijing Jeep, Tianjin Xiali, and Guangzhou Peugeot). These firms were the 
exclusive beneficiaries of preferential policies at both central and local levels of government. 
Section 3, Article 31 of the “1994 Auto Industrial Policy” stipulated that the joint ventures were 
to be established between the designated SOEs and foreign MNCs to export their automobile 
products and utilize export to solve the foreign exchange balance problem. Contrary to the AIP’s 
requirement, the designated firms have reaped the majority of their benefits from assembling 
foreign-brand cars. As shown in Table 1-6, the major automobile exporting firms are the recently 
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established indigenous companies that entered the industry in violation of the industrial policy. A 
Chinese analyst summarized two decades of failure of the auto industrial policy as follows: “The 
encouraged firms were wasted, the limited ones were animated, the specific policy goals were 
lost, and the policy overall was distorted” (Hu 2003, 34).  
 
Table 1-6. China’s Top 20 Auto Exporting Firms: Performance, and Ownership Type in 2012 
Firm Number of 
Exports 
(Unit: 1,000) 
Percentage Ownership Type 
Chery Auto 168 16.98 Municipal SOE 
Shanghai Geely Jiafeng 98 9.9 Private 
Changcheng 74 7.48 Private 
Anhui Jianghuai 51 5.15 Provincial SOE 
Chongqing Xiaokang 46 4.65 Private 
Lifan 46 4.65 Private 
Shanghai-GM-Dongyue* 38 3.84 JV 
Honda China 30 3.03 Foreign 
Beijing Foton 29 2.93 Subsidiary of BAIC 
BYD 23 2.32 Private 
Zhejiang Gonow 23 2.32 Domestic JV between GAIC 
and private  
Hafei 17 1.71 Private 
Jiangxi Jiangling 17 1.71 ? 
Shanghai-GM 14 1.41 JV 
Shanghai-GM-Wuling 14 1.41 JV 
FAW 12 1.21 Central SOE 
Chery Overseas Investment 11 1.11 Municipal SOE 
ZXAuto 10 1.01 ? 
Nanjing Nanqi 9 0.91 Subsidiary of SAIC 
King Long 8 0.80 ? 
 Export Total: 
989,000 
Total: 
74.62% 
 
Source: Export numbers and percentages are calculated from information available from the 
Statistics Division of General Administration of Customs (2013, 24–25). Company ownership 
types are according to each company’s official website.  
Note: SOEs and their subsidiary JVs that are the primary beneficiaries of the AIP are in bold.  
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1.4 Introducing Market Mechanisms into Transitional China  
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expanded and deepened the 
designated role of the market in resource allocation from a “basic function” in 1993 to a 
“decisive function” in 2013.8 While market mechanisms have become increasingly important 
during the last 20 years of economic reform, the state has maintained and sometimes 
strengthened its control over SOEs. The 1993 CCP Central Committee decision regarding the 
socialist market economy emphasized building large enterprise groups equipped with 
international competency. In 1997, a report to the 15th CCP Congress also called for forming 
large enterprise groups with international competitiveness through market mechanisms. 
Furthermore, in 2001, the state council issued a document entitled “Guiding Advice for 
Developing Large Enterprise Groups with International Competitiveness.” In other words, 
expanding reliance on market mechanisms for resource allocation and strengthening the party-
state’s power over large SOEs go side by side in contemporary China.  
Previous studies have usually framed the relationship between the state and the market as 
oppositional; on this view, the economic transition is a linear transformation from state-directed 
planning to a market-driven economy. This “transition orthodoxy” (Nolan and Wang 1998) or 
“plan to market narrative” (Heilmann and Shih 2013, 21), which is strongly advocated by the 
World Bank (1996a, 1996b; Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort 2002; Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 
2006), has led frequently to inaccurate diagnoses of the market transition. It has also obscured 
the real changes of political economy in transitional China. For instance, after witnessing the 
privatization or ownership transformation of small and feeble SOEs that took place under 
Premier Zhu Rongji (1998–2003), some scholars depicted China as on “the race to market” 
                                                 
8 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Problems Concerning the Socialist 
Market Economy System,” November 14, 1993; “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” November 12, 2013. 
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(Story 2003). But in the following period of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao (2003–
2013), “the state advance[d], the private sector retreat[ed]” (guojin mintui; Eaton 2015) and a 
description of China’s system as “state capitalism” gained popularity (Bremmer 2008; The 
Economist 2012). But as the saying from the Boston Globe goes, “In rejecting Lenin it is not 
necessary to embrace Milton Friedman” (cited in Nove 1992). The transition orthodoxy and plan 
to market narrative construct political economy too simply, as if the only two choices really are 
Lenin or Milton Friedman. 
Discussions of the market transition usually assume that the planning and market systems 
are mutually exclusive. The widely-held conclusion, drawn from a simplistic view of the 
transitions in the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union, is that only 
privatization can solve the industrial problem in communist countries. The World Bank has 
generally espoused the transition orthodoxy (Nolan and Wang 1999) or “plan to market” 
narrative (Heilman and Shih 2013), and their logic and prescriptions were quickly expanded to 
China (Tenev, Zhang, and Brefort 2002; Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2006). As shown in 
Table 1-7, however, the Chinese economic transition, especially after the state endorsed the SME, 
has not adhered to the transition orthodoxy. First, from the perspective of transition orthodoxy, 
reform must start with an anticommunist revolution, because a “reform reduces the power of the 
bureaucracy by definition, and most of the administration will inevitably oppose reform” 
(Aslund 1989, 14, cited in Nolan and Wang 1999, 171). Yet the political power of the Chinese 
Communist Party remains undiminished. Second, privatization is viewed as an “indispensable 
process” that will ensure a complete break with the old planning economy. The reality in China 
proves this assumption to be false. While selective privatization did occur, state asset 
management, especially for the large SOEs, grew stronger at the same time. The total number of 
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SOEs decreased, but SOEs’ overall share in strategically important sectors increased. Third, 
contrary to the orthodox prescription that small enterprises must be promoted, China did the 
opposite, especially after 1992. Initially, small TVEs (Township and Village Enterprises) were 
the leading forces of economic reform; however, after the endorsement of the SME, “grasp the 
large, let go of the small” became the principal direction of the reforms. Finally, rather than 
“close” integration with the global economic system, China employed “strategic” integration. In 
short, the Chinese party-state has strategically mediated the rhythms and modes of the 
globalization of China’s economy.         
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Table 1-7. Comparing “Transition Orthodoxy” and China’s Political Economy  
 Prescriptions of “Transition 
Orthodoxy” 
Chinese Political Economy 
during the SME 
Antibureaucratic revolution “The collapse of communist 
one-party rule was the sine 
qua non for an effective 
transition to a market 
economy.” (Lipton and Sachs 
1993, 34) 
Continuing one-party rule 
Privatization Enterprise reform must be 
equated with privatization. 
Private property is the only 
means for owners and 
managers to “take 
responsibility for the full 
range of business decisions 
and for the financial benefits 
and costs of those decisions.” 
(IMF et al. 1990, 16–17)  
Selective privatization and the 
strengthening of the state asset 
management system through 
establishing personified 
shareholders for state-owned 
assets 
“Close the large, support the 
smll.” 
“For the most part, Eastern 
Europe’s production sector is 
composed of large, inefficient 
firms. Many, if not most, of 
them will have to close, and 
others will need to shed labour 
on a large scale.” (Blanchard 
et al. 1991, 64–65) 
“Grasp the large, let go of the 
small.” 
Globalization “Close” integration into the 
international economic system 
accelerates growth in the 
reforming economies. 
Strategic integration  
Source: Compiled by author from Nolan and Wang (1999).  
 
1.5 State Capitalism and the Chinese Economic Miracle 
About three decades ago, strong government coordination headed by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) was regarded as the primary factor behind the Japanese 
economic miracle, as described in Johnson’s (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle. More 
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recently, Kellee Tsai and Barry Naughton (2015) recognized state capitalism as the major force 
of the Chinese economic miracle, as reflected in the title of their edited book’s introduction: 
“State Capitalism and the Chinese Economic Miracle.” Chinese state capitalism, however, has 
just started to take its own shape. Furthermore, as Tsai and Naughton put it, “China’s state 
capitalist system was not in place at the beginning of China’s growth miracle, it developed in 
tandem with the acceleration of growth, and it was shaped by the desire of China’s leaders to 
facilitate rapid growth” (20).  
 Johnson’s (1982) summary of the Japanese developmental state (DS) might provide a 
useful benchmark for understanding how the Chinese situation is different: “One clear lesson 
from the Japanese case is that the state needs the market and private enterprise needs the state; 
once both sides recognized this, cooperation was possible and high-speed growth occurred” 
(318). The initial condition for Japanese-style rapid growth was premised on the existence of a 
separate market and state. The DS model relies on a competent bureaucracy that can persuade 
independent private enterprises that they need help from the state, and eventually induce 
cooperation between them. But in command economies, firms are not separate entities, but parts 
of the state. In Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union, enterprise reform was 
equated with privatization. Hence, the states swiftly retreated from the economy and 
discontinued their role as an economic control tower. In China, however, enterprise reform was 
never associated with privatization, so the reform process has been much slower (Nolan and 
Wang 1999). Moreover, the state has not thoroughly retreated from the economy, and therefore 
enterprise reform has required complex complementary adjustments in the state bureaucracy, 
state-business relations, and central-local state relations.  
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The massive changes in these realms could not possibly have been initiated from the 
beginning of the Chinese economic reform in 1978. During the early period, the state allowed 
“creative destruction” to disrupt protected bureaucratic relationships and downsize the bulky 
state sector (Naughton 2015). Naughton (2008) divided the Chinese economic reform into two 
distinct periods. In the first (1978–1993), the reform was somewhat passive, because power at 
the top was fragmented and many players, such as revolutionary elders, made reform difficult. 
Thus, it was impossible to follow a clear blueprint to restructure previous institutional templates. 
Enterprise reform in this period did not touch the fundamental ownership structure, but 
decentralized or transferred management rights to lower authorities. In this way, the first-period 
reform was “reform without losers” (Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000) and “growing out of plan” 
(Naughton 1995). At the start of the second period (from 1993 onwards), which was signaled by 
the state’s promulgation of the socialist market economy, a full range of comprehensive reforms 
was initiated. Many of the revolutionary elders who had impeded comprehensive economic 
reform had passed away by this time. The success of the early period of economic reform also 
enabled the reformist leadership to consolidate its power. The comprehensive reforms inevitably 
resulted in losers, so market-driven reform was pursed in tandem with centralization reforms. 
Industrial policy was actively promoted in this context as an important means of macroeconomic 
policy.  
As mentioned earlier, sectoral industrial policy was first introduced to the automotive 
industry in 1994. In predicaments common to most late-developing countries, the Chinese auto 
industry faced a chronic shortage of capital investment and a trade deficit caused by the low 
quality of domestic cars. The Chinese government attempted to restructure the automotive 
industry through an industrial policy closely modeled on that of neighboring Japan and South 
 29 
Korea. The AIP distorted market prices and artificially raised profit rates in order to draw higher 
investment. The profit rate for the auto assembly industry at international levels was about 10% 
on average, but it was raised to 30–60% in China (Yu 2006). At the same time, a strict entry 
barrier was built to enhance the economy of scale of a targeted group of firms. In the 1994 and 
2004 AIPs, addressing the problem of too many assembly plants and dispersed investment (san) 
was regarded as the most important policy goal. While the Chinese central government attempted 
to apply DS-style industrial policy, China’s unique characteristics as a continent-sized 
authoritarian transitional economy severely hampered government coordination. In a DS, the 
central government’s firm grip over the financial sector allows the government to both guide 
capital investment and exercise political control over private enterprises (Woo 1991). Even 
though high physical capital investment (more than 40% of the GDP in recent years) has been a 
crucial factor behind China’s economic miracle (Knight 2014), conditions in China have made 
government coordination much more difficult. The central government purview of capital 
investment in the auto industry had been continuously decreased. Contrary to the persistent 
decline of the capital investment by central jurisdiction and state-holding firms, investments by 
local jurisdiction and private has been increasing. The patronage of local governments enabled 
the expansion of investments by private firms. This unintended capital investment structure has 
implications for our understanding of the relationship between the state and private firms in the 
Chinese State capitalism. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 2 positions the puzzle of Chinese auto 
industry’s rapid growth amid failed policies in the context of Chinese transitional economy. In 
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order to identify the position of industrial policy in transitional China, the chapter first looks at 
the temporal structure of policy change in the transition China. Then, I identify the expected role 
of industrial policy for building the Socialist Market Economy (SME). In addition, I present what 
doing fieldwork in a highly competitive industry looks like.  
Chapter 3 analyze how the recurrent central government reshufflings impact on the auto 
industrial policy implementation with analysis on the historical evolution of industrial 
governance in the Chinese auto industry. The frequent government organizational reforms 
seriously reduced government autonomy and dismantled institutional continuity, which are the 
minimum necessary conditions for effective industrial policy implementations. 
Chapter 4 examines how the efforts to reshape state-business relations led to the 
emergence of a dual structure in the auto industry. The Chinese central state’s dualistic approach 
to SOE reform not only affected the overall rebalancing of the industrial distribution of SOEs, 
but also shaped the unique corporate governance structure.   
Chapter 5 investigates the relationships between central-local fiscal restructuring and the 
rise of new local states’ development model. The subprovincial governments’ changes in 
development incentives subsequently influence on the formation of the competing coalition in 
the auto industry.  
Chapter 6 attempts to uncover an understudied industrial governance mechanism of 
Chinese state capitalism by comparing the automobile, machinery, and petroleum industries to 
answer two questions: Why was industrial policy not promulgated in the other pillar industries 
when the automobile industry policy was introduced? Why do the market competition structures 
of the automobile industry and the other industries differ?  
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Chapter 7 concludes with the clarification on this study’s theoretical and methodological 
implications. Then, I will illustrate some features of China’s state capitalism.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Framework 
 
2.1 The Temporality of Policy Change in Transitional China 
The main rhythm of policy changes in democratic states is determined by regularly held elections 
that change political leaders and policy priorities. In addition to regular elections, political parties 
and interest groups also transmit popular demands through legislative procedures. In autocratic 
China, however, administration, legislation, judicature, and the political party are de jure 
independent, but de facto interconnected. Thus, the personnel and power among them are 
undifferentiated. As the term “governing the state through the party” (yidang zhiguo) indicates, 
the Communist Party and state were not designed to check and balance each other; the former is 
the tool to govern by the latter. Despite the Communist Party’s huge emphasis on the masses 
(qunzhong), which facilitates input from society to state, the underdevelopment of institutions 
such as party systems or interest groups requires a much larger role of the state than in 
democratic societies. Policy makers in China must diagnose problems by themselves without 
knowing much about the problems. The heavy burden on the state induces two chronic and 
interrelated governance problems: a lack of policy continuity and a low level of 
institutionalization. As vividly illustrated in David Lampton’s (2014) recent book, Chinese 
government officers are confronted by too many agendas to coordinate (xietiao) them.9  
The Chinese party-state has devised unique methods to remedy the policy discontinuity 
problem. According to Cheng Siwei (2004, 6), who is a famous economist and also a former vice 
                                                 
9 It may also be plausible to argue that the lack of policy continuity is caused by rapidly changing situations induced 
by China’s reform since 1978. But if we look into China’s government institutional reforms after the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China, it is obvious that frequent government reshufflings are not a new problem rooted 
in the 1978 reform. For the early period of government organization, see Fang and Huan 1987.  
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president of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the five-year 
state development plan system is inherited from a mid- and long-term planning tradition and has 
been designed to maintain policy continuity between leadership changes. Following the five-year 
plan system, the terms of (1) the members of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, 
(2) the members of the National People’s Congress, and (3) the State Council leaders are all set 
at five years. New tenures of the leaderships in the NPC and the State Council start in the third 
year of the five-year plan that was created by the former government. For example, the 10th Five-
Year Plan (10-5 plan) ran from 2001 until 2005. The 10th NPC president, Wu Bangguo, began 
his five-year tenure in 2003. The new heads of the State Council, President Hu Jintao and 
Premier Wen Jiaobao, also began their first tenure in 2003 after getting the approval of the newly 
organized NPC. During the first two years of their first term (2003–2005), President Hu and 
Premier Wen would draft their policies along the direction of the 10th Five-Year Plan, which was 
outlined by the former leadership. Furthermore, to enhance the continuity between five-year 
plans, new methods have been devised recently, from the 11th Five-Year Program (11-5 
program), such as interim evaluation of the previous program’s implementation. More methods 
to induce input from academic circles and the public on policy-making processes were also 
introduced in the 11-5 program. The National People’s Congress reviewed the outline of the 11-5 
program and put forth the opinion to revise it. Such active participation by the NPC in five-year 
plan making is also a new development (Ma 2006). 
Notwithstanding its expected role and alleged descent from a tradition of mid- and long-
term plans, the plan itself did not have overall effects on Chinese policy change. Ironically, the 
importance of the five-year plan was being emphasized when China changed its direction 
towards a market economy (Heilamann 2011; Heilmann and Melton 2013). Although Cheng 
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Siwei (2004) stressed the tradition of long-term planning, the tradition was imagined after 
China’s reform rather than actually having existed during Mao’s period. Before the Chinese 
reform, the Chinese central state had not been able to draft and implement a long-term plan. 
During the planning period in China, only the first five-year plan (1953–1957), which was 
drafted with the support of Soviet experts, was publicly released. The second five-year plan 
(1958–1962) was passed in the Eighth Congress of the CCP in 1956, but the official document 
failed to be promulgated due to changes of a guiding principle. In 1966, drafting work on the 
third five-year plan (1966–1970) started, but the sudden uprising of the Cultural Revolution 
prevented the formation of the plan. The fourth five-year plan (1971–1975) was never fully 
developed into a final draft; only the “first draft” was issued. Drafting work on the fifth five-year 
plan (1976–1980) began in 1974, but was included in the “1976–1985 National Economic 
Development Decade Plan,” rather than being a separate text. A decade plan, however, was 
released in 1977, so this five-year plan shrunk to cover the remaining three years. In the end, the 
sixth five-year plan (1981–1985) was the first that could be called a plan 
(http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/151935/204121/).     
The grand designs of reforms are set forth and released through results, decisions, or 
resolutions of the CCP National Congress or the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee. Once 
party decisions require changes in government responsibilities, the following government 
organizational reforms coincide with leadership changes in the State Council. Temporally, the 
five-year plan seems to guide the rhythms of the CCP Central Committee and State Council, but 
it has not functioned as a powerful driving force. Table 2-3 shows the temporal sequence of the 
five-year plans, Central Committees of the CCP, State Councils, and the Chinese National 
People’s Congress leadership.    
 35 
 
Table 2-1. Five-Year Plans, Central Committees of the CCP, and State Council/National 
People’s Congress (CNPC) Leadership, 1981–2010 
 Five-Year Plan Central Committee of 
CCP 
State Council / NPC 
1981 6-5 Plan   
1982 (1981–1985) 12th CCP  
1983  Sep. 1982–Oct. 1987 Zhao Ziyang (6th NPC) 
1984   Jun. 1983–Apr. 1988 
1985    
1986 7-5 Plan   
1987 (1986–1990) 13th CCP Zhao Ziyang to Li Peng* 
1988  Oct. 1987–Oct. 1992 Li Peng (7th NPC) 
1989   (Apr. 1988–Mar. 1993) 
1990    
1991 8-5 Plan   
1992 (1991–1995) 14th CCP  
1993  Oct. 1992–Sep. 1997 Li Peng (8th NPC) 
1994   (Mar. 1993–Mar. 1998) 
1995    
1996 9-5 Plan   
1997 (1996–2000) 15th CCP  
1998  Sep. 1997–Nov. 2002 Zhu Rongji (9th NPC) 
1999   (Mar. 1998–Mar. 2003) 
2000    
2001 10-5 Plan   
2002 (2001–2005) 16th CCP  
2003  Nov. 2002–Oct. 2007 Wen Jiaobao (10th NPC) 
2004   (Mar. 2003–Mar. 2008) 
2005    
2006 11-5 Plan   
2007 (2006–2010) 17th CCP  
2008  Oct. 2007–Nov. 2012 Wen Jiaobao (11th NPC) 
2009   (Mar. 2008–Mar. 2013) 
2010    
* The 23rd plenary session of the Sixth National People’s Congress, November 23–30, 1987, 
decided that Li Peng replace Zhao Ziyang as premier of the State Council.  
Note. Highlighted years in the first column indicate the year that central government 
organizational reform occurred. 
 
 In addition to the weakness of the tradition, the feeble institutional basis of the five-year 
plan made the problem worse. As highlighted in Table 2-1, in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 
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2008, and 2013, there were large-scale government organizational reforms.10 In sharp contrast to 
the continuity of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Japan’s 
economic pilot agency, in China the “historical, organizational, and also biographical 
continuities” of the government agencies in charge of the five-year plans are shaken by these 
numerous government organization reshufflings (Johnson 1982, 309). Despite the continuous 
evolution of the five-year plan and its increasing importance, the weakness of the tradition and 
the various government organizational changes have limited the five-year plans’ ability to affect 
policy continuity.  
Instead of being determined by the five-year plan, the overall rhythm of reform is 
orchestrated by CCP decisions. The 1993 proposal for the government organizational reform also 
institutionalized the procedure of reform work. First of all, the National Congress of the CCP, 
which is held every five years, proposes missions of reform. Then the CCP Central Committee 
reviews and discusses the proposal. Finally, the first meeting of the NPC examines and ratifies 
the proposal for State Council organizational reform (Wang 2008, 85). Policy changes usually 
occur when new government leadership is established with new government agencies. The 
government organizational reforms and leadership changes coincide, because the year of 
leadership change is the beginning stage and at the same time often marks the retirement of some 
officials who have resisted reform. In his recently published memoirs, former premier Zhu 
Rongji described the stubborn resistance he faced, recollecting that when he talked with dozens 
of ministers about organizational reforms, not a single minister expressed the need for their own 
ministry’s abolition (Wang 2013).  
                                                 
10 Except in 1982, government organizational reforms have coincided with leadership changes in the State Council. 
The 1982 government restructuring took place a year earlier than the State Council leadership change. 
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Central government organizational reforms affect not only the central government, but 
also the lower-level local governments. One of the salient features of the Chinese government is 
the “isomorphic responsibility” system. This means that, vertically, different levels of 
government are responsible for the same functions and have equivalent bureaus (duikou) at each 
level. For example, if a National Development and Reform Commission is set up at the central 
level, provincial and municipal governments also need to set up their own Development and 
Reform Commissions to harmonize their structure with the central government’s (Zhu and Zhang 
2005). Facing the 1998 government reform, then-Premier Zhu Rongji made a speech to local 
cadres about the magnitude of government organizational reforms:  
 
The State Council system only has 30,000 people, so the difficulty of 
organizational reform is relatively small. But local government organizational 
reforms are not that easy. The number of cadres in the party and government is 
about 8 million, or 5.3 million if we calculate government officials only. 
Reducing by half means 2.6 million, so the difficulty of personnel layoff is very 
high. (Zhu 2011, 34; my translation) 
 
 If central government organizational reforms cause changes at the very lowest level of 
government agencies, such changes also hold for every realm of state policy. The lead 
government agencies in charge of industrial policy also have been reorganized according to 
recurring government organizational reforms. (See chapter 3 for more detail.) The reforms of the 
lead agencies for the automobile industry therefore have been affected by the government 
organizational reforms across the years of leadership changes. The five-year rhythm of policy 
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and organizational changes is frequent enough to disrupt historical, organizational, and 
biographical continuity in industrial policy, even though it has been becoming more 
institutionalized than the previous sporadic changes. If we focus on the institutional changes 
governing the auto industry, reforms before 2003 seem to have occurred more sporadically and 
without concurrent leadership change.  
Table 2-2 presents a list of central state agencies’ publications regarding industrial 
policies from 1987. Before industrial policy was officially adopted as a pillar of macroeconomic 
control, research institutes such as the Developmental Research Center of the State Council and 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published internal documents to promote industrial policy. 
While not yet adopted as the primary macroeconomic control tool, the first industrial policy in 
China, “State Council’s Decision on the Main Points of Current Industrial Policy,” was issued in 
March 1989. The SPC was assigned to be the primary industrial policy organization, and it also 
internally published a book as a manual and teaching material for officials. In the 1998 
government organizational reforms, the SETC was officially assigned to be the main 
organization for industrial policy, but the SDPC, the successor of the SPC, still published a book 
on industrial technological policy.  
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Table 2-2. Publications on Industrial Policies by Central State Organizations 
Year Central 
Organization 
Publication Title 
1989 DRC Studies on Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy [Zhongguo bumen chanye 
zhengce yanjiu] 
1989 SPC Industrial Policy Handbook [Chanye zhengce shouce] 
1990 CASS Studies on Chinese Industrial Policy [Zhongguo canye zhengce yanjiu] 
 SPC Our State’s Current Industrial Policy Problem [Woguo dangqiande chanye 
zhengce wenti] 
1999 SDPC Comparative Research on Foreign Countries’ Industrial Technology Policy 
[Guowai chanye jishu zhengce bijiao yanjiu] 
 SETC China’s Industry Association: Reform and Exploration [Zhongguo hangye 
xiehui: Gaige yu tansuo] 
2000 SETC Studies on China’s Current Industrial Structure and Industrial Policy 
Options [Zhongguo gongye jiegou xianzhuang fenxi yu duice yanjiu] 
 SETC Industrial Policy Working Handbook, Vol. I [Chanye zhengce gongzuo 
shouce diyiji] 
2001 SETC Industrial Policy Working Handbook, Vol. II [Chanye zhengce gongzuo 
shouce dierji] 
 SETC “10-5” Industrial Plan and Development Strategy [“Shiwu”gongye guihua 
yu fazhan zhanlue] 
2004 NDRC Research on Integrated Policies for China’s Sustainable Industrial 
Development Vol. I, II, and III [Zhongguo kechixu fazhande chanye 
zhengce yanjiu Shang, Zhong, Xia] 
2006 NDRC China’s Industry Development and Industrial Policy [Zhongguo chanye 
fazhan yu chanye zhengce] 
2011 MIIT Report on China’s Industrial Development and Policy (2011): Adjustment 
and Upgrade (with CASS Institute of Industrial Economy) [Zhongguo 
chanye fazhan he chanye zhengce baogao 2011: Tiaozheng yu shengji] 
2012 MIIT Report on China’s Industrial Development and Policy (2012): Industrial 
Transfer (with CASS Institute of Industrial Economy) [Zhongguo chanye 
fazhan he chanye zhengce baogao 2012: Chanye Zhuanyi] 
 
 
2.2 Industrial Policy and the Building of the Socialist Market Economy 
The meaning of industrial policy in a transitional economy is entirely different than it is in a 
market economy. Even the term for “industry”—a collective noun referring to businesses that 
provide the same products and services—is a neologism in reformed China, because a minimally 
functioning market exchange system is a necessary condition for industries in this sense. In the 
Soviet-style planned economy, the state was the sole owner of the means of production, and all 
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production units were disaggregated to different administrative ministries or bureaus. Production 
units were subordinated to the respective administrative units, and all production and exchange 
were circulated according to administrative chains. The following anecdote, from the 
recollection of the senior official who had participated in the drafting work for economic reforms, 
shows why the same type of product, when it is consumed and produced at factories with 
different affiliations, cannot be grouped in a single industry in such a system:    
 
In the northeastern city of Shenyang, two factories adjoined each other. One was 
an electronic transformer plant affiliated with the Ministry of Machine Industry; 
the other was a copper metallurgy factory affiliated with the Ministry of 
Metallurgy. The copper required in the transformer factory was procured in 
quantity from far-away Yunnan through the channel of the Ministry of Machine 
Industry; by contrast, the copper produced in the neighboring metallurgy factory 
was distributed to the whole country through the channel of the Ministry of 
Metallurgy. Although the two plants were located next door to each other, the 
factories’ different affiliations, which decided where they procured raw materials 
and distributed finished goods, made transactions between them impossible. (Gao 
2008, 51–52; my translation)  
 
The SETC document called the situation described in the anecdote “management by units” 
(bumen), and the goal of reform “management by industry” (chanye).11 Transitioning from the 
former to the latter would clearly entail multiple interconnected changes. First of all, business 
enterprises that were part of the government during the planning period would have to be 
                                                 
11 About book-length description of the same mechanism, see Naughton 1995.   
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released from direct government supervision to become principal agents of market competition; 
as a corollary, the government would need to change its mode of management from direct to 
indirect. Second, once businesses were separated from government, the government would have 
to take on previously nonexistent roles as market regulator and owner of state-owned assets. 
Finally, the Chinese state would need to develop new tools for macroeconomic control (Bureau 
of Economic Operations, SETC 2003, 174). 
 The first period of reform (1978–1993) was a period of “Hayekian experimentalism” 
carried out in an ad hoc manner under the nonstrategy of “groping for stones to cross the river” 
(Yang 2004). The ad hoc reform, however, reached an impasse and culminated in a confrontation 
between state and society in the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. This bloody confrontation highlighted 
the urgent need for a new direction of reform. After a few years of exploration and adjustment, 
the official endorsement of the socialist market economy (SME) in 1992–1993 put an end to the 
argument over the market ignited by the Tiananmen Incident. China finally embraced market 
mechanisms as the primary means of resource allocation for the first time in the history of the 
People’s Republic of China.12  
The official endorsement of the SME opened the second phase of Chinese reform, which 
required “Polanyian programmatic reform,” departing from “Hayekian experimentalism” (Yang 
2004). As Polanyi (2001 [1944], 145) put it, “free markets could never come into being merely 
by allowing things to take their course … laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state.” Active 
state involvement is necessary to develop a governance structure, rules of exchange, and 
conceptions of control (Fligstein 2001). Because the controversy over markets had just ended, 
                                                 
12 Jiang Zemin first introduced the concept of the socialist market economy in his speech at the Party School of the 
Central Committee in June 1992. The term was officially endorsed at the 14th CCP Congress in October 1992. The 
content of the SME was shaped by a decision ratified at the third plenary session of the 14th CCP Central Committee 
in November 1993.  
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however, active state involvement in the accompanying reforms had to reflect concerns raised by 
anti-market groups. Having witnessed the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European 
Communist countries in the 1990s, many intellectuals, especially from the “New Left” group, 
were worried about weakening the central’s state capability (China Youth Daily 1991; Wang and 
Hu 1993). Hence, building a socialist market economy needed to accomplish seemingly 
contradictory goals: while businesses became the principal agents of market competition, the 
central government wanted to strengthen its fiscal capacity and control over strategically 
important enterprises and industries.  
Transitioning from “management by units” to “management by industry” did not mean 
the market completely replaced the planning system. Chinese policy makers did not see market 
reform as a linear transition from a planned to a market economy (Heilmann and Shih 2013; 
Nolan and Wang 1999). In the process of China’s transition, the market was never allowed to 
replace the old system, but only gradually allowed more room to work as long as it remained 
under the control of the Chinese Communist Party and increased the country’s productive force. 
According to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, the goal of China’s basic 
economic system is to keep “public ownership playing a dominant role and allow different forms 
of ownership to develop side by side” (my emphasis).13 The SME is a dual-track system of a 
dominant public economy in strategically important industries and a market economy in other 
areas. In 2000, then-President Jiang Zemin elaborated the basis of the Chinese socialist market 
economy: 
 
                                                 
13 For the full text of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party in Chinese and English, see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2012-11/18/c_131982634.htm.  
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In our country, the CCP is the governing party, guiding the people and exercising 
the power of the state. Our socialist state regime needs efficient operation and 
should control a certain amount of economic and material capacities. … Without 
a public economy that consists of the state-owned economy as the core, there will 
be no socialist economic basis; neither the reign of the CCP nor an overall 
socialist superstructure’s economic base and strong material means. Leading 
cadres at various levels, especially high-ranking cadres, must be clearly and 
soberly aware of this point. (quoted in Li 2013, 3; my translation)    
 
To uphold the CCP’s political monopoly, there needed to be enough material support from the 
public economy. On the other hand, a “nonpublic ownership economy,” which is equivalent to a 
market economy and mainly driven by private actors, was also indispensable. With a firm base 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in strategically important sectors, the private economy was to 
be encouraged to prosper in other sectors because it is more conducive to market competition, 
industrial structural innovation and upgrading, fast development of the national economy, the 
introduction of advanced technology and management skills, and cooperation with global 
markets (Li 2013, 3–4).  
After the CCP endorsed the SME, it began macro institutional reforms across government 
organizations, the tax system, and SOEs. In addition, the government began to introduce 
industrial policy as a new pillar of macroeconomic control to pursue control and efficiency 
simultaneously. A 1987 internal research article that circulated widely among top leaders 
suggested that industrial policy would be a useful tool for the Chinese-style economic system, 
which combined “competition” and “intervention” (Li, Zhou, Liu, and Lin 1999 [1987]). While 
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in market economies, industrial policy is pursued to remedy market failures and address 
externalities problems, in China’s SME, industrial policy was primarily intended to maintain the 
public economy’s dominant role. Thus, promulgating sector-specific industrial policies conveyed 
the central state’s recognition of certain sectors’ strategic importance and the state’s will to 
develop the designated industries. The government’s policy actions at this time substantially 
relieved worries about the central state’s predatory behavior and incentivized multiple actors, 
including multinational corporations (MNCs), local governments, and even initially excluded 
private actors, to invest in the designated industries. In this way, industrial policy in authoritarian 
China functions as a “commitment technology” in the absence of stable legal property rights 
institutions (Haggard 2004).  
 
2.3 Configurational Causal Chain of the Argument 
This dissertation’s analysis starts with an intensive case study, which demonstrates how 
industrial policy and macro institutional reforms to build the SME work together and how their 
combination can explain the rapid growth of the Chinese auto industry. As the case study of the 
auto industry in Chapters 3 to 5 demonstrates, government intervention through industrial policy 
has been fraught with huge policy failures.14 The auto industrial policy has been devised and 
implemented in the context of building the SME, and the complex interactions between industrial 
policy and macro institutional reforms have led to varying coalition structures in all of the 
industries to which government industrial policy has been attempted to be applied. Because these 
coalition structures directly shape the modes of competition in the given industries, Chapters 3 to 
5 will explicate the configurational mechanisms of the auto industry in detail. Chapter 6 then 
                                                 
14 The major criterion of policy evaluation here is whether the original policy intentions have been realized or not. In 
some cases, the policy goals were achieved, but had no positive impact on industrial development. In these cases, for 
the purposes of this study, the policy is considered to have succeeded.  
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presents a comparative study across three “pillar” industries, i.e., machinery, petroleum and 
automobile, to explain varying level of industrial policy enactments and structures of market 
competition. All of the pillar industries were supposed to have an equal level of strategic value 
and be regulated by the same growth-promoting industrial policies, but the actual levels of policy 
implementation and resulting outcomes vary significantly across industries. Chapter 6’s 
comparative study uncovers understudied industrial governance mechanisms of Chinese state 
capitalism. 
No single actor decisively influences the policy process in the modern political system, 
owing to the increasing complexity of problems and the growing need for organizational 
resources. Hence, scholars studying policy process, especially in Western democratic countries, 
have developed theories focusing on coalitions such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF), involving political parties, interest groups, administrative agencies, or subnational actors 
(Sabatier 1987). Interest in the role of coalitions in policy processes has been aroused by the 
premise that “coalition structure has consequences on the outcome of a policy process” (Fischer 
2015, 245–246). While such theoretical frameworks developed in the setting of democratic 
countries, the same premise is applicable to Chinese institutional contexts. In China, where 
decision making and implementation are separate, policy outcomes tend to be more contingent 
on the coalition structure in policy subsystems. By taking account of all the main actors in the 
policy process, coalitional politics is better suited to explaining the linkage between industrial 
policy and economic performance.   
Industrial policies define who can legitimately participate in the given industry by issuing 
licenses and screening investments. By thus drawing the boundaries of public ownership, 
industrial policies are intended to exclude all but a few actors in any given industry. In addition, 
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industrial policies target a few important industries, thus also excluding all other industries. 
Official industrial policies involve a great deal of policy support, so the majority of industrial 
actors aspire to having industrial policies in their domains.  
On the other hand, macro institutional reforms to build the SME have readjusted the 
consolidated relations between policy actors. First, the government organizational reforms at 
short intervals aimed at breaking the close ties between central economic policy-making agencies 
and central state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but it ended up dismantling historical, organizational, 
and biological continuities of industrial policy agencies. Second, massive SOE reform, called 
“grasp the large, let go of the small,” provoked the formation of new coalition structures in the 
auto industry. The large SOEs were part of the state and resisted being left alone, and the central 
party-state also did not want to lose control over important industries. Their shared desire drove a 
reorganization of the large SOEs into pyramidal business groups under the hierarchy of the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The decrease in the 
central government’s supervision capability caused by the government organizational reforms 
and the small and medium-sized companies that spun off from former SOEs opened the door for 
new actors to enter into the passage car assembly industry. Finally, the 1994 tax-sharing reform 
enhanced the central government’s fiscal capacity, but it also changed local government tax 
incentives. The revised fiscal incentives consequently transformed the local development model, 
and local governments became eager to act as the patrons of these new actors. After the myriad 
reforms, two competing alliances in the auto industry, centered on the traditional SOEs and the 
new indigenous brands, have been created and finally hampered fulfilling the policy intentions. 
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2.4 Methods and Data 
This study utilizes comparative-historical analysis (CHA) as the primary research method. Three 
core defining features of CHA are macroconfigurational research, case-based research, and 
temporally oriented research (Mahoney and Thelen 2015). First, the macro component entails 
“concern with large-scale outcomes” (5), as in this study’s discussion of the macro industrial 
changes in contemporary China. The configurational component refers to the specific mode of 
explanation of the macro outcomes. Instead of specifying the effect of X on Y, it examines “how 
variables work together in combinations or ‘causal package” (Ragin 1987)” (7). I analyze the 
effect of auto industrial policy (AIP) by taking into account the institutional context in which the 
policies were adopted as a means of macroeconomic control. This study specifies three main 
institutional factors that have interacted with the AIP in the context of the building of the 
socialist market economy and the nature of its effects on auto industrialization. Second, case-
based research “focus[es] on real-world puzzles” and the “use of mechanisms-based explanation” 
(12). Such problem-driven research seeks a deep understanding of actual, not stylized, cases. 
Furthermore, it takes a dynamic process-oriented approach to specifying the mechanisms at work, 
rather than a static institutional approach. Third, temporally oriented research is sensitive to 
temporal location and temporal structure. Instead of seeking a universal theory independent from 
temporality, I investigate the sequences of unfolding events and gradual changes of institutions 
over time.    
Previous research on Chinese economic governance has studied single government 
bureaucratic agencies, such as what was once called the “little State Council,” the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC, 1993–2003) and the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC, 2003 onwards), as a primary level of analysis (Gore 2012; Jung 
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2008). Even though these studies have deepened our understanding of China’s top economic 
management bureaucracies, bureaucratic agencies in China have been short-lived. Government 
agencies can come and go, but the problems of industrial transformation persist. Once central 
economic management agencies have either achieved or demonstrated they are not likely to 
achieve their designated goals, they are demolished or merged with other bureaucratic agencies. 
Therefore, tracking myriad administrative, state-business, and central-local reforms relating to 
certain industries is more suitable than targeting one central economic bureaucracy as a way to 
analyze rapid industrialization amid failed central policy implementations. 
While industrial policy deals with varied industry sectors, regional developments, and 
even multiple industries, this dissertation research focuses on the auto industry for its intensive 
case study. What makes the auto sector a suitable case for the research? When the Chinese 
central state started to reform its Soviet-style planning system with economic measures in the 
early 1980s, the Chinese central planner designated a few industries as pilot experiment 
industries for the economic system and industry management reform. The auto industry was one 
of these pilot industries (Chen 2005, 274; People’s Daily 1987, September 23). Later, when the 
Chinese central government selected a few sectors to become “pillar industries” in the early 
1990s, the auto industry was also chosen to be one of them. The auto industry’s extensive 
linkages with other industrial sectors and its symbolic meaning of representing a modern 
industrialized country add to its interest. The auto industry was the first sector for which the 
Chinese state issued industrial policy and the sector in which it has intervened most seriously 
(Eun and Lee 2002; Huang 2002). The long history and intensity of government intervention in 
the automotive industry make it one of the best industries to study to track the interaction 
between state intervention in the economic realm and macro institutional reforms.  
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 The data for this dissertation were mainly collected during 18 months of fieldwork in 
China in 2012 and 2013. The study employs data collected from a variety of sources: interviews 
with the major players in the industry, archival research including internally circulated journals 
and books, publications from the central economic management agencies, memoirs of former 
high-ranking government officers, policy reports, academic writings, and statistical data. Most of 
these materials were not accessible until very recently. With the deepening of Chinese reform, 
these once sensitive materials have become a window to see into the black box of Chinese 
central government policy making.  
2.5 Doing Fieldwork in a Highly Competitive Industry 
I arrived in Beijing to begin fieldwork in midsummer 2012. I had been to this mega city many 
times since 2002, but the level of change brought by the past ten years’ high growth was just 
astonishing. Facing what was clearly a transformed society, I had to surrender most of my 
expectations for my fieldwork research. One day not long after I arrived, I was walking in the 
Wudaokou neighborhood with a close friend who had studied Chinese with me back in 2002. As 
we walked, we recalled the area as it had been ten years before; almost every place we passed 
was entirely different. The muddy dirt road had been nicely paved, different brands of cars 
congested the road, and the lot where temporary tents for “peasant-workers” (nongmingong) had 
stood had become a trendy place for foreign students and tourists. As I witnessed these street-
level transformations, I realized the auto industry I had been studying might not be an exception 
to the sea change that had swept the country.   
 When I started my fieldwork in 2012, China had already become the world largest auto 
producer and consumer. Many of my interviewees who worked in the sector believed that China 
might be one of the most competitive auto markets in the world. As one of the few countries that 
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has a very low level of motor vehicle ownership but a very high growth rate,15 the China market 
is irresistible to every global auto player. The result is vicious competition, which bodes ill for 
the researcher trying to get access to the inside of the Chinese auto industry. I was expecting to 
encounter challenges, and, having studied Doing Fieldwork in China (Heimer and Thøgersen 
2006), I knew about “fieldwork as coping and learning” (Sæther 2006)—but the harsh 
competition looked like it would block many chances for learning from the beginning. The 
experts I wanted to interview were extremely busy, and I faced many hurdles as I tried to contact 
them. Even after I secured access, most of the interviewees were very cautious about sharing 
information with an unfamiliar outsider. Even though I put enormous effort into building rapport, 
many of them simply could not afford to let me occupy their time.  
2.5.1 Why political economy? 
For doing business in China, what kind of academic discipline is the most 
important? Political economy is the most important! What is political economy? 
Political economy is a combination of politics and business, politics plus economy: 
grasping politics in one hand, economics in the other hand, this is called 
knowledge! Learning political science only? No, it’s obsolete. Learning 
economics only? No, that does not work either, we have not reached that kind of 
period yet. (a private entrepreneur in China, interview in Zhang and Lin 2010, 43, 
November 21, 2007; my translation) 
 
My primary target interviewees were in both business and government. As the quote above 
suggests, government no longer prevails over business in China. At the same time, business must 
                                                 
15 In 2015, there were 125 cars per thousand people in China; by comparison, there were 809 cars per thousand 
people in the United States in 2011.  
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heed both market signals and government policies to be successful. Hence, my interviews 
usually started under a strange tension as my interviewees engaged in extended reconnaissance 
of me and my motives. To illustrate, in this section I provide examples of two kinds of interview 
circumstances I encountered. I first describe incidents from two interviews with a manager from 
an auto MNC, and I then describe an interview with a local official. 
 
Interviewee 1: A manager from a foreign JV partner  
January 15, 2013, and March 1, 2013 
Company’s China Branch Headquarters16 
 
My interviews with this manager at a foreign JV partner took place in a conference room at his 
company’s China branch headquarters. The company was well known for its “goose-flight type” 
advance into China. Following the auto assembler, parts suppliers, banks, investment companies, 
and even chambers of commerce advanced together to China. In the building’s directory, I saw 
many company names from the same origin country, including an airline, a primary partner bank, 
investment companies, and a chamber of commerce. The building was centrally located in a 
commercial area known for extremely expensive real estate. The China headquarters of other 
companies from the same country were concentrated in the same area, many within walking 
distance. The organizational structures of the countries of origin seem to have been transplanted 
into Chinese soil (Florida and Kenney 1991). I later interviewed several other experts from the 
same origin country, meeting them at their offices or in restaurants located within a two-mile 
radius of this auto company’s China headquarters. 
                                                 
16 I omit city names and other identifying information to maintain my interviewees’ anonymity. 
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As the manager of the management planning department, my interviewee was in charge 
of negotiating with local governments. He had been involved in many negotiations with local 
governments in the company’s efforts to expand its production capacity. The China market had 
been vital for the interviewee’s corporation. Performance pressure is keen, so such managers are 
attentive to even small changes that can affect market conditions. For my interviewee, 
institutional changes in the Chinese central government or in the incentives offered by local 
governments were not abstract. Subtle changes in government policy could directly impact his 
position at the negotiation table. Hence, I was able to hear his interpretation of the nuanced 
meanings of policy and institutional changes, even before I could grasp the concrete implications.  
 
Q: There is a news report that the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) recently replaced the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) as the leading government organ for the auto industry. 
What do you think about this? 
A: The NDRC is the extended form of the planning department in the past years, 
so they are eager to manage and control the economy through policies. In contrast, 
the MIIT seems to believe in the effectiveness of market mechanisms more than 
the NDRC. The NDRC and the MIIT have had many conflicts on issues of 
approval and licensing before. Transferring control of the auto industry to the 
MIIT might reflect the Chinese government’s willingness to trust market 
mechanisms more than regulations through industrial policy. Following this 
transfer, as far as I know the Chinese government will not promote new auto 
industrial policy anymore. 
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Q: How do local governments foster the automotive industry? 
A: In general, local governments are using the following three ways to promote 
the auto industry. First, in the past, local governments granted the land free of 
charge, but now land use rights must be purchased. At present, local government 
grants subsidize the cost of purchasing land usage rights, or investments in 
infrastructure around the plants in the construction process. Second, the local 
government fully reimburses local corporate tax for three years. Third, local 
government provides apartments or residential areas for employees at low prices.   
 
These interviews with a manager working at the business front allowed me a taste of doing 
business in China. He explained a lot of nuances that I could not know about as an outsider and 
pointed out whom I should interview. For example, he said that local government officers, not 
managers from companies, are his major negotiating partners. Following his information, as a 
next step, I identified what kind of local government officers negotiate with foreign investors, 
and why and how. But due to the highly competitive market situation, my interviewee was 
reluctant to share detailed information. When I asked him to share some written documents, he 
erased “sensitive” information using his own notebook computer in front of me and gave me an 
edited MS Word file filled with many blanks. 
 
Interviewee 2: A local government official 
Location: Foreign Investment Office of the Tianjin Municipal People’s Government, TEDA 
Building   
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November 5, 2013 
 
This interview was held at the conference room, located in the building belonging to the Tianjin 
Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA, Tianjin jingji jishu kafaqu). The 
development area (kaifaqu) was created in the early 1980s as a special administrative zone, and it 
has enjoyed subprovincial-level district administrative rank (fushengjiqu). Compared to other 
district-level (qu) governments within the Tianjin municipality, the development area 
government is not strictly bounded by the municipal government. While the area is 
geographically part of the Tianjin Municipality, it has semi-independent administrative units, 
which were designated a national-level development district (guojiaji) by the central government. 
Starting with Pudong Xinqu in Shanghai in 1992, the central government began to rename these 
development areas as “new districts” (xinqu) and it had designated 17 such national districts as 
of 2016. Although this development area was renamed Binhai New District in 2006, the building 
still uses the old name.  
 The TEDA (currently Binhai New District), is an administrative unit relatively 
independent from the Tianjin Municipal Government. The TEDA building, as the property of a 
profit-making legal entity, belongs to the Binhai New District government. Despite its 
independent status, active support from the municipal government is vital for “inviting business 
and attracting investments” (zhaoshang yinzi). While the Binhai government enjoyed 
autonomous status compared to other districts, its economic performance is also indispensable to 
the Tianjin Municipal Government in measuring Tianjin’s economic performance. These 
complementary interests led to the establishment of the Foreign Investment Office of the Tianjin 
Municipal People’s Government at the TEDA building. TEDA gave the 11th and 12th floors to 
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the Tianjin Municipal Government without compensation to house the Foreign Investment 
Office. Due to the notorious tiao-kuai (vertical-horizontal) relations17, the administrative 
procedures were extremely complicated. Hence, when TEDA was established in 1984, then-
mayor Li Ruihuai suggested creating a “one-stop administrative office” to deal with foreign 
investment. Currently, the Commission of Commerce takes the leading organizational role, and 
the Commission of Economy and Information Technology as well as the Commission of 
Development and Reform also dispatched teams to the office. The office deals with all tasks 
related to investment promotion, especially resolving visa problems, registration (hukou) for 
employees, loans, and securing administrative approval and production licenses. Therefore, when 
“foreign”18 investors come to Tianjin, their initial business partners are government officers from 
this office.  
 The interview was conducted in one of the conference rooms at the Foreign Investment 
Office. I made the acquaintance of the government officer through my Chinese school network,19 
and he not only introduced me to the interviewee but accompanied me throughout the interview. 
The interviewee worked in the village-level government in Tianjin Municipality, but he had 
previously worked in the Department of Equipment Manufacturing Industry at the Commission 
of Economy and Information Technology. The conference room was the place where foreign 
investors initially met with local government officials. On the inner door, there was a sign 
written in red Chinese characters: “Do not leak the contents of the meeting. Confidentiality is 
everyone’s responsibility.” My interviewee seemed very familiar with the meetings that took 
place in this room. Although our mutual acquaintance introduced me as a foreign scholar doing 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of tiao/kuai relations, see Lieberthal 2004, 186–188 and Mertha 2005.   
18 “Foreign” means not only investors from other countries, but also investors from outside Tianjin Municipality.   
19 Section 2.5.2 describes the process I used for contacting interviewees in detail.  
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doctoral research, when we touched upon technical problems, he replied to my questions by 
asking my intentions: “What do you do? Are you doing business, intelligence, or what?”  
As these brief vignettes from my interviews suggest, the highly politicized character of 
market competition in the Chinese auto industry made it tough to gain access to relevant 
interviewees. As a coping strategy, I learned to exploit multiple aspects of my own identity in the 
process of the snowball sampling method I used to contact potential interviewees (section 2.5.2). 
In addition, although interviews with experts helped me to get a sense of the Chinese auto 
industry, they were not enough for gaining correct information. Therefore, I needed to devise 
multiple methods both to collect data and to cross-check the data (section 2.5.3).      
2.5.2 Snowball sampling 
At the beginning of my fieldwork research in China, I had many difficulties getting access to my 
target experts. On January 8, 2013, a personal acquaintance invited me to dinner with a junior 
editor at one of the CCP-run journals. The editor agreed to review my interview questionnaire. 
As a local Chinese working for a party organ, she had several useful suggestions for me: 
 
Your survey questionnaire and invitation letter include lots of “sensitive” words 
that will make it difficult for people to agree to do an interview. You have to 
revise your research goal in much plainer language and without “sensitive” 
language. For many Chinese locals, interview requests from foreigners can be a 
dangerous endeavor. If you want access to local Chinese, you should try to get 
domestic credentials, such as a “letter of introduction” with the stamp of Peking 
University. If they see the Peking University stamp, they will be assured that you 
are a safe and important person. 
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As a foreign scholar, however, no matter how much I revised my questionnaire, my inquiry into 
one of the most competitive pillar industries touched on sensitive issues. For example, the fact 
that Chery Auto is the outcome of an Anhui Provincial government-backed secret project, 
although it is an open secret, is still hard for people to talk about. The editor also told me a 
locally circulated rumor about Chery, which is located in her hometown of Wuhu in Anhui 
Province: 
 
For many Wuhu residents, Chery is considered the best place to work except the 
city government. Wuhu locals all know that Chery’s technical level is much lower 
than that of foreign brand cars, and nobody from my family would purchase 
Chery cars, but they believe Chery is necessary for the prosperity of Wuhu’s 
economy. Most of the taxis running across Wuhu are Chery-brand cars, and I 
think most of the locals might know the Wuhu government is working hard to 
support Chery in the shadows. I heard a rumor that the net profit for selling one 
Chery sedan is only 50 RMB (approximately 7.5 USD) and the price adjustment 
[that Chery got from] Ma’anshan Steel would have been impossible without the 
Wuhu government’s pressure.  
 
In our casual dinner table conversation, she was comfortable candidly discussing rumors about 
her hometown company. But when I contacted target interviewees because they held a certain 
position, I could not meet them for a casual dinner, especially for the initial meetings. However, 
if I could not assure my interviewees of my understanding of what was “sensitive,” they would 
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not feel safe enough to talk with me. My identity as an interviewer therefore had to be 
customized to my interviewees. In the process of snowballing, I had to draw on various of my 
identities: as an alumnus from many different Chinese and non-Chinese schools I have attended, 
as a “friend of a friend,” as an audience member at conferences, and even as a customer 
interested in purchasing related materials.20 Although China has become open to the outside 
world in many ways, Chinese network formation is still very exclusive. While I tried to expand 
my list of potential interviewees through my alumni network from my non-Chinese schools, it 
was very difficult to cross the border between Chinese and non-Chinese. To my request to 
introduce me to other Chinese experts, one non-Chinese government foreign service official 
refused, with the following rationale: “I know them very well. But if I introduce you to that 
agency, we have to ask a favor on behalf of you. We are working for our national interests, and 
we cannot sacrifice a national resource for the pursuit of your self-interest” (interview with an 
economic counselor at a foreign embassy, December 14, 2012, Beijing). While my foreign 
identity helped me to connect with non-Chinese experts working in China, I keenly realized that 
I could not reach the Chinese inner circle without an insider’s credentials.    
 As an effort to get such insider’s credentials, I joined a Chinese government-sponsored 
joint Ph.D. program hosted by Nankai University, a prestigious Chinese university located in 
Tianjin. Becoming a member of the research group (tuandui) led by my Chinese supervisor made 
a huge difference in how others perceived my identity. Incumbent Chinese government officers 
pursuing Masters of Public Administration (MPA) degrees under the supervision of the same 
adviser became my shixiong (senior brother) or shimei (senior sister). For example, one shixiong 
who was a professor at Nankai University introduced me to another shixiong who worked in a 
                                                 
20 These are all true aspects of my personal identity. During the interview process with human subjects, I strictly 
abided by all the research guidelines suggested by the Human Studies Program of the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. 
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department of a local government. As a member of the tuandui, I was invited to join the 
tuandui’s online mailing list and social media services as well as offline gatherings. The 
resulting horizontal information sharing and vertical guidance dramatically enhanced my access 
to the inside of Chinese policy processes. Furthermore, the tuandui credential transformed my 
“sensitive” foreign identity to that of a knowledgeable “China hand.”  
 The process of interviewing experts created critical moments that transformed 
incomprehensible fast-changing facts into a connected story. They taught me how to mimic their 
perspectives. As James Scott (1999) tried “seeing like a state” to understand how certain 
schemes to improve the human condition had failed, I tried “seeing like an expert” and “seeing 
like an official” to understand the paradoxical success of the auto industry amid policy failures. 
The multiple lenses through which I learned to see by conducting interviews with experts in turn 
guided me towards the kind of supplementary archival documents I needed to augment my data. 
While the interviews taught me how to see the problems I was studying, they were not detailed 
enough to build a complete picture. Furthermore, no interviewee was free from ontological limits, 
so each piece of information had to be cross-checked and constructed again.    
2.5.3 Cross-checking  
Even though I learned how to see problems like my interviewees, I also needed to find out how 
deeply I could reach into Chinese archival systems. I made numerous trials and errors to probe 
the reachable layers. I visited central, provincial, and county-level archives and record centers 
(dang’anguan) to check what kind of archives were publicly accessible. Except for in a very few 
areas, such as the environment, agriculture, and military family support, most archives created 
since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China have not yet become publicly 
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accessible.21 Administrative documents are not publicly released either, but fortunately many 
“internally circulated documents” (neibu wenjian) are accessible at university libraries, the 
National Library of China, and even a recently developed full-text searchable Chinese online 
database. This digital academic database was constructed by “officially sponsored mass scanning 
of previously unpublished material” and it allows access to a broad range of previously 
inaccessible internal documents and research reports (Heilmann and Shih 2013, 5). In addition, 
the fast commodification of old materials has made it possible to purchase previously 
unavailable documents through online used book markets.  
 An online database, the commodification of used books, and the implicit “declassifying” 
of many internal documents22 has made huge amounts of material accessible to researchers. In 
addition, these recent developments have also facilitated collecting data from numerous materials 
published in series. Due to tiao-kuai fragmentation, each tiao unit (e.g., auto industry, steel 
industry, coal industry, etc.) and kuai unit (e.g., provincial, country, and village governments) 
publishes their own yearbooks or local gazetteers. But even the most prestigious Chinese 
university libraries, such as those at Peking and Tsinghua Universities, do not house complete 
collections of these materials. Online databases and online used book stores have made it much 
easier to search and access the materials.23     
 
                                                 
21 For a research guide for using Chinese official archives, see Diamant 2010. 
22 Many “internal documents” are not systematically classified. These documents are printed in very small numbers 
and circulated exclusively to members of certain units (danwei). Once these units are replaced by other units, there 
is no authority to control the circulation of once “sensitive” documents, which are then frequently commoditized as 
scarce goods. I call this implicit declassifying because it does not involve any formal (de)classification process.     
23 These new changes have brought significant impacts on China studies. Only a decade ago, very few institutions, 
such as the Universities Service Centre (USC) for Chinese Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
collected Chinese materials systematically. Due to the fragmented nature of Chinese policy making, it was difficult 
to find data covering policy implementations that ranged from central to local. For the contribution of the USC to 
China studies, see Vogel 2016. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Recurrent Government Reshuffling and Its Impacts on Industrial Policy  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to explicate how the organizational changes of the Chinese central government 
affect the implementation of industrial policy. As shown in chapter 2, new policy changes in 
China coincide with government organizational reforms. The central government reshufflings 
significantly affect the central government’s industrial governance capability by reducing 
autonomy and breaking organizational continuity. The central government reshufflings not only 
alter the industrial governance structure at the central level, but also impact the structures of local 
governments. The organizational changes of the central government consequently shape modes 
of industrial policy implementation.  
The debates over East Asian developmental states (DS) have addressed the factors that 
contributed to rapid economic development in East Asian countries. Because the DS concept has 
enhanced our understanding of East Asian economic growth, many scholars have asked whether 
China was following the East Asian developmental state model (Beak 2005; Eun and Lee 2002; 
Lee, Hahn, and Lin 2002; Tsai and Cook 2005). Previous literature has pinpointed that China has 
deviated, significantly, from the core components of the DS for three different primary reasons. 
The first two reasons are related to autonomy and embeddedness, which were pointed out by 
Evans (1992, 1995) as positive features of the DS, and the last reason is about timing.24 First, the 
                                                 
24 The different timing of China’s rapid growth is important, but outside the scope of this chapter. Even though 
fierce debates are still ongoing about the nature of globalization and the path of economic development for late-
developers in the neoliberal globalization era, it looks like the external environment China now faces as a late 
industrializer is significantly different than it was during the Cold War period. China does not enjoy unilateral 
market access to the United States, as Japan and South Korea did. In addition, economic globalization and the 
strengthening WTO regime have shrunk the “development space” and delegitimized many industrial policy tools 
(Tsai and Cook 2005; Wade 2003). The “late development” model requires strong state institutional involvement in 
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Chinese state is not an “autonomous” state. Instead of the bureaucrats-qua-agents in the East 
Asian DS who had to follow the grand developmental goals set forth by their principals, Chinese 
bureaucrats were directly exposed to political logic, so they acted in a way that ensured the 
specific policies that would maintain their own power base and increase their chances of political 
survival (Shih 2004). Second, although the central party-state still retains some discretionary 
control through its monopoly over personnel appointments (Chan 2009; Heilmann 2005; 
Brødsgaard 2012), it seriously lacks connections to industrialists, land owners, and labor. In 
addition to these weak connections with business and society, decentralization has seriously 
weakened its connections with local governments.  
From the beginning of China’s reform, Chinese central planners have initiated various 
rounds of government organizational reforms to build proper market institutions. The principal 
goals of these institutional changes can be thwarted in three different ways. First, official 
institutional change can be stymied by informal adjustment. The central state’s strategy of 
disembeddedness generated sociopolitical contention by dismantling preexisting social relations. 
This contention resulted in myriad informal reactions and finally led the proper functioning of 
market institutions astray (Lin 2006). Second, the central state’s reform efforts can also meet 
doom by being captured by the short-term winners of partial reforms (Hellman 1998; Liou 2014). 
In other words, particular groups can take control of the formal institution-building process to 
protect their vested interests. Finally, a central state scheme to build the market economy can 
also destroy the institutions that have practical knowledge about certain industries, leading 
eventually to failed policies. As James Scott (1988) illustrated, the modern state project takes the 
form of “simplification” to enhance “legibility,” but this “simplification” is frequently achieved 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic development (Amsden 1989; Gershcenkron 1962; Johnson 1982; Kohli 2004), but neoliberal globalization 
has rendered this old path impassible. 
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by destroying practical knowledge (“metis” in Scott’s term). The foremost goal of building the 
socialist market economy was zhengqi fenkai (separate government and business), but this 
separation also destroyed the government agencies that closely controlled and monitored 
businesses, which led to the central state’s lack of information on industries.  
 In empirical reality, an informal intrusion of formal institutions, captured institution 
building by early winners, and the state’s simplification scheme happened together. However, it 
is salient in Chinese reform that almost every five years there have been government 
organization reshuffles to sever close ties between central economic agencies and state 
enterprises. Consequently, official institutional changes have had more impact on the functioning 
of the market system than informal adjustment has had. Furthermore, various government 
reforms also have realigned the winners’ coalitions and made the early beneficiary groups 
difficult to discern.25 In sum, the Chinese central state has reshuffled government organizations 
at short intervals to separate state and enterprise, which makes studying its formal institutional 
changes worthwhile. Also, there is no doubt that early winners had decisive power on the path of 
reform, but that multiple reforms dismantled the institutional base of the winners’ coalitions. For 
this reason, this chapter will focus on the central state’s scheme to separate government agencies 
and businesses through multiple government organizational reforms and how this scheme has 
affected the implementation of industrial policy in the auto industry.  
It is indispensable to understand the normative changes of value systems that support 
certain institutional arrangements in order to fully understand the institutional reforms at critical 
junctures. In this context, Eaton (2013, 2015) studied the politics of ideas about the rise of large 
enterprise groups (2013) and the advancement of the state (2015). Wang (2015) analyzed how 
                                                 
25 For an effort to distinguish four major advocacy coalitions in China’s economic governance arena, see Heilmann 
and Shih (2013). 
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financialization of economic management by state and para-state actors was normalized during 
the early 1990s. This chapter, however, limits its scope to the trajectories of central government 
organizations, because “as a result of both high political uncertainty of the situation and the 
nature of the interaction itself, the outcome does not reflect the preferences of any of the key 
actors involved in the institution-making process” (Capoccia 2015, 161). Capoccia suggested 
two analytical steps in this situation: 
 
first, carefully unpacking the actual impact that objective macrostructural 
conditions have on the influence of political actors and organizations; second, 
focusing at close range on political agency and interactions (the politics of 
institution making) and the institutional outcome of the process. (161–162, 
original emphasis) 
 
Proceeding from here, this chapter first briefly describes the changing mode of industry 
management and principal actors involved in this transition. Section 3.2 follows how industrial 
governance in the auto industry has changed from 1982 to the present. The final section (3.3) 
analyses the dilemma between government institution building and effective industrial policy 
implementation.  
3.2 Managing Industry: How and by Whom? 
Since China embarked on economic reform, major governmental organizational reforms have 
coincided with the new terms of the State Council in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 
2013. With almost a hundred ministries and special organizations under direct supervision of the 
State Council before 1982, simplification (jingjian) of government agencies became an important 
agenda item. As Table 3-1 shows, after various government reshuffles, the overall numbers of 
 65 
central organizations and central government employees were reduced by more than half. From 
the beginning of the Chinese reform, top planners recognized the necessity of separation between 
government and business. On October 20, 1984, the third plenary session of the 12th CCP Central 
Committee officially affirmed zhengqi fenkai (separate government and business) as the 
direction of future economic system reforms.26 The separation between government and business 
later expanded to separation between “government and assets” (zhengzi) and “government and 
society” (zhengshe). 
 
Table 3-1. Changes in Numbers of Central Ministries, State Council Supervising Special 
Organizations, and Personnel 
Year 1982 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 
Number of Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Ministries 52 43 45 41 42 41 40 29 29 28 28 27 
Special 
Organizations 
43 15 22 19 19 13 13 17 17 18 18 15 
Personnel*  51 39 52 42 37 29 33 16 29 28 28 27 
% of 
Decrease 
23.5 19.2 21.6 51.5 3.4 3.6 
* Unit: 10,000 
Source: Wang (2008, 102–3); revised 
 
 In China’s Soviet-style planning period, the central economic agencies were largely 
composed of two different types, comprehensive and specialized. Table 3-2 captures the 
changing trajectories of the comprehensive and specialized economic agencies related to the auto 
industry from 1982 to 2014. The State Planning Commission (SPC) and the State Economic 
Commission (SEC) had been two important pivots of economic policy making. In the period of 
Soviet-style administrative resource management, the SPC set the imperative plans and the SEC 
                                                 
26 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues concerning the Economic 
System Reform,” October 20, 1984. 
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was responsible for distributing targets to individual governments and SOEs through ex ante 
coordination. After the reforms began, the State Commission for Restructuring of the Economic 
System (SCRES) was added as another pivot to function as a kind of “think tank” to guide the 
direction of economic reform (Liu 2014, 40–44). While these three commissions were 
comprehensive economic agencies, eight different additional ministries supervised individual 
industries, such as machine and electronics, nuclear, aviation, radio electronic, ordnance, 
shipbuilding, aerospace, and agriculture machine industries.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, the SETC document (2013) categorized two different modes 
of industry management: bumen guanli (management by government sector) and hangye guanli 
(management by industry). As all factories were regarded as the government sector (bumen) 
during the planning period, management style during this period was called management by 
government sector. As shown in Table 3-3, during the planning period, supervisory 
bureaucracies were the sole principal agents of management, and enterprises were part of their 
affiliated governments. The management purview of supervisory units was strictly limited to the 
affiliated firms. Figure 3-1 shows the position of state-owned banks and enterprises in the state 
structure during the 1980s.  
Table 3-3. Different Features of Management by Government Sector (Bumen Guanli) and 
Management by Industry (Hangye Guanli) 
 Management by 
Government Sector 
Management by Industry 
Base of Economic 
System 
Planned Economy System Market Economy System 
Base of Enterprise 
Institution 
Unity of government and 
enterprise 
Separation of government and enterprise  
Principal Agent for 
Management 
Government administrative 
units 
Government industry management units and 
nongovernmental industrial association 
Object of 
Management 
Enterprises directly 
affiliated with the unit 
Same type of products in whole society 
Boundary of 
Management 
Enterprises affiliated with 
the units and region 
Systemic coordination over the same type of 
products in whole society 
Features of 
Management 
Direct management Indirect management 
Methods of 
Management 
Orders issued through 
administrative channels 
Industrial policy and legal methods as the primary 
tools, and necessary administrative methods 
Source: Bureau of Economic Operation, SETC (2003, 171) 
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Figure 3-1. Management by government sector (bumen guanli).  
“Positions of SOEs and state-owned commercial banks in the state structure in the 1980s before 
industrial ministries were abolished (black arrows represent administrative and supervising ties). 
Note that industrial ministries and SOEs under their supervision were divided by sectors.”  
Source: Wang (2015, 615) 
 
If the Chinese SOEs and state banks were managed in the way described in Figure 3-1, 
creating zhengqi fenkai would not be a very difficult task. The Ministry of Finance in the 
banking sector, and branch ministries in industrial sectors mediate between state council and 
state banks and SOEs. Therefore, SOEs could be set free by abolishing intermediary branch 
ministries. However, separation between state and businesses is not that simple. The 
organizational structure suggested by the management by government sector model (bumen 
guanli) is not the case in China, but is closer to the situation that existed in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, which was called “unitary hierarchical structure based on functional or 
specialization principles” (the U-form) (Qian and Xu 1993). In this U-Form system, “most 
enterprises were grouped by industry and under the direct supervision of ministries, and regional 
governments were primarily subordinates of the centre and their roles were limited to collecting 
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information from below and implementing plans from above without much autonomy” (143). 
The Chinese economy, however, was organized into a multilayer-multiregional form (M-form), 
which operated “mainly according to territorial principle, in which each region at each layer can 
be regarded as an operating unit” (144). Qian and Xu also present an example from the Chinese 
auto industry to explain the Chinese M-form economy: 
 
In the automobile industry, almost all enterprises in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union were directly controlled by the central government and the number of the 
enterprises was rather small. In China, there were 58 enterprises making 
automobiles before the reform, and most of them were controlled by the local 
governments (Wang and Chen 1991). Consistent with this, the number of 
products directly under the central plan in China was much smaller, only 791 in 
1979 (Zhu 1985), as compared to more than twelve million in the former Soviet 
Union in the late 1970s (Nove 1980). (Qian and Xu 1993, 144) 
 
 To make matters worse, auto enterprises were not only segregated by territorial principle 
(diqu fenge), but also scattered throughout diverse sectors. Around the early 1980s, more than 10 
sectors were involved in auto manufacturing, refurbishment, and parts. Hence, auto plants were 
dispersed in diverse local areas as well as sectors, and had individually complex affiliations 
(lishu guanxi), financial channels (caizheng xiangjiao qudao), and ownership types (suoyouzhi 
xingzhi). In this situation, some institutional conditions had to be met in order to separate the 
enterprise from the state. First of all, because auto plants were dispersed across various local 
areas and diverse sectors, establishing management by sector, as shown in Table 3-3, was a kind 
of prerequisite to proceed with zhengqi fenkai. SOEs should be able to operate as more 
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independent entities. Second, once SOEs become independent entities, branch ministries that are 
supposed to supervise designated sectors also need to sever their direct links with individual 
SOEs. Finally, comprehensive economic agencies, especially the State Planning Commission 
and State Economic Commission, must also change their roles and establish new relationships 
with SOEs.    
Such a transition, however, entails interconnected changes in principal government 
agencies, policy goals, boundaries between state and business, and methods of industry 
management. China’s post-Mao reforms no longer adopted Maoist radical revolutionary methods, 
but progressed in more incremental and recurrent ways. As a result, changes in government 
responsibility and institutions have kept bouncing back and forth. One reform measure often 
seems to contradict the previous one, but analyzing long-term trends reveals a hidden logic of the 
continuing reforms. In the next section, we look at what institutional changes have occurred in 
the industrial governance of the Chinese auto industry in three different eras.    
 
3.3 Historical Evolution of Industrial Governance in the Chinese Auto Industry 
3.3.1 Emancipating enterprises from administrative shackles, 1982–1993 
Even during the Maoist period, most industries in China were not centrally managed, as depicted 
in Figure 3-1. Former Premier Liu Shaoqi attempted to form industrial trusts in 12 industries to 
overcome tiao-kuai partition in 1964, but Liu’s fall during the Cultural Revolution led to the 
breakdown of the industrial trusts and the delegation of the management of enterprises to mostly 
local governments and central branch ministries as well (Chen 2005, 302). Due to failed attempts 
to centralize industrial management as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the tiao-kuai 
partition remained, and it has severely restricted the efficiency of resource allocation and 
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management flexibility. Chen Zutao’s recollections well illustrate the situation during the period 
from 1982 to 1993: 
The rigid management system restricted managerial and technical managers’ 
initiative and vitality, and it made them not think about problems, but just follow 
advice from above. In this kind of management system, how can enterprises have 
vitality? Next to the engine laboratory of the Second Auto Works (SAW; Erqi), 
there was a water tower that had an oil tank on the top of the tower. The oil tank 
was very dangerous and also caused deaths in fire accidents. I proposed removing 
it and rebuilding it as an underground oil tank, which required increasing the area 
more than 60 square meters. If it were today, this might be a simple matter. A 
word from the top manager would suffice to solve the problem. However, at that 
time, the process was too complicated. I was the chief engineer and I wanted to 
remove it, but I did not have the power to change the design. No matter what I 
said, it was no use. Hence, I started looking for other people in charge: first, I 
invited Li Zizheng, our SAW deputy secretary, and Wang Jinren, SAW’s deputy 
secretary in charge of infrastructure; then, deputy secretary of the Municipal Party 
Committee, deputy secretary of the installation company, and finally one 
secretary of the construction unit. I met five secretaries in total. Although they 
also agreed to the demolition, nobody could take initiative, but had to wait for the 
decision from the State Planning Commission. In this helpless situation, I rushed 
to thousands-of-miles-away Beijing to find a director of the SPC. After I 
explained it clearly to him, he signed the agreement, and then we could demolish 
and rebuild the oil tank. Is not the director of the enterprise who understands the 
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situation better in this kind of matter? There are so many companies all over the 
country, and if a person who does not understand the actual situation of the 
company makes the decisions, then can any company actively work? It wasn’t 
limited to the oil tank problem alone, but happened in all of the processes of 
production and construction, such as minor changes to a design, the adjustment of 
production layout, the revision of industrial processes and so on; all needed to be 
reported and get approval. (Chen 2005, 273; my translation) 
 
To remedy such chronic problems, the Chinese party-state decided to separate enterprise 
from administrative channels to improve enterprise’s vitality. This overall direction of economic 
reform was also reflected in the auto industry. The auto industry, along with petroleum, 
shipbuilding, and metallurgy industries, was chosen as one of the pilot industries for the industry 
management system (SETC 2003, 179). For the reform of the automotive industry management 
system, the first step was issuing a guiding document, “Nationwide Automotive Industry 
Adjustment Plan (Implementation),” by the National Commission of Machine Industry in 1980. 
Following the plan, the China National Automotive Industry Corporation (CNAIC; Zhonguo 
qiche gongye gongsi) was established in 1982.27 A general management responsibility system 
under the leadership of a board of directors was adopted and implemented in the CNAIC. A 
three-level management structure was designed: a board of directors as the highest echelon; 
CNAIC as the middle echelon; and seven jointly managed companies (lianying gongsi) as the 
lower echelon, which were Dongfeng, Nanjing, Jiefang, Zhongxing, Shanghai, Jingjinbei, and a 
supply company. At the opening ceremony of the CNAIC on May 6, 1986, then–Vice Premier 
                                                 
27 Petroleum, shipbuilding, and metallurgy industries also established administrative corporations as intermediate 
organizations to separate government from business. The specific authorities and names differed. 
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Bo Yibo spoke of how establishing the CNAIC was an important breakthrough in China’s 
economic management system, because it replaced business management, which had been done 
by the administrative organizations, with economic organizations for the first time (Chen 2005, 
303). 
Far from vitalizing enterprise, however, the CNAIC, at the middle of the three-level 
hierarchy, became the “small Ministry of Industry.” The board of directors was supposed to 
supervise the CNAIC, but it had no power, and never even held meetings. The initial purpose of 
the reform was to vitalize the enterprises at the lower level, but the reform reinforced the power 
of the CNAIC by placing it between the insubstantial board of directors and the loosely 
organized joint companies. The CNAIC was awarded vice-ministry level administrative ranking 
(jibie) and enjoyed independent mandates over external affairs, planning, finance, and personnel 
(Chen 2005, 303). While the reform intended to change companies from the “state’s product line” 
to the principal agents of the market, it ended up building corporations in name, but a “Ministry 
of Automotive Industry” in fact.  
Shortly after the establishment of the CNAIC, members of both upper and lower echelons 
strongly criticized the excessive concentration of power in the CNAIC. In July 1984, the 
leadership of First Auto including Xu Yuancuan, the party secretary of First Auto, and Huang 
Zhaoluan, plant manager, sent a letter to the CCP central leadership. The letter criticized the 
current automobile industry management system and argued that the companies should be the 
entities that enjoyed independent management rights, not the CNAIC. The letter attracted great 
attention from the central leadership. In August 1984, the Central Finance and Economy 
Leadership Small Group held a conference on automotive industry development. One of the 
central leaders criticized the CNAIC and said: “CNAIC, you guys are trying to monopolize!” 
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(Zhang 2014). The pressure from both upper and lower echelons urged another reform on auto 
industry management. The basic direction of change loosened the relationship between the 
CNAIC and the seven joint companies by making the CNAIC hollower and weaker as an entity. 
The central leadership suggested making the CNAIC a service company, proposing the possible 
name, “Chinese Automotive Industry Joint Service Corporation” (Zhongguo qiche gongye lianhe 
fuwu gongsi).  
Further reform measures aiming to weaken the power of the CNAIC and strengthen the 
joint companies’ autonomy had been started with a relatively long transitional period. In October 
1986, the State Planning Commission designated Jiefang (First Auto), Dongfeng (Second Auto) 
and Zhongxing as discrete planning (jihua danlie) units. This meant the three companies did not 
have to account to the CNAIC anymore. In 1987, bolder actions were taken. At the upper 
echelon, the State Council directly engaged in the auto industry by organizing the Automotive 
Industry Leading Small Group, composed of leaders from the State Council, National Machine 
Commission, and the China National Automotive Industry Alliance (CNAIA, Zhongguo qiche 
gongye lianhehui).28 The Leading Small Group was expected to replace the board of directors of 
the CNAIC. At the middle echelon, the CNAIC was abolished and reorganized into the CNAIA. 
The expected role of the CNAIA was to function as a bridge and conveyer belt between state and 
business. The CNAIC had directly managed enterprises, but the CNAIA was not allowed to do 
that. Finally, while the power of the CNAIA was weaker, the joint companies were growing 
stronger, as they became a business group (qiye jituan) through horizontal alliances.29 Internally, 
                                                 
28 I use an abbreviation of the literal translation, CNAIA, although the organization continued to be known as 
CNAIC in English to maintain its international reputation as the national team of the auto industry. 
29 For detailed reports about building the business group in Jiefang and Dongfeng, see Hu, Wang, and Lan 1989 and 
Wang and Tu 1986. 
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the business group tightened its control over the subsidiary companies; and, externally, it secured 
management autonomy through discrete planning.  
Despite remaining historical legacies, the business group became a relatively independent 
market agent through the 1987 reform measure. However, the reform faced another setback 
caused by the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The tide of economic reform temporarily flew 
backward, and the CNAIC was revived again.30 The backflow, however, could not re-insert the 
already detached business group into the part of government sector. After these seemingly 
capricious reforms, inchoate state-business relations made an appearance for the first time in 
PRC history. Many issues remained with these recurrent reforms, but it was the first step out of 
the planned economy system. 
3.3.2 Building the socialist market economy, 1993–2002 
Through the institutional reforms in the previous period, SOEs became more autonomous entities. 
The emergence of relatively autonomous enterprises became the basis of promoting management 
by industry. The socialist market economy promulgated in 1992–1993 anticipated enterprises 
becoming principal agents of market transactions. SOEs, however, were not completely 
separated from the government. In order to separate government and businesses, both 
comprehensive and specialized economic agencies had to change their roles with regard to SOEs.  
In 1992, the 14th CCP Central Congress affirmed industrial policy as a pillar of 
macroeconomic control, and a turf war over who was going to hold the reins of industrial policy 
began. Following the decision of the 14th CCP Congress, another round of government 
organizational reform was implemented to meet the needs of the socialist market economy. After 
the 1993 government organizational reforms, the distinction between the two types of central 
                                                 
30 Its Chinese name gained one more character, zong, or “comprehensive,” while the English name again did not 
change. 
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economic ministries, comprehensive and specialized, became much clearer. The 1993 reform, 
however, was merely a repackaging of existing ministries into two categories. The 
comprehensive group was composed of the successors of planning commissions, such as the SPC, 
the SETC, and the SCRES. The specialized group inherited the line ministries that had purview 
over particular industries such as the Ministry of Coal Industry, Ministry of Machine Industry, 
Ministry of Construction, and so on. Hence, the “regulating relationship” (lishun guanxi) 
between the comprehensive and specialized groups, as well as among planning bureaus within 
the comprehensive group, became a salient issue. As a result, when the central leadership 
determined to promote industrial policy, four central-level agencies, including the Development 
Research Center (DRC), SPC, SETC, and SCRES, jointly held an industrial policy roundtable 
meeting (Jingji Yanjiu Cankao 1993). Coordination among these four central agencies was 
required, because the DRC was the leading organ of research and the three other commissions 
were directly involved in drafting industrial policy. Thus, at the bureau level, each commission 
had its own department for industrial policy.31 (See Table 3-4.) To add to these difficulties, 
coordination among relevant specialized ministries also needed to be orchestrated.  
 
                                                 
31 As shown in Table 3-4, between 1993 and 1998, in addition to SETC and SPC, SCRES also had a specific 
department for industrial policy, named the Department for Comprehensive Planning and Pilot Experiments (Bureau 
of the Secretary General’s Office 1995).  
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Table 3-4. Shifting Competition in Industrial Policy and the Auto Industry, 1988–2012 
 Competing 
Agencies in 
Industrial Policy 
Competing Departments (si) in 
Industrial Policy 
Primary Agencies for the 
Automobile Industry 
1988–93 SPC foundational 
body 
Department for Industrial Policy CNAIC (China National 
Automotive Industry Corporation, 
Zhonguo qiche gongye gongsi 
1982) 
CNAIA (China National 
Automotive Industry Alliance, 
replaced CNAIC in 1987) 
CNAIC (Zhonguo qiche gongye 
zonggongsi, 1990)32 
1993–98 SETC Department of Economic Policy 
Coordination  
Bureau of Auto Industry, MMB 
(established in 1993, and 
demolished in 1998) 
SPC rival body Department of Long-term 
Planning & Industrial Policy  
 
1998–
2003 
SETC Department for Industrial Policy Bureau of Machine Building 
(established in 1998, transferred 
to the command of the SETC in 
2001) 
SDPC shadow 
bodies 
Department for Economic 
Prognostics (1998–2001)  
Department for Industrial 
Development (2001–2003)  
 
2003–08 NDRC Department for Industrial Policy   
NDRC rival body Department for Industry   
2008–12 MIIT Department for Industrial Policy  Department of Equipment 
Industry, MIIT 
NDRC dominant 
body 
Department for Industrial 
Coordination  
 
Note: NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission, 2003–current), MIIT (Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology, 2008–current), MMB (Ministry of Machine Building, 
1993–8), SPC (State Planning Commission, 1954–98), SDPC (State Development Planning 
Committee, 1998–2003)  
Source: Compiled by the author from Heilmann and Shih (2013, 11); Zhao (2000, 231); Liu; 
Feng, Yang, Qian, Liang, Li, Lai, and Shi (2003); CAAM (2006, 130–134); and the Bureau of 
the Secretary General’s Office and SCOPSR (1995, 1998, 2003, 2008). 
 
On September 12, 1997, the CCP party secretary Jiang Zemin, in his report to the 15th CCP 
Congress, harshly criticized its bulky organization and personnel, nonseparation of politics and 
                                                 
32 The early reform of the CNAIC to the CNAIA was intended to reduce the government’s direct involvement in the 
auto industry, but faced a setback when economic reforms were reversed temporarily after the 1989 Tiananmen 
Incident. For a detailed history of this period, see Chen (2005, 271–313). 
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business, and severe bureaucratism as hindrances to the deepening of reform and economic 
development. Following the party’s direction, another round of massive government 
organizational reform was initiated. After this 1998 reform, the number of central ministry-level 
organizations was drastically reduced from 40 to 29 (Table 3-1), which were streamlined into 
four different types of organizations: (1) macroeconomic control sectors; (2) specialized 
economic management sectors, which no longer were directly involved in enterprise 
management, but only guided coordination among industries; (3) science, technology and 
education, social welfare, and resource management sectors; and (4) government affairs sectors. 
In terms of economic management, this round of reforms emphasized the end of the 
government’s direct intervention into corporations by separating the roles of players and referees. 
First of all, the SPC, renamed the SDPC, mainly took charge of long-term macroeconomic 
control. Second, the SETC took the responsibility for short-term economic management. The 
mandate of industrial policy was handed over to the SETC to facilitate more effective industrial 
management. It also absorbed most of the specialized economic organizations under its 
command as subordinate bureaus.33 For instance, the Ministry of Machine Industry was relegated 
to the State Machine Industry Bureau and attached to the SETC. This reform measure was 
another step forward in separating politics and businesses by weakening and finally abolishing 
the specialized economic ministries. The Ministry of Machine Building’s (MMB) total number 
of personnel once reached about 4,600, and it directly supervised more than 900 SOEs and 60 
research institutes. These branch ministries were relegated to state bureaus under the SETC, 
which was planned to be abolished after only three years. Thus, the primary task of the bureau 
                                                 
33 Namely, the (1) State Internal Trade Bureau, (2) State Coal Industry Bureau, (3) State Machine Industry Bureau, 
(4) State Metallurgy Bureau, (5) State Petroleum and Chemical Industry Bureau, (6) State Light Industry Bureau, (7) 
State Textile Industry Bureau, (8) State Construction Material Industry Bureau, (9) State Nonferrous Metal Industry 
Bureau, and (10) State Tobacco Monopoly Bureau.    
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was arranging former cadres’ reemployment. The MMB’s 308-member staff before the 1998 
reform was cut to 105; because the bureau would fade away soon, only cadres close to retirement 
age remained in the office (Ji 2014). By completely abolishing the line ministries through this 
reform, the Chinese central state cut another link with SOEs. The line ministries were no longer 
allowed to be involved in the management of former SOEs. By making the SETC the control 
tower of short-term economic management, the reformers expected more harmonious 
coordination between different industrial sectors. (On the implications of establishing the SETC, 
see Jung 2008.)  
Abolishing the line ministries and annexing them to agencies under the jurisdiction of the 
SETC prevented the anticipated resistance to the massive SOE reform, discussed in chapter 5. 
Demolishing the line ministries, however, left medium and large central SOEs abandoned. To 
make the SETC an impartial regulator, the SETC severed the official ties between the newly 
annexed former line ministries and SOEs, putting the SOEs in an awkward position. While the 
state nominally owned the SOEs, it was not clear which specific states owned which enterprises. 
In this circumstance, the Central Party made an appearance in the Large Enterprises Working 
Committee of the CCP Central Committee (henceforth LEWC) in July 1998 (Guthrie, Xiao, and 
Wang 2015, 82; Zhang and Yuan 2008, 97). Because there were no state bureaus that could 
function as owners of SOEs, the LEWC made direct appointments to fill the high-ranking posts 
of the central SOEs and coordinated SOE reform. The Central Committee of the CCP’s apparent 
role in SOE reform had two different consequences. First, the direct supervision of the CCP 
Central Committee in SOE reform and the abolition of line ministries reduced the resistance to 
the SOE reform noticeably. Second, local government was empowered to manage SOE reforms 
at the respective local levels. Local government was able to enjoy much greater room to 
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maneuver because the LEWC only supervised large central enterprises that used to be under the 
control of central line ministries. But the party’s direct involvement in the personnel matters of 
the central SOEs went against the spirit of the socialist market economy. More fundamental 
reform of state enterprises management system became unavoidable.  
3.3.3 Rise of the shareholding state, 2003–present 
Since 2003, the previous economic governance structure has been transformed into a totally new 
mode of economic management. After the line ministries were abolished through the relegation 
of their responsibilities to the SETC, it became an urgent task to find a viable mechanism of state 
control for SOEs. The 2003 government reshuffle consolidated the Chinese industry 
management system to be run by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC; 
SPC’s succeeding organization) and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) (Table 3-2; Lu and Cai 2010). Except for the Ministry of Information 
Industry, all branch ministries had been destroyed at the end of the Ninth State Council (1998–
2003). The previous comprehensive economic agencies, SCRES, SDPC, and SETC, were finally 
merged into a single so-called “mini-State Council,” the NDRC (Gore 2012). The NDRC’s 
missions encompass those of the three prior comprehensive economic agencies, such as strategic 
planning and macroeconomic regulation, orchestrating industrial policy and coordinating 
economic activities, and reforming the economic systems. The NDRC became a “visible hand in 
the market” with the emergence of “the state advances, the private sector retreats” (guojin 
mintui). On the foundation of the LEWC, the SASAC became the personified sole owner of 
central SOEs in the nonbanking sectors. By establishing the SASAC, the Chinese central 
government discovered financial mechanisms for state control of SOEs (Wang 2015).  
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 A chained hierarchical ownership structure for the SASAC, parent company, and 
subsidiary companies in central SOEs became an efficient tool to control the central SOEs with 
minimal financial shareholdings. (See chapter 5 for details.) As shown in Figure 3-2, the SASAC 
is no longer constrained by sectoral segregation. The SASAC is the sole owner of the all central 
SOEs. The SASAC also owned industrial holding companies, such as the State Development and 
Investment Corporation (SDIC), and it indirectly controlled subsidiary SOEs.  
 
 
Figure 3-2. Management by shareholding state, 2003–current.  
“Positions of SOEs and state-owned commercial banks in the state structure at present. Note that 
state asset management bodies (in ovals) constitute the intermediate structure that closed off 
sectoral divisions. White arrows represent ties of ownership.”; PBOC: People’s Bank of China. 
Source: Wang (2015, 615) 
 
 In 2008, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) reorganized as the 
major organization for industrial management. Although the MIIT merged with other related 
agencies, it was based on a transformation of the Ministry of Information Industry. The 
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reorganization of the MIIT was expected to fill the void left by the abolishment of the SETC. 
[The central government, however, had already lost organizational capacity and cadres who had 
decades of experience interacting with SOEs; thus, establishing the MIIT was not enough to 
change the course of reform. Furthermore, the division of labor between the NDRC and the MIIT 
has not been clarified yet, so local governments play their own game by selectively utilizing 
project-screening authorities. According to one provincial-level government official at the 
Economic and Information Committee, once local governments finalize certain projects, they 
apply to either the NDRC or the MIIT to be ratified, choosing the one where they have a better 
chance of winning permission. Ratification from one organization can be a source of leverage on 
the other, so local governments frequently abuse the murky division of labor (interview, Oct. 10, 
2013, Tianjin, China).]  
3.4 Biased Preferences, Organizational Discontinuities, and Industrial Policy 
Implementation 
The organizational evolution of China’s central state discussed in the previous sections has had 
significant influences on the central state’s preferences for businesses and organizational 
capacities to implement industrial policy. Repeated government restructuring resulted in a lack 
of stable organization, and ended up causing the central government to lack both information and 
learning capability in regard to industries. According to a study on the empirical impacts of 
industrial policy by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, leaders’ preferences have been 
neglected in the study of industrial policy. The study claims that leaders’ career backgrounds and 
the personnel structures of agencies have huge influences on the objectives of industrial policy. 
For example, the Chinese National Automotive Industry Corporation (CNAIC) has had profound 
impacts on the processes of auto industrial policy making. All the top leaders of the CNAIC had 
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career backgrounds at the First Auto Works (FAW). Furthermore, all leading cadres at the 
bureau (ju) and department (si) levels were exclusively recruited from either the FAW or the 
Second Auto Works (SAW). Their careers at these central SOEs influenced their policy 
preferences, as expressed in diverse ways. Technically, the FAW and SAW specialize only in 
commercial and passenger vehicles, so agriculture vehicles were not on the agenda until the 
production volume of agriculture vehicles reached 2.6 million in 1996. Also, these leaders were 
accustomed to the working style in the SOEs, so when they were in policy-making positions, 
there was not enough consideration of market mechanisms (Zhao 2000, 122–123). The 
policymakers’ preferences made a small number of SOEs to take advantage of the AIPs to gain 
favorable positions in finance and government procurement. When the Chinese central 
government first released its AIP in 1994, the policy designated a small number of large SOEs to 
be nurtured as national champions in the auto industry. These designated SOEs enjoyed 
exclusive preferential policy treatment including matching subsidies corresponding to production 
capacity, the right to form JVs with MNCs to acquire technical and financial support, and 
preferential treatment for government procurements (Fuller 2016; Huang 2003, 2008; Pettis 2013; 
Unirule 2011).    
In addition to such biased preferences, the recurrent government organization reshuffles 
disrupted the historical, organizational, and biographical continuity of industrial policy agencies. 
In July 1994, the SPC issued the first AIP. Because three different comprehensive economic 
commissions (SPC, SETC, and SCRES) and one specialized ministry (MMB) had direct interests 
in the 1994 AIP, it was a difficult task to coordinate among the government agencies. To 
facilitate issuing the first industrial policy, the highest CCP-level Central Finance Leading Small 
Group issued an order about automobile industry development (1995 Automotive Industry 
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Yearbook, 11). The central leadership’s direct involvement expedited the policy-making process, 
but the party was able to intervene only after multiple stakeholders had already distorted the 
original intention behind the industrial policy. In addition, after promulgating the 1994 AIP, the 
strict entry barrier was relatively well maintained until the SPC was responsible for industrial 
policy. But once the jurisdiction of industrial policy was transferred to the emerging, powerful 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) in 1998, the controlling ability apparently 
diminished. The 1994 AIP stated that “the SPC is responsible for final interpretation” (article 61), 
but in 1998 the SPC was transformed into the State Development Planning Committee (SDPC), 
and the discretion for industrial policy became vested in the SETC between 1998 and 2003.  
A decade later, in 2004, the central agencies drafted a new AIP. The 2003 government 
organizational reforms divided the central state’s role into those of investor (SASAC: State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission), macroeconomic regulator (NDRC), 
and independent coordinator of commerce (Ministry of Commerce), in the style of a Western 
regulatory state. By separating the state’s roles as owner and regulator, this organization seems to 
fulfill the minimal conditions for a level playing field. However, despite the organizational 
separation, the Chinese central state still was not able to keep an arm’s length in its relations with 
SOEs. As a macroeconomic regulator, the NDRC drafted a new AIP in 2004. When the NDRC 
released the “Draft for Collecting Opinions,” it said it was intended to collect views and 
suggestions from all the parties concerned. In May 2004, when the NDRC initially released it, 
the full draft went only to its “biological offspring”: FAW, DMC (Dongfeng Motor Coporation, 
formerly SAW), SAIC (Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation), and BAIC (Beijing 
Automotive Industry Corporation), with a clear warning of a strict ban on disclosure to the press. 
In contrast, the drafts issued to private auto companies only had a couple of titles without 
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contents (Hu 2003). This Chinese example of AIP preferences fits well with a description by 
Doner (1992, 400): “Autonomously developed preferences may reflect and enhance predatory 
behavior by state officials; instead of promoting innovations and productivity increases, such 
behavior can exacerbate informational difficulties.” 
The reorganization of industrial management after 2003 also provoked new adverse 
effects on the implementation of industrial policy. As the SPC’s succeeding organization, the 
NDRC’s mission centers on the national economy and social development, rather than the 
development of individual industries. Furthermore, its major counterparts have been government 
units including ministries and local governments. As a result, the NDRC’s primary concerns are 
macroeconomic balances and screening projects (xiangmu shenpi). Because the NDRC manages 
industrial policy mainly by screening projects, local governments easily bypass investment 
regulation by adjusting the scale of their projects. The SASAC, as a state asset manager, also 
primarily cares about SOEs’ asset value. In the logic of industrial policy, enterprises should be 
considered mediums of organizational capacity, and the major policy goal should be to develop 
enterprises’ capacity. However, because the SASAC, along with the Organizational Department 
of the CCP, appoints managers to the top positions of large SOEs, the incumbents at large SOEs 
are concerned more about financial metrics than capacity building.34 In the auto manufacturing 
SOEs that were the principal beneficiaries of the AIP, the top managers cared mainly about 
financial statements and their own promotion, and they preferred to expand joint venture 
operations with foreign partners over developing their own brands and models.  
 
                                                 
34 In 2005, SASAC started to use “the rate of preserving and appreciating the value of state assets” for measuring 
SOEs’ performances (Wang 2015, 613). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
China’s economic control tower is far from being an internally cohesive and unitary agency like 
Japan’s MITI or South Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB). The frequent government 
organizational reforms seriously reduced government autonomy and dismantled institutional 
continuity, which are the minimum necessary conditions for effective industrial policy 
implementations. Government organization reform, simplified in terms of separation of state and 
business, resulted in the following negative effects on industrial policy. First, during the period 
before 1992, some government responsibilities for industry administration (gongye xingzheng) 
were delegated to an intermediate organization, which had a profound impact on industrial policy 
formulation after 1992. Second, government reorganizations to remedy the government’s 
involvement in corporate management eventually abolished the State Economic Commission, 
which worked mainly with state enterprises, and strengthened the State Planning Commission, 
which worked mainly with government sectors including central specialized ministries and local 
governments. Overthrowing the organizations that had practical knowledge about the industry 
and close connections with businesses made it impossible to implement the goals set in the 
industrial policy. The planning commission, which is a new supervising department for industrial 
policy, traditionally worked with governments, and is not effective at much more than screening 
investment proposed by local governments. In addition, SASAC was established as the owner of 
state enterprises, and hence only cares about asset preservation and growth from the owners’ 
perspective. Finally, recurrent government organization reforms resulted in the lack of stable 
organizational structure and led to the central state’s lack of information and learning capacity in 
regard to industry.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Reshaping State-Business Relations and the Emergence of a Dual Industrial Structure 
  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to analyze how reforms of state-business relations affected the 
implementation of the auto industrial policy. Since embarking on the socialist market economy 
(SME) in the early 1990s, the Chinese central party-state has aggressively promoted a large-scale 
state-owned enterprise restructuring program, especially during the administration of Premier 
Zhu Rongji (1998–2003). In 1997, the 15th Party Congress put forth the policy of zhuada 
fangxiao (grasp the large, let go of the small) and this policy had a great impact on not only 
SOEs, but also private enterprises. The SOE reform before 1993 was intended to motivate the 
SOEs’ performance by changing their incentive structure without fundamentally changing 
ownership structures. The SOE reforms in the period of SME, however, pursued (1) the 
adjustment of the public economy’s industrial structure with (2) corporatization (gongsihua) of 
SOEs and (3) financialization of state-asset management (guoyou zichan zibenhua).35 China’s 
party-state grasped important industrial sectors and enterprises by designating “commanding 
heights” industries and backbone enterprises several times. The policies regarding structural 
adjustment reset the boundaries of the SOEs’ dominance and indirectly set the scope of activity 
for non-SOEs. In addition, despite only very gradual progress towards the original goals, China’s 
central party-state carried out corporatization of SOEs and financialization of the controlling 
                                                 
35 For more detailed discussions of the meaning and progress of corporatization in China, see Naughton 2015 and Li 
2015 
; 2016. For a general description of financialization, see Van der Zwan 2013, and for the financialization of China’s 
economic management, see Wang 2015.  
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public economy. These institutional changes in governance directly affected the incentive 
structure of the SOEs’ profit-seeking activities.  
 In analyzing China’s incomplete transition to a market economy, previous studies have 
also noted continued party-state–business relations. The focal point of existing studies has been 
on whether the party-state was captured by the SOEs or vice versa in the course of reform 
(Brødsgaard 2012; Chan 2009; Heilmann 2005, 2006; Yang 2015). The CCP’s tight control over 
personnel in important SOEs’ top managerial positions through the nomenklatura system has 
received particular attention.36 The nomenklatura system explains the “balance between 
economic decentralization and political coherence” (Heilmann 2005, 1) and “the coexistence of 
the contracting forces for further enterprise autonomy and continued central control” 
(Brødsgaard 2012, 624). Researchers have also looked at other aspects of government 
intervention in SOEs; for example, Yeo (2013) studied the party’s creation of new corporate 
governance modes through the establishment of external boards of directors, and Li (2016) 
examined the CCP’s role in the rise of central SOEs. While these studies have contributed to 
describing the concrete reality in China by going beyond normative approaches like the 
“transition orthodoxy” (Nolan and Wang 1998) or the “plan to market narrative” (Heilmann and 
Shih 2013, 21) mentioned in Section 1.4, they fail to show the big picture of structural change in 
state-business relations.  
 According to Capoccia (2015, 160–164), insitutional change at critical junctures can be 
explained in terms of three primary mechanisms: coalitional engineering, out-of-winset outcome, 
and the politics of ideas. This chapter pay special attention to the politics of ideas on the 
relationship of public ownership and market mechanisms. Of course, Chinese reformers’ ideas 
                                                 
36 According to Brødsgaard (2009, 80), the nomenklatura system can be defined as “a list containing those leading 
officials directly appointed by the Party as well as those officials about whom recommendations for appointment, 
release or transfer may be made by other bodies, but which require the Party’s approval.”  
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are also open to contestation, and face opposition that inevitably leads to them being largely 
revised in the course of policy making and implementation. However, the identity of China, as a 
socialist country transitioning to a market economy, remains tied to socialism, whose role cannot 
be denied although it has been weakened. Hence, the details of China’s market transition can be 
interpreted in light of its socialist identity. This chapter explains Chinese SOE reform after 1993 
by paying close attention to the social contexts that have shaped the actors’ identities. Top 
leaders’ identities determine their ways of interpreting their current situations and their ways of 
doing things (Locke and Thelen 1995). According to Chen Li (2016, 4), when Vice-President Li 
Yuanchao (2013–present) was the head of the Organizational Department of the CCP Central 
Committee, he “stressed [that] … the Party’s leadership in the SOE sector should ‘never be 
weakened’” and that “it was critical to ‘organically integrate’ the party’s leadership with the 
development of a modern enterprise system” (my emphasis). Moreover, Chen Qingtai, the 
deputy director of the Development Research Center of the State Council, defined the core of 
SOE reform as follows: “Ostensibly it [SOE reform] looks like an efficiency problem, but in 
substance it is about how the public and state-owned economy combine with the market 
economy” (Chen 2005, 2). In other words, the Chinese party-state has conducted various 
experiments to organically combine the public economy and the market economy while 
maintaining the party’s control. Within this big picture, the SOE reform was carried out in two 
directions: through restructuring the industrial system and through creating a new SOE 
governance structure. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section (4.2) explores China’s unique 
understanding of the relationship between public ownership and market mechanisms. After that, 
section 4.3 examines how the Chinese central government proceeded to change the public 
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economy’s industrial structure through selective retreat and concentration of state ownership. 
Section 4.4 analyzes how the vertical integration of planning and market mechanisms was 
embedded in the hierarchy of the party-state, SASAC, and the central SOEs. Section 4.5 
scrutinizes the implications of SOE reform for the implementation of auto industrial policy, and 
section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 The Relationship of Public Ownership and Market Mechanisms   
Expanding market mechanisms’ role in resource allocation and strengthening the party-state’s 
power to influence large central SOEs go side by side in contemporary China. How do these 
seemingly contradictory movements proceed together? The real practices of Chinese economic 
reform did not go hand in hand with political liberalization. The continuing socialist regime and 
guiding ideology provide unique solutions in the face of economic reforms. Over the two-plus 
decades since 1993, China’s SOE reforms have actively combined corporatization (gongsihua) 
and financialization (zibenhua) based on Marxist theory. Faced with a bankruptcy crisis of the 
SOEs, the Chinese central party-state pursued institutional reforms that enabled it to strengthen 
its control over strategically important SOEs and transform its total liability for the SOEs to 
limited liability. The majority shareholders of corporations enjoy both “contractual rights” and 
“property rights,” which allows companies to avoid responsibility when exercising property 
rights (Kim 2013, 2015, 2016).37 China’s corporatization of the SOEs, despite being a long, 
dragged-out process, has worked toward converting the form of state-owned assets from 
enterprises (qiye) to capital (ziben). This transition has led naturally to the financialization of the 
management of state-owned assets. Financialization is broadly defined as “the increasing role of 
                                                 
37 Section 4.4 discusses Chinese corporatization reform, but for more detailed discussions, see Hassard et al. 2007; 
Lin and Zhu 2001; Oi 2011; Zhang 2008. 
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financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005, 3). For corporatized state-owned 
assets, the government no longer directly manages the enterprises, but exercises “property rights” 
as the largest shareholder. Yingyao Wang (2015) described this new role of the government as a 
“shareholding state,” which is “embodied presently in a proliferation of ‘personified’ state 
shareholders and institutional owners who exist between the abstract state and operative SOEs” 
(608).  
 In order to induce corporatization and financialization, the party continually provided 
opinions on how the relationship between the public economy and the market economy should 
be formed. As early as 1993, a decision of the third plenary session of the CCP suggested 
“actively explor[ing] the rational forms and ways of state-owned assets management.” In 1997, 
the 15th National Congress of the CCP further pointed out that “we should try to find a form of 
public ownership that can greatly promote the development of productive forces.” In 2002, the 
16th National Congress of the CCP reiterated that “we should further explore the multiple 
effective forms of public ownership, especially the state-owned system.” The third plenary 
session of the 16th CCP Central Committee in 2003 further emphasized that the state should 
“actively explore effective forms of supervision and management of state-owned assets.” The 
fifth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2015 stressed the need to “deepen the 
reform of state-owned enterprises, and enhance the vitality of state-owned economy, control, 
influence, and anti-risk ability … [and to] improve the management system of various types of 
state-owned assets, and strengthen supervision over capital-based state-owned assets 
management to prevent the loss of state assets” (my translation and emphasis).  
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Instead of following the “transition orthodoxy” discussed in chapter 1, the CCP never 
allowed market mechanisms to replace the old system, only gradually allowing them to work in 
ways that maintained the CCP’s control and increased productive forces. However, control and 
effectiveness are hard to achieve at the same time, if not entirely incompatible. Thus, the Chinese 
central leadership employed a strategy of selection and concentration to chase two hares at once. 
First of all, while decreasing the projected scope of public ownership, a series of reforms aimed 
to increase the influence of SOEs in strategically important areas (section 4.3). Second, by 
redefining public ownership through corporatization and financialization, the Chinese top-level 
reformers created a hierarchy in which public ownership was at the top and other, diverse types 
of ownership were at the bottom. This hierarchy seems to correspond with Chinese reality as 
well as classical Marxist theory. Li Rongrong, the founding director of SASAC, elaborated on 
the Chinese socialist economic base by citing a 2000 speech by Jiang Zemin entitled 
“Consolidating and Strengthening the Socialist Economic Base”:  
 
In our country, the CCP is the governing party, which guides the people and 
exercises the power of the state. Our socialist state regime needs to be an efficient 
operation and should hold the reins in certain economic and material 
capacities. … Without a public economy that consists of the state-owned 
economy as the core, there would be no socialist economic basis: neither the reign 
of the CCP nor the overall socialist superstructure’s economic base and strong 
material means. Of this point, leading cadres at various levels, especially high-
ranking cadres, must be clearly and soberly aware. (Jiang Zemin, quoted by Li 
2013, 3; my translation)    
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Jiang Zemin’s speech made a direct link between the economic situation of China and Marxist 
theory. To uphold the CCP’s political monopoly, there had to be enough material support from 
the substructure. Public ownership and the nonpublic economy, however, have distinct roles. 
Public ownership is good at representing the advantages of a late-industrializing country, as 
suggested by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), as well as at realizing independent development 
and protecting national economic security. On the other hand, the “nonpublic ownership 
economy,” which is equivalent to a market economy mainly driven by private actors, is favorable 
for promoting market competition, upgrading industrial structure, implementing innovations in 
industrial structure, quickly developing the national economy, introducing advanced technology 
and management skills, and cooperating with global markets (Li 2013, 3–4).  
 After 20 years of experience of the socialist market economy, the third plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee of the CCP in 2014 finally named China’s realized mode of basic economic 
institutions a “mixed ownership economy” (hunhe suoyou jingji).38 A mixed economy in 
capitalist countries means a linkage between different forms of private capital, and it aims to 
smooth and eradicate crises resulting from the fundamental contradictions of capitalism. In 
contrast, a socialist mixed ownership economy means an alliance of public ownership, which is 
located in the principal position, with a nonpublic economy that is utilized to increase productive 
forces (Jia 2014, 7). Jia Huaqiang, a professor of the Central Party School, found a theoretical 
reference for “mixed ownership” in Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto:    
 
                                                 
38 For in-depth debates on the “mixed ownership economy” in Chinese, see Chang 2014, Jia 2014, Ju 2014, Qiu 
2014, Tian and Liu 2014, and Xie 2014.  
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The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital 
from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of 
the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the 
total productive forces as rapidly as possible. (my emphasis) 
 
In Jia’s (2014, 3) interpretation, prioritizing public ownership is a way of centralizing the 
instruments of production in the hands of the state; furthermore, by following the direction of the 
Communist Manifesto, the CCP allows diverse ownership structures to increase the country’s 
total productive forces. According to Jia, because history shows that a maturing commodity 
economy and a market economy cannot be transcended, pluralized agents with different 
ownership types must be allowed.  
   
4.3 Adjustment of the Public Economy’s Industrial Structure 
The SOEs’ total debt ratio, which is the ratio of total assets and total debt, increased 75% in 1995 
(People’s Daily 1996, May 9). As Figure 4-1 shows, the total deficit ratio also dramatically 
increased after the 1990s. The state had unlimited liability for SOEs, so heavily debt-ridden 
SOEs drove the state into a dangerous situation.  
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Figure 4-1. Trends of SOE deficit rates (%), 1981–1997. 
Source: Zhang and Yuan (2008, 90). 
Note: Deficit rate = (total amount of deficit / total amount of profit) * 100.  
 
As a first step to overcome the large-scale debt situation, the central party-state 
rebalanced the distribution of industries in which SOEs were concentrated. The fourth plenary 
session of the 15th CCP Central Committee in 1999 specified the following four sectors as the 
industries that the state-owned economy needed to dominate: (1) industries involving national 
security; (2) industries with natural monopolies; (3) industries that provide important public 
goods and services; and (4) key enterprises in pillar industries and high-tech industries. The first 
three categories include the entire industries as the sectors that the state needed to control, but the 
last category only covers the most important companies in the pillar and high-tech industries. In 
a pillar industry such as the auto industry, apart from a few key corporations, small enterprises 
were designated for fangxiao, “let go of the small.” The overall rebalancing of the industrial 
distribution of SOEs has had two important implications for the pillar industries. First of all, 
many SOEs in the first three categories were engaged in high-profit industries outside of their 
major business areas. For example, many military and ordnance SOEs had expanded into other 
lucrative sectors such as hotels and automobiles. The monopoly status of SOEs in the first three 
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categories ultimately led them to focus on their main business areas. In the end, the companies 
that were operating beyond their main business areas were selected for sale. Second, the central 
party-state explicitly proclaimed that a few core enterprises (gugan qiye) in the sectors of the 
fourth category would be their targets: zhuada, “grasp the large.” Declaring that the central 
government would focus on only a few important companies likely acted to neutralize the entry 
control enforced by industrial policy.  
In December 2006, the SASAC announced a new policy to strengthen the state’s control 
of the public economy. It required the state-owned economy to maintain absolute control over 
seven strategic industries and relatively strong control over key enterprises among nine other 
industries (See Table 4-1). 
 
Table 4-1. SASAC’s New Guidelines for National Economic Control, 2006 
Level of State Control  Major Targets  Specific Industries 
Absolute  7 industries Military, power grid and power generation, 
petroleum and petrochemical, telecommunication, 
coal, civil aviation, and shipping  
Relatively strong  Key enterprises 
in 9 industries 
Equipment manufacturing, automotive, digital 
information, construction, steel, nonferrous metals, 
chemical, exploration and design, science and 
technology 
 
These new guidelines were an extended version of the 1999 CCP decision. With the 
establishment of the SASAC in 2003, the SOEs specified in Table 4-1 were reorganized as 
centrally controlled enterprises (zhongyang qiye or yangqi). The number of these has been 
continuously decreased (see Table 4-2), reaching 102 as of August 2016. Table 4-3 shows the 
number of yangqis by industry, along with their income and profit, as of 2010. The seven 
industries that are absolutely state-controlled have higher profit margins due to their monopolies. 
For example, the three yangqis in the petroleum/petrochemical sector (CNOOC, CNPC, and 
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China Petrochemical Corporation) account for about 31.74 percent of all the yangqis’ net profits 
as of 2010. (See chapter 6 for more detail.) According to Zhang Hanya, vice president of China 
Investment Association, in the monopolistic industries in China at present, the proportion of 
private capital entry does not exceed 20%. Of the 80 industrial sectors in the whole society, 72 
allow the entry of state-owned enterprises, 62 allow the entry of enterprises with foreign 
investment, but only 41 allow entry by private-sector enterprises (Liu 2010). 
 
Table 4-2. Number of Centrally Controlled Enterprises (Yangqi), 2005–2013 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
No. of yangqi 166 162 155 148 129 120 117 115 113 
Source: Chen and Zhao (2014, 38); revised by author. 
 
 Table 4-3. Yangqi: Industries, Numbers, Total Operating Incomes, and Profits in 2010  
Industry Number of 
Enterprises 
Total Income Total Net Profit 
Billion RMB Proportion Billion RMB Proportion 
Petroleum and 
petrochemical 
3 4044.69 24.1% 270.54 31.7% 
Steel 3 615.25 3.7% 26.29 3.1% 
Power grid and 
generation 
9 2772.58 16.5% 72.11 8.5% 
Machinery equipment 
manufacturing 
12 713.39 4.3% 48.35 5.7% 
Construction 8 1987.52 11.8% 44.07 5.2% 
Telecommunication 3 956.23 5.7% 103.16 12.1% 
Civil aviation 3 241.07 1.4% 23.52 2.8% 
Shipping 3 323.61 1.9% 23.07 2.7% 
Trade  19 1746.09 10.4% 33.94 4.0% 
Subtotal  63 13400.43 79.9% 645.05 75.7% 
Other 57 3376.51 20.1% 207.22 24.3% 
Total  120 16776.94 100% 852.27 100% 
Source: SASAC Financial Supervision and Evaluation Bureau (October 2011), cited by Chen 
and Zhao (2014, 39–40); revised by author.  
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4.4 Embedding Vertical Integration of the Planned Economy and Market Mechanisms  
The large SOEs targeted for state control have continuously been subjected to state-initiated pilot 
projects, such as those experimenting with “large corporations, large business groups” (dagongsi, 
dajituan); a modern enterprise system (xiandai qiye zhidu); business groups (qiye jituan); and a 
shareholding system (gufenzhi). The main purpose of these experiments has been to test the 
effects of new institutional devices. The central party-state has searched for innovative 
institutions that can enhance the central government’s capacity for control while enlarging the 
SOEs. The corporatization (gongsihua or gongsizhi gaige) of traditional SOEs has been at the 
base of numerous experiments. Corporatization, however, has been a prolonged process.39 About 
corporatization in China, Naughton (2015, 54) wrote: 
 
“Corporatization” (gongsihua) came to the Chinese economic reform process in 
1993, at the beginning of the 1990s era of reforms. A reform blueprint in that year 
called for the adoption of a “modern enterprise system,” a euphemism for 
corporatization. The Company Law came into effect in July 1994, and under this 
Law traditional state-owned enterprises were to be reorganized into one of a 
variety of corporate forms. The creation of a joint stock company listed on the 
stock exchange was the most thorough option, but enterprises could also be 
reorganized without listing on the stock exchange, including through the 
formation of a limited liability corporation with a single (state) owner. Reformers 
                                                 
39 The legal framework provided by the Company Law was in place in 1994, but until 2003, only 30.4% of the 
yangqi had been reorganized. By the end of 2011, the share had increased to 72% (Wang 2012). Naughton (2015, 54) 
summarized the situation as follows: “eighteen years after the adoption of the Company Law, a quarter of SASAC’s 
firms have still not been converted. Even this overstates progress because, after all, the top-level firms are the largest 
and most important firms, and less than half of these have been converted into corporations under the Company Law. 
Most of the top-level firms are traditional state-owned enterprises with ‘managerial responsibility systems’ (SASAC 
Yearbook 2009, 57–58; Wang 2012).”  
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saw corporatization as key to both of their main policy objectives. As a 
fundamental reform of corporate governance, corporatization permitted much 
greater clarity in the relations between owner and manager, giving managers a 
more delineated scope of authority, while also allowing the creation of better 
types of incentive payment. At the same time, the corporation would provide 
greater flexibility in restructuring, since it provided new avenues to merge firms, 
spin off peripheral companies and assets, and raise funds through listing on stock 
markets.  
 
In contemporary China, the three terms for SOE (guoyou qiye), corporation/company (gongsi), 
and modern enterprise system (xiandai qiye zhidu) are used interchangeably. Legally, SOEs 
should be restricted to state-owned enterprises regulated in accord with the Enterprise Law.40 
Corporations or companies are shareholding companies regulated by the Company Law.41 The 
reformers’ corporatization agenda pursues the conversion of enterprises to companies, but the 
two different types of legal entities still coexist. The third term, modern enterprise system (MES), 
despite its use of “enterprise,” connotes state-owned companies regulated by the Company Law. 
The basic features of the MES are “clear property rights, clear-cut authority and responsibility, 
separation of politics and enterprises, and scientific management” (SPC 1996, 158). The Ninth 
Five-Year Plan set the goals of the MES as follows:  
 
                                                 
40 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (Enterprise Law), 
effective as of August 1, 1988 (http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=3789&lib=law)  
41 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (Company Law), effective as of July 1, 1994 
(http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=641) and 2013 Amendment, effective as of January 1, 
2006 (http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=218774&lib=law)   
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The MES is for adapting to the demands of socialized mass production and the 
development of the market economy. The MES is a new type of enterprise 
institution, which is based on renovation of business enterprise incorporation. The 
distinctive features of the MES are limited liability, scientific leadership structure, 
and organizational institutions, and its prevailing morphological manifestation is 
the gongsizhi company. (SPC 1996, 158; my translation) 
 
 By allowing shareholders to be the owners of companies, the Company Law clarified the 
relation between owner and company.42 When all enterprise was owned by the whole people, all 
enterprises were parts of the state at some level according to administrative “subordinate 
relations” (lishu guanxi). However, in the modern enterprise system, which is regulated by the 
Company Law, the financial relationship created through holding stock shares has replaced the 
administrative ties of state-business relations. The new financial ties also facilitated the 
formation of multilevel business groups, as encouraged by the “large corporations, large business 
groups” reform.43 With corporatization, specifying “who owns what” became an urgent issue. 
Financial ties mediated by stock sharing facilitated a hierarchical restructuring between SASAC, 
the group headquarters of the yangqis, and their subsidiaries.    
 At the business-group level, corporatization led to the formation of multilevel 
corporation systems, as shown in Figure 4-2. Under this system, both the parent company and the 
                                                 
42 About the ownership of enterprises and companies, compare the following two articles in the Enterprise Law and 
the Company Law: “The property of the enterprise shall be owned by the whole people, and shall be operated and 
managed by the enterprise with the authorization of the state in line with the principle of the separation of ownership 
and managerial authority. The enterprise shall enjoy the rights to possess, utilize and dispose of, according to law, 
the property which the state has authorized it to operate and manage (Article 2, Chapter 1 of the Enterprise Law, my 
emphasis); “The shareholders of a company shall be entitled to enjoy the capital proceeds, participate in making 
important decisions, choose managers and enjoy other rights” (Article 4, Chapter 1 of the Company Law, my 
emphasis). 
43 On the pro–big business strategy, see Eaton 2015 and Li 2015.   
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subsidiary companies are independent legal entities, which are registered separately in the 
industrial and commercial administrative bureaus (Jia, Wen, Han, and Liu 2007, 3). The state has 
allowed the corporatization of whole business groups to happen only very gradually, in part 
because of the potential for it to lead to massive labor lay-offs, which, without a state-sponsored 
social security system, might threaten social stability (Naughton 2015, 54–57).44 In most cases, 
corporatization though listing on the stock exchange was allowed only for a few of the most 
profitable subsidiary companies operating entirely within their industries’ main business area. 
Subsidiaries operating in low-profit service sectors or that had a large number of workers 
undermined the value of their listed parent companies, and so were transferred to other, unlisted 
companies. One or more of the reconstructed SOEs became the first-level subsidiaries and then 
merged under the guidance of administrative orders to establish “national teams” (guojiadui). 
The business group headquarters (mugongsi or mother company) were then placed over 
subsidiary companies (zigongsi) ex post facto. During the transition, the group headquarters had 
the highest position in the vertical structure, although they were set up to eventually function as 
intermediaries between SASAC and subsidiary companies. Even after this restructuring of the 
business group, in many cases, the group headquarters are registered as enterprises (qiye) 
according to the Enterprise Law, and subsidiary companies, especially in their main business 
areas, are registered as company (gongsi) according to the Company Law.     
 
 
                                                 
44 SOEs fulfilled many important social welfare functions during the state planning system period (qiye ban shehui), 
and in many cases they provided a considerable amount of local taxes and employment (Steinfeld 1998). 
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Figure 4-2. Multilevel corporation system of Chinese state-owned business group.  
Source: Jia et al. (2007, 4). 
Note: There is no solid line between the first-level subsidiary and below, because in the 
multilevel corporate system, there are very complex cross-shareholding phenomena, rather than 
a straight-line relationship. For example, a second-tier company’s shareholders can be 
diversified, possibly including the parent company, one or more first-level subsidiaries, and 
external investors. 
 
 The group headquarters were intentionally created to be intermediary agencies between 
SASAC and subsidiary companies. Although group headquarters’ ownership relations with the 
subsidiary companies are diverse, including wholly owned, majority holding, or equity 
participating, the group headquarters are solely owned by SASAC. The strategy of forming large 
business groups provided the party-state a convenient tool for controlling the business groups 
indirectly. As the single owner of the group headquarters, SASAC has the right to appoint top 
executives, dispatch independent board members, and conduct audits. The clarification of the 
ownership structure also freed SASAC from unlimited liability for state-owned business groups. 
However, SASAC does not have a legal rationale to intervene in subsidiary-level firms, creating 
the need for an agency that has the legal right to do so. A Chinese scholar, Yang Yungao (2008), 
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described the parent company as a corporate Politburo (gongsi zhengzhiju). Sutherland and Ning 
(2015, 140) evaluated this pyramid group formation strategy as a “desirable option for those 
accustomed to holding power.”  
 At the central state and yangqi level, the establishment of SASAC bestowed much more 
autonomy than before by clarifying responsibilities as follows. First, SASAC clarified ownership 
in the central and local vertical structure. Because the “central SASAC has no direct hierarchical 
authority over local SASACs” as Naughton (2006, 17) noted, the local states were able to 
manage their assets more independently. Second, SASAC also clarified responsibilities among 
horizontal central ministries. Finally, SASAC separated the institutions responsible for 
macroeconomic policy (NDRC) from those with ownership (SASAC) (Chen 2005). But above 
all, financial ties between SASAC and central SOEs further strengthened financial incentives. A 
vital consideration in the eyes of SASAC is how to increase, or at least preserve, the value of 
state-owned assets. SASAC has been revising its evaluation criteria for top SOE managers, but, 
still, “profit taking typically [takes] on a weight between one-third and two-thirds of the total” in 
the evaluation criteria (Naughton 2015, 56). This financialized incentive structure has had 
profound effects on the SOEs’ operation.  
 
4.5 Implications for Auto Industrial Policy Implementation 
After the Zhu Rongji period’s SOE restructuring, only two business groups in the automotive 
sector, FAW and Dongfeng, were restructured into SASAC-controlled yangqis. The changes in 
state-business relations have had different impacts on auto industrial policy implementation for 
these two yangqis and the other enterprises in the industry.  
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4.5.1 Opening Up Chances for Non-State Enterprises by Selective Retreat 
The overall situation of SOEs in the auto industry during the late 1990s was fairly similar to that 
of other SOEs. As shown in Table 4-4, in 1998, 66 out of 115 auto manufacturers were state-
owned, and 37 of these (56% of all SOEs) were in the red. Even though SOEs produced more 
than 40% of the total output value, they were losing money. Only limited liability companies and 
JVs were operating in the black, with the JVs reaping more than 90% of total profits. After the 
period of 1997–1999, which was dubbed “the three years of getting away from difficulty” 
(sannian tuokun),45 the total number of auto manufacturer SOEs and the deficit companies 
among them decreased dramatically. Between 1998 and 2002, 30 SOEs had transformed 
ownership types, and the remaining SOEs’ total profit value went up; the number of deficit SOEs 
decreased from 37 to 13. Based on these numbers, it is logical to infer that the majority of the 
transformed SOEs had been in deficit in 1998. Thus, the original intentions of “grasp the large, 
let go of the small” were realized in the auto industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 The first plenary session of the 15th CCP Congress held in autumn of 1997 urged the government to “extricate 
[itself from] the majority of state-owned loss-making enterprises, and strive to establish a modern enterprise system 
in the majority of large and medium SOEs within three years.” This is the origin of the phrase “the three years of 
getting away from difficulty” (Zhang and Yuan 2008, 119). 
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Table 4-4. Total Number of Automobile Companies, Number of Deficit Companies, and 
Percentage of Total Output Value and Profit by Ownership Types, 1998, 2002, 2005, and 2011 
 Total State Collective Cooperatives Joint 
Ownership 
Limited-
Liability 
Shareholding Private HMT 
JV 
JV 
1998           
Total # of 
companies 
115 66 2 2 1 20 4 0 6 14 
# of deficit 
companies 
59 37 2 1 1 7 2 0 2 7 
Total output value 
(%) 
 
43.49 0.06 0.21 0.11 22.18 0.38 0 1.45 32.17 
Total profit (%)  
-16.64 -1.21 -0.29 -0.52 31.31 -2.1 0 -1.52 90.99 
2002           
Total # of 
companies 
117 36 0 2 0 37 14 0 6 22 
# of deficit 
companies 
31 13 0 0 0 7 2 0 2 7 
 26.49 36.1 0 0 0 18.91 14.28 0 33.3 31.81 
Total output value 
(%) 
 
47.23 0 0.21 0 21.48 5.57 0 3.1 22.32 
Total profit (%)  
43.43 0 0.1 0 13.22 -2.05 0 2.19 43.08 
2005           
Total # of 
companies 
117 34 0 1 0 41 10 1 4 26 
# of deficit 
companies 
35 14 0 0 0 14 2 1 1 3 
 29.91 41.17 0 0 0 34.14 20 100 25 11.53 
Total output value 
(%) 
 
27.49 0 0.1 0 22.31 12.43 0 1.31 36.33 
Total profit (%)  
13.72 0 0.05 0 9.64 1.4 -0.02 0.39 74.91 
2011           
Total # of 
companies 
115 12 1 1 1 28 17 8 4 43 
# of deficit 
companies 
18 2 1 1 1 8 0 2 0 3 
 15.65 16.6 100 100 100 28.57 0 25 0 6.9 
Total output value 
(%) 
 
29.62 0.34 0.59 0.89 16.71 11.17 2.94 0.9 36.79 
Total profit (%)  
30.14 0.11 0.23 0.34 17.73 12.06 2.95 0.89 36.51 
Source: Compiled by author from China Automotive Industry Yearbook, multiple years.  
Note: Ownership types: (1) Domestic-funded corporations: state-owned (guoyou), collective-
owned (jiti), shareholding cooperatives (gufen hezuo), joint ownership (lianying), limited 
liability corporations (youxian zeren gongsi), shareholding corporations (gufen youxian gongsi), 
private (siying); (2) HMT JV: corporations with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
(Gang Ao Taishanng touzi gongsi); (3) JV: foreign funded enterprises (waishang touzi qiye). 
 
 However, it is a serious misunderstanding to equate ownership transformation with 
privatization (Guo 2003, 566–567). The most increased ownership types are limited liability 
companies (youxian zeren gongsi) and shareholding companies (gufen youxian gongsi). The 
former type increased from 20 to 37 between 1998 and 2002. The number of the latter rose from 
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4 to 14 during the same period. The creation of limited liability corporations was the dominant 
method used for the large SOEs, with listed stock, mergers, and acquisitions among state 
shareholders. The formation of shareholding companies was the preferred method for small 
SOEs. Making them into shareholding cooperatives (gufen hezuo) entailed selling small SOEs to 
all employees through full implementation of employee ownership. By purchasing stock, the 
workers became the shareholders. This type of ownership transformation was much easier to 
implement than other types because the “joint stock system” (gufenzhi), in which workers 
became the owners of the company, was believed to accord with socialism (Zhang and Yuan 
2008, 87). 
The transformation of small and medium SOEs, along with the decrease in the central 
government’s supervision capability caused by the organizational reforms (chapter 3), together 
created a rare opportunity for nontraditional actors to enter the auto manufacturing industry. 
Owing to the industry’s high profits and high developmental potential (Lu and Feng 2004), many 
nontraditional players were eager to join and ride the wave of what became a car manufacturing 
“fever” or “movement” (Rensheng Yang 2004). The performance record of private companies is 
available only from 2005 (Table 4-4), but private or subprovincial local governments’ journeys 
to secure vehicle production permits, preferably sedan production licenses, had already started 
around the mid-1990s, in the middle of zhuada fangxiao. This was the case for Geely, which 
introduced its first sedan model in 1998 under a bus production license, as it did not receive a 
sedan production license until 2001 (Li 2014). 
In 2003, BYD, a private company that was a frontrunner in the battery industry, 
purchased 77% of the stock of Xian Qinchuan Auto Limited Liability Companies and entered the 
sedan production industry. BYD’s successful entry into the sedan industry is a typical example 
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of how the SOE ownership reform distorted AIP implementation, especially entry control. Xian 
Qinchuan Auto was affiliated with the China Weapon Industry Corporation. As explained in 
section 4.3, the 1999 CCP decision on SOE reform specified four priority realms for public 
ownership control. These four realms became the primary targets of the “grasp the large” 
strategy. In July 1999, five defense corporations transformed into 10 defense business groups. 
These 10 large business groups became the backbone of the central SOEs (Zhu 2011, 277–281). 
In 2003, Xian Qinchuan Auto was a residue of the process of grasping the large. Furthermore, it 
was January when BYD bought in, and the new agency responsible for industrial policy, NDRC, 
was not established until March of that year. Auto production licenses were not eligible for 
transfer, but the absence of administrative power allowed the emergence of new actors in the 
auto industry.  
 
4.5.2 Distorted Incentive Structures of State-Led Corporatization and Financialization  
State-led corporatization and financialization contributed to the creation of the vertical hierarchy 
that put SASAC above the central SOEs. This hierarchical structure has led central SOEs to 
pursue financial interests rather than implement the goals of the auto industrial policy. According 
to the 2012 National Audit Office Report on the FAW:  
 
Between 2008 and 2010, the proportion of independent research and development 
investment was low; the profitability of independent brand cars was not strong; 
and the FAW Group’s profits [came] mainly from the joint venture subsidiaries. 
(National Audit Office 2012; my translation) 
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Rather than fulling the goals of industrial policies, the largest beneficiary of the AIP, FAW, 
became parts suppliers for the JVs. Its independent brand sedan Benteng’s annual sales 
performance also has been poor, remaining below 50,000 units per year (Yuan 2012).  
 The distorted incentive structure is mainly caused by the long chains of “principal-agent” 
relations from SASAC at the top, to business group headquarters in the middle, and to the 
subsidiary companies at the bottom. To strengthen control over their agents, SASAC and group 
headquarters sought various control measures. First, SASAC promoted a “board of directors” 
experiment at central-level SOEs (Yeo 2013). A board of directors is a requirement for a 
corporatized company, but many companies had not established a board even after the 
conversion. The FAW Car Co., Ltd. (stock code: 000800), a listed FAW first-level subsidiary 
company, established its official board of directors in 2013. Among seven board members, three 
were FAW Group employees (including one manager and one party committee secretary) and 
four were independent (People’s Daily 2013, April 18). Those four external board members were 
directly dispatched by SASAC. Second, SASAC also regularly sends auditors to central SOEs. 
Finally, as the ultimate owner of the central SOEs, SASAC appoints the top management with 
the cooperation of the State Council and the Party’s Department of Organization. A survey of 
nine central SOEs, conducted between the period of December 2005 and July 2006, showed that 
a third of the top managers were appointed by SASAC alone, and another third were appointed 
by SASAC in cooperation with the CCP Department of Organization. Because of the enormous 
influence of SASAC through its control of personnel, the top managers of central SOEs have to 
pay attention to SASAC’s evaluation criteria.  
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Table 4-5. Top Managers’ Appointments in Nine Central SOEs, 2006 
 Agencies Responsible for Top Managers’ Appointment 
 Number of 
Surveyed 
SOEs 
State 
Council 
State Council 
& Dept. of 
Organization 
Dept. of 
Organization 
SASAC & 
Dept. of 
Organization 
SASAC 
Number 9 1 1 1 3 3 
Percentage 100% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 33.33% 33.33% 
Source: Jia et al. (2007, 13).  
 
The First Auto Works (FAW) group, as of 2005, comprised one parent company, 30 
wholly owned subsidiary companies, 17 holding subsidiary companies, and 28 equity 
participating companies. Facing 75 subsidiary companies, the group headquarters shares the 
worries of SASAC. In regard to corporate governance, its primary concern is how to make the 
subsidiary companies follow the group headquarters’ intentions. The working mechanisms 
within the group hierarchy are fairly similar to the relationship between SASAC and the parent 
company. In August 2004, SASAC organized a meeting for central SOE executives to share their 
experiences in connection to some of the important topics of SOE reform. Based on this 
conference, SASAC published a collection of exemplary cases of central SOEs in a book entitled 
Exploration and Practice for Being Strong and Large (2005). The FAW group contributed a 
section about parent-subsidiary company management, which emphasized the different roles of 
group headquarters and subsidiary companies: the former is in charge of planning, while the 
latter is in charge of operations. In order to function as a single business group, linking these two 
different systems is a critical task.  
The FAW’s contribution suggested three different measures to tightly connect the two 
separate systems. First, the parent company should control personnel affairs at the subsidiary 
companies by placing managers in concurrent positions at the parent and subsidiary companies. 
The chairs of the boards of directors at subsidiary companies are usually held by the general 
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manager or vice general manager of the parent company. The other board members are also 
high-ranking managers at the parent companies. Second, the parent company should run the 
auditing system, sending auditors (who are high-ranking members of the parent company as well) 
directly to their wholly owned subsidiary companies. Finally, the parent company should lead 
and oversee all decision-making processes, providing agendas in advance. Because the 
ownership structures of subsidiary companies are diversified, the parent company must employ 
different measures to control agenda-setting. In the case of listed or joint venture subsidiary 
companies, little room for intervention may remain, as the management is much more 
institutionalized and standardized by company law or JV contracts. But for nonlisted, wholly 
owned subsidiary companies, the parent company, as the sole shareholder, can devise more 
complicated ways to control decision-making processes. As the term “inside first, outside later” 
indicates, because the parent company is not directly involved in operations, the subsidiary 
companies (inside) can initiate discussion on important matters. But at the same time, the 
subsidiary companies must consult the board members, who are dispatched from the parent 
company, and report to their functional division of the parent company. Once the functional 
division at the headquarters accepts a report from the subsidiary company, a review at the parent 
company (outside) must be completed before a final decision is taken by the subsidiary company. 
The functional division transfers the matter to the related committees and the general managers’ 
business meeting. A matter can be put on the agenda of a board of directors’ meeting at the 
subsidiary company only after getting permission to do so from the parent company (SASAC 
2005). 
To further ensure that subsidiary companies’ board meeting decisions accord with the 
intentions of the parent company, the sequence of board meetings is also set up in advance. The 
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main agenda of board meetings held in the spring must be about planning and implementation, 
and the meetings at subsidiary companies must follow those at the parent company. Fall board 
meetings’ agenda must be about budgets, and the meetings at the subsidiary companies must be 
held after the group’s annual investment meeting. In this way, the group headquarters can give 
regular guidance to its subsidiary companies.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has traced the changes in state-business relations, and their impacts on AIP 
implementation, after the Zhu Rongji period’s “grasp the large, let go of the small” strategy. 
Contrary to the claims of “plan to market transition” proponents, Chinese reformers postulated a 
superstructure and a substructure, with different mechanisms and goals, by referring to Marxist 
theory. The superstructure should run by the command of the party-state; hence, it is not much 
different from a traditional planning system. In contrast, the substructure was intended to 
maximize productive capacity by incorporating market mechanisms. While the super and 
substructures are run by different mechanisms, the party-state devised institutional tools to 
mediate between the two systems.  
The dualistic approach to overall SOE reform applied to the individual industries, 
including the auto industry, as well. At the industry level, the point of “grasp the large, let go of 
the small” was to select the important enterprises and consolidate them under the new state-
owned assets management system. The selected firms became part of the superstructure that was 
directly under the party-state’s political control. At the same time, the reform opened rare 
opportunities for new actors to enter the auto industry. The medium and small SOEs that were 
dropped from direct state-ownership were assigned new missions as the substructure. Despite 
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continued implementation of strict entry control, the Chinese central government granted new 
actors legitimate qualifications to operate as far as they were able to help increase the total 
productive forces as rapidly as possible.  
At the business-group level, within those grasped by the newly established SASAC, the 
strategy of “large corporations, large business groups” (dagongsi, dajituan) reformulated central 
SOEs to run in a “multilevel corporate body management system.” The parent company 
(superstructure) is solely owned by SASAC, but the ownership types at subsidiary companies 
(substructure) are diversified among wholly owned, majority holding, or equity participating. 
The Chinese-style vertical integration of planning and market mechanisms did not transform 
ailing SOEs into efficient ones. But this vertical integration allowed the state to maintain a firm 
grip on important economic sectors. The Chinese party-state’s continued intervention through 
vertical integration is not enough to enhance economic efficiency, because of the long chains of 
“principal-agent” relations and the large potential for rent-seeking activities and short-term 
profit-seeking by high-level cadre-entrepreneurs due to frequent personnel rotation. Despite 
these shortcomings, the continuing intervention of the state through vertically embedded market 
mechanisms within the state planning system expanded, rather than hampered, market functions 
in overall resource allocation. In a transitional economy like China’s, where market mechanisms 
and market actors did not originally exist, more consistent rule-making functions that eventually 
supported market operations were urgently needed. Therefore, counter to the predictions that an 
economy in transition must follow a “plan to market narrative” or “transition orthodoxy,” market 
mechanisms in China did not arise from the complete extinction of the state planning system, but 
alongside it as the party-state remolded its shape and functions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Central-Local Fiscal Restructuring and the Rise of the Local Corporate State 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Chinese central government initiated fiscal reforms to enhance central fiscal capacities as 
part of its efforts to build the socialist market economy from 1994 onwards. In 1994, a 
tax-sharing system (fenshuizhi; TSS) replaced the previous tax-contracting system, and this fiscal 
reform changed local governments’ incentive structures and, subsequently, the local 
development model. Although secure property rights are traditionally considered to be a 
necessary condition for high economic growth (North and Weingast 1989), institutional settings 
in early reform China were not versed in protecting property rights at the individual level. The 
fiscal contracting system before 1994 instead promoted a merged state and economy, with local 
government officials “acting as the equivalent of a board of directors” (Oi 1992, 100). Fiscal 
contracting, according to Oi, “assigned local governments property rights over increased income 
and … created local officials to pursue local economic development” (100). Under the fiscal 
contracting system, local government was allowed to retain tax surpluses beyond a contracted 
“baseline amount” regardless of the tax category. Therefore, the local government had a strong 
incentive to own and farm cash cows to fill its coffers. In contrast, under the TSS, taxes are 
assigned to central government or local governments, and shared differently according to their 
category. (See Table 5-2.) Under the previous system, what was important was not what was 
taken out, but what was left. The tax surplus had mattered a great deal to local governments. But 
under the new fiscal system, a development strategy that could selectively increase only local 
taxes became a much more reasonable approach for local officials. 
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This chapter argues that fiscal reform after 1993, when the socialist market economy was 
initiated, changed the roles and incentives of local governments and that these changes 
subsequently affected the coalition politics of auto industrial policy by shifting the relations of 
local governments and SOEs.46 Fiscal reform along with banking reform increased the costs of 
directly owing collective or state-owned enterprises especially at subprovincial levels. Hence, 
local governments actively compete with each other to attract more businesses that can create 
more taxes and employment. Before 1993, Chinese society was composed of like units such as 
danwei at different levels; hence, the functional division of labor was inchoate.47 Even central 
and provincial governments’ major roles were quite similar. However, the 1994 fiscal 
centralization reform and bank reform, which severed banks from provincial governments, 
changed local government incentives and their roles in industrial governance. Because every 
province had the same incentives, the new type of local state, that is, the “local corporate state,” 
replaced the previous “local state corporatism” (Oi 1992). The rise of the “local corporate state” 
proceeded in tandem with the central government’s efforts to consolidate the large central SOEs. 
These conflicting movements led to the formation of two major coalitions in the auto industry, 
which subsequently further constrained effective implementation of auto industrial policy.  
In the next section (5.2), I analyze how the 1994 fiscal reform shifted the cost structure of 
SOE ownership. Local reactions to the changed cost structure differed, so I then examine varying 
arrangements of local government-business relations with three case studies (section 5.3). 
Section 5.4 of this chapter explores the formation of coalitions in the auto industry and its impact 
on auto industrial policy implementation, and section 5.5 concludes the chapter.  
                                                 
46 Banking reform also contributed to loosening relations between local governments and SOEs. See Yang 2004. 
47 Vivienne Shue (1988) called the structural pattern of Chinese cell-liked communities and bureaucratic units as 
“honeycomb” model. Like a cell in honeycomb, danwei had been a self-sufficient unit. For the historical and 
comparative analysis on danwei, see Lu and Perry eds. 1997.  
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5.2 Fiscal Reform and the Changing Cost Structure of SOEs 
Tax-sharing reform and industrial policy were both launched to accomplish the goals of the 
socialist market economy around 1994. The former was mainly introduced to remedy the “two 
ratios” problem. The previous fiscal contracting system, which was launched in the mid-1980s 
and further developed in 1988, was successful in motivating local economic development, but 
seriously weakened the central government’s fiscal capacity. “Two ratios” refers to the ratios of 
(1) fiscal revenue to GDP and (2) central fiscal revenue to total fiscal revenue. The first ratio was 
28.4% in 1979, but it decreased to 12.6% in 1993. The second ratio also declined dramatically, 
from 46.8% to 31.6%, in the same period (Wang 1997). The fall in the two ratios severely 
damaged the central state’s fiscal capabilities and led to fiscal reform. (See Figure 5-1.) On the 
other hand, one of the major intentions of promoting industrial policy was to make it a substitute 
for economic planning. Socialist planning had proved to be obsolete and insufficient to bring the 
expected level of economic growth, and therefore the agreement to dismantle the old planning 
system was reached easily. But Chinese leaders never intended to lose policy tools that allowed 
them to lead the trends of economic development or to intervene in the economy whenever they 
thought it necessary. Whereas the fiscal reform was intended to strengthen central fiscal capacity, 
the industrial policy was designed to let the central government keep hold of the reins of the 
economy.48 The change in the former, however, transformed local governments’ incentives and 
the policy tools they could use. These changes consequently changed local governments’ 
                                                 
48 In 1987, the Development Research Center of the State Council in China published a research article about 
industrial policy that was widely circulated among Chinese policy makers. The article defined the primary function 
of industrial policy as follows: “At this stage, [industrial policy] has the function of filling the vacuum of the 
planned economy and promoting the market economy, and it needs to become a useful tool for transitioning towards 
a planned commodity economy” (Li, Zhou, Liu and Lin 1999 [1987], 8; my translation). When the fierce debate 
about market and planned economies reached a deadlock, Chinese policy makers expected the roles of industrial 
policy to offer an intermediate mechanism to smooth the transition.    
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economic behaviors as well as the relations between local states and SOEs. The local 
development model under the new fiscal arrangements eventually came into conflict with central 
industrial policy.     
 
 
Figure 5-1. Changes of the “two ratios” before and after the 1994 tax-sharing system. 
Source: http://rhg.com/notes/chinas-fiscal-and-tax-reforms-a-critical-move-on-the-chessboard 
 
After the 1994 fiscal reform, a saying that can be translated as “Do not pursue ownership 
of the firm, but seek to locate the firm within your boundaries and further strive for development” 
was widely circulated among Chinese local officials (Zhang and Yuan 2008, 176). Table 5-1 
shows the changing sources of local taxes before and after the 1994 tax-sharing reform. First, 
commodity turnover taxes (production tax and value added tax) were abolished or reduced in 
importance. The production tax (chanpinshui) was completely removed in 1994. While the 
contribution of value added tax (VAT) to local taxes peaked in 1994, it then continuously 
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decreased, from 23.28% in 1991 to 15.89% in 2010. The decline of the commodity turnover 
taxes in local tax revenues undermined motivation for “pursuing ownership of the firm.” Even 
though business tax (yingyeshui) has been one of the largest sources of local tax revenues, it was 
not an amenable target for local governments before the 1994 TSS reform. Business tax is 
mainly “levied on the construction industry and tertiary industry, with the former the greatest 
contributor,” but local governments did not have the mandate to expand construction at that time, 
and the level of industrialization was simply not great enough to create flourishing tertiary 
industries (Sun and Zhou 2014, 55). As a result, commodity turnover taxes were considered to be 
a more viable target to increase local tax revenues. Whether or not a product is profitable, 
turnover taxes are levied once a firm has started production. For instance, VAT is levied on the 
added value between the input of materials and product output. The cost of final output is always 
higher than raw material, because wage costs and equipment depreciation must be added during 
the production process. Hence, in Sun and Zhou’s words, “the combination of a tax system based 
on turnover tax and a fiscal system with a fixed turnover base was a strong motivation for local 
governments to develop local enterprises, especially township and village enterprises” (52). 
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Table 5-1. Breakdown of Local Government Taxes in 1991, 1994, and 2010 
 1991 % 1994 % 2010 % 
Production Tax 473.13 21.41 0 0  0 
VAT 514.56 23.28 579.98 25.27 5196.27 15.89 
Company Income Tax 272.24 12.32 291.51 12.70 5048.37 15.43 
Business Tax 526.59 23.83 647.36 28.20 11004.57 33.65 
Tax on Resources 18.80 0.85 45.45 1.98 417.57 1.27 
Personal Income Tax  0  0 1973.30 6.03 
Urban Land Using Tax 15.74 0.71 32.51 1.41 1004.01 3.07 
Stamp Tax on Security Exchanges 10.16 0.45 22.66 0.98 16.34 0.04 
Other Industrial and Commercial Taxes 156.22 7.06 226.02 9.84  0 
Salt Tax 8.37 0.37  0  0 
Agriculture Tax 72.79 3.29 195.02 8.49  0 
Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax 97.83 4.42 174.63 7.60 1736.27 5.30 
Fixed Assets Investment Adjustment Tax  30.86 1.39 43.30 1.88  0 
Tax on the Use of Arable Land 13.33 0.60 36.47 1.58 888.64 2.71 
Other Taxes  0  0 5455.15 16.68 
Total 2209.62 100.00 2294.91 100.00 32701.49 100.00 
Note: Unit: 100 million RMB 
Source: Compiled by author from Finance Yearbook of China (1992, 1995, 2011) 
 
Company income tax was another factor that had motivated local governments to pursue 
owning firms before the fiscal reform. In 1991, for example, company income tax was the fourth 
largest source of local tax revenues. Because commodity turnover tax and company income tax 
(boxed in Table 5-1) flow towards the owner according to the “subordinate relation” (lishu 
guanxi), these taxes motivated local governments to nurture their own state-owned or collective 
firms. If we only count the contribution ratio of commodity turnover tax and company income 
tax, it had already reached more than 56% of local tax revenues in 1991. Because increasing 
revenue from business tax was still beyond local governments’ capacities, nurturing locally 
owned firms was a reasonable strategy to improve local budget conditions.     
Another change that stands out after the 1994 TSS is the rise of business tax’s share of 
total local government taxes. Business tax contributed 23.83% of local revenue in 1991, and 
33.65% in 2010. Except for production tax, which was abolished in 1994, the ranking of the 
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primary sources has been relatively stable. (Figure 5-2) But the importance of business tax 
became much greater after 1994. The gap between business tax and VAT was less than 1 
percentage point in 1991, but continuously widened until it was 17.76 percentage points in 2010. 
After the TSS reform, commodity turnover taxes lost their previous position in local government 
revenues, with business tax filling the gap. This change resulted from the new incentives 
accompanying the fiscal reform. The essential feature of the 1994 tax-sharing reform is that it 
changed the ways tax revenues were shared between central and local governments by shifting 
from “a negotiated system of general revenue sharing to a mix of tax assignments and tax sharing” 
(Wong and Bird 2008, 434). Table 5-2 presents the categories of tax assignments between the 
central and provincial governments.  
 
 
Figure 5-2. Four major sources of local government taxes, 1991–2009. 
Source: Compiled by author from Finance Yearbook of China, numerous years. 
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Table 5-2. Revenue Assignments between the Central and Provincial Governments  
(Source: World Bank [2002, Table 4.1], cited by Wong and Bird [2008, 435]) 
 
I. Taxes exclusively assigned to the central government 
1. Excise taxes 
2. Taxes collected from the Ministry of Railroads and from the headquarters of banks and 
insurance companies 
3. Income taxes, sales taxes, and royalties from offshore oil activities of foreign companies and 
joint ventures 
4. Energy and transportation fund contribution 
5. Seventy percent of the three sales taxes collected from enterprise owned by the Ministry of 
Industry, the Ministry of Power, SINOPEC (petrochemicals), and the China nonferrous metal 
companies 
6. All customs duty, VAT, and excise tax on imports 
7. Enterprise income tax collected from banks and other financial institutions 
II. Taxes shared between the central and local governments 
1. Value-added tax (75% central and 25% provincial) 
2. Natural resources taxes (coal, gas, and other minerals if the enterprises are fully Chinese 
owned) 
3. Construction tax on the cost of construction of buildings that are outside the plan and 
financed from retained earnings 
4. Salt tax 
5. Industrial and commercial tax, and income tax levided on foreign and joint venture 
enterprises 
6. Security and exchange tax (50% central and 50% provincial) – added in late 1990s 
7. Income tax of all enterprises – added in 2002 
8. Personal income taxes – added in 2002 
III. Taxes exclusively assigned to local governments 
1. Business (gross receipts) tax falling on sectors not covered by VAT (transportation and 
communications, construction, finance and insurance, post and telecommunications, culture 
and sports, entertainment, hotels and restaurants, and other) 
2. Rural market (stall rental) trading tax 
3. The urban maintenance and construction tax (a surcharge on the tax liability of enterprises for 
business tax, CT, and VAT) 
4. The urban land-use tax 
5. Vehicle and vessel utilization tax 
6. Thirty percent of the product and VAT revenues collected from enterprises owned by the 
Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Power, SINOPEC, and the China nonferrous metal 
companies 
7. Value-added tax on land 
8. Education surtax 
9. Entertainment and slaughter taxes 
10. Property tax 
11. Surtax on collective enterprises 
12. Resources tax 
13. Fixed-asset investment tax (discontinued in 1999) 
14. Fines on delinquent taxes 
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VAT was assigned to the shared taxes, with 75% going to the central government and 
only 25% to the local. (II-1 in Table 5-2) While company income tax remained a local tax at the 
beginning of the TSS, it was also added to the shared taxes in 2002. (II-7 in Table 5-2) These 
changes further cooled local interest in owning enterprises. The loosened relations between local 
governments and SOEs had several implications for local development models. First, even after 
the TSS, the business tax was still solely a local tax; thus, local governments spontaneously 
changed their development strategies to garner more business tax. (III-1 in Table 5-2) Among 
industries, those that have large industrial linkages (Su, Tao, and Yang, forthcoming) or are 
related to land development (Sun and Zhou 2014) generate more business tax, and hence became 
preferable targets. Second, the loosened relationships also facilitated ownership transformation 
for local SOEs and Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), as addressed in chapter 4. The 
relative ease of ownership transformation during the period of Zhu Rongji’s administration 
mainly resulted from the changes of local governments’ incentive structures caused by the TSS. 
Finally, the loosening relationships also opened up new chances for private enterprises. Local 
governments now started to pursue having any ownership-type businesses located within their 
boundaries, rather than trying to own the firms. If private firms can generate a good amount of 
local taxes and increase employment, local governments are willing to sponsor non-SOEs in their 
boundaries.  
 
5.3 Rise of the Local Corporate State and Diverse Local Government-Business Relations  
Institutional reforms accompanying the socialist market economy, including government 
organization reforms, SOE reforms, banking reforms, and fiscal reforms, led to complex 
interactions among multidirectional incentives. Overall, the reforms that followed the 
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inauguration of the socialist market economy aimed to maintain the central government’s firm 
grip over the economy through industrial policy, centralize more fiscal power through the TSS in 
1994, and strengthen central control over the large SOEs by establishing the SASAC in 2002. 
Because these reforms were oriented towards centralization, they differentiated the roles of 
central and local governments. The position of the local governments has never been equivalent 
to that of the central government, but in the previous fiscal contracting system their tasks were 
similar. Once a contract was established, and to the extent that a local government was able to 
fulfill its promises, most of the details of local administration were left to local leaders. The 
major differences between central and local administrations were ones of scale rather than 
responsibility. But after the TSS, clear divisions of labor between central and local governments 
emerged. In contrast to the pre-TSS “two ratios,” the new fiscal system allocated the lion’s share 
of tax revenues to the central government. The central government thus gained greater freedom 
from fiscal revenue concerns. In regard to SOEs, the central government began to step up its role 
as an asset owner by establishing the SASAC in 2003, and it now acts as controlling shareholder 
of about one hundred central state–owned mega–business groups and most of the commercial 
banks through Central Huijin Investment Ltd.49  
In contrast with the central government’s strengthened control over large SOEs, local 
governments’ situations vary according to their level. The situation of affluent provincial-level 
local governments, such as Shanghai, is similar to that of the central government. But most 
subprovincial governments face more fiscal constraints as well as disincentives to taking direct 
                                                 
49 As mentioned in chapter 3, SASAC does not oversee banking sectors. Central Huijin takes that role in the banking 
and financial sectors, holding shares in 19 institutions as of December 31, 2015. For the information of its current 
shares, see:   
http://www.huijin-
inv.cn/wps/portal/!ut/p/a1/pZHNDoIwEISfxQcwuwIpeKyg_EjlQIjYC2mM_CRSiCEefHoL0SPFxLlt8k1mdhc45M
CleDaVGJpOivs4c1KckODGTTFCRg9IHdyzxIyMJCMKuCjA9Wlg2TEiWo6BobcLPHvLEEOi9RPz48cZUdT5nf
SbrwF-yp8BfMv8yz8CC_eLJkCzvwowHsxlFfBeDPW6kWUHed21t-Iq4Qxcl-AfjQVg3HACdC9c6rjQwYS-
zZTyV1ymYRPS1RuhAyPa/dl5/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/  
 124 
ownership of firms. Every local government faces the urgent need to farm tax bases, but their 
varying local conditions have made them choose different strategies. Under the fiscal contracting 
system before 1993, directly owing firms was the most lucrative way to increase fiscal revenue. 
But the TSS opened new possibilities for diverse relations between local governments and 
enterprises.  
Zhao Shukai (2012), director general of the information center of the Development 
Research Center of the State Council, called this new type of local state the “corporate state,” in 
contrast to Jean Oi’s (1982) “local state corporatism.” Zhao identified three essential 
characteristics of the local corporate state: (1) a corporatized incentive structure, (2) a 
fragmented authority structure, and (3) a movement-type behavioral model. As a corporation, 
local government’s primary goal was to maximize fiscal revenue, so investment promotion 
became the most important task of the government. Local leaders frequently advertised their 
locales’ “low land prices,” “special taxes,” “low-interest loans,” and even “guaranteed 
acquisition of operation permits” (zhunshengzheng) (interview with a local government official, 
November 5, 2013, Tianjin). The behavior patterns of local corporate states, however, vary 
according to their administrative hierarchy and their local endowments. Hence, even though the 
TSS pushed local states to become “local corporate states,” each local state started by exploiting 
the resources it possessed. In the case of the auto industry, three changes in local state-business 
relations are especially apparent. In the fierce competition to “invite business and attract 
investments” (zhaoshang yinzi), the auto industry became an attractive target for local 
governments for multiple reasons. First, it has vast industrial linkages to other industries from 
primary to tertiary, as well as significant employment effects. Second, as a symbol of the 
manufacturing sector, the auto industry has a demonstration effect. Third, the auto industry 
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generates considerably more tax revenue than other manufacturing sectors. Finally, it is 
environmentally friendly, which has recently become an important criterion in cadre 
performance evaluation (interview with a high-ranking manager at an auto MNC in charge of 
negotiation with Chinese local governments, January 15, 2013, Beijing).   
 
5.3.1 Growing leverage of private firms vis-à-vis local governments  
The first change that emerged in local state-business relations after the TSS was the growing 
leverage of private actors over local governments. The changing relationships of Geely, a private 
auto company, with numerous local governments are typical in the rapid ascendancy of the 
private firm vis-à-vis the local states. When the first AIP was issued in 1994, the central 
government raised the entry barrier to the auto industry by controlling vehicle production 
licenses. The 1994 AIP intended to nurture a few large SOEs; at that time, it would have been 
unimaginable for Li Shufu, the founding father of Geely, to enter the auto manufacturing 
industry. Furthermore, because most of the vehicles produced were not bought by individuals but 
by institutions, private automakers had little chance of winning customers away from the 
incumbent SOEs. But when the new tide of “grasping the large, letting go the small” (zhuada 
fangshao) rolled in during Zhu Rongji’s administration, it opened a small space for new entrants 
in the protected auto industry. As mentioned earlier, the incentive to directly own firms has 
continuously decreased, especially for lower-level governments. Li Shufu’s long-cherished 
desire was realized when he was able to purchase a small bus production license by merging with 
a small auto company in Sichuan that was run by a local prison. But even access to the facility 
was not free owing to its location, and they were not allowed to produce sedans with this license. 
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Although Geely introduced its first sedan model, Haoqing, in February 1998, its sedan 
production license was officially awarded only in 2001 (Li 2014). 
Less than a decade later acquiring legitimate status of sedan producer, Geely merged with 
Ford Motor’s Swedish-origin Volvo sedan unit in 2010. The final bidding price was set around 
1.5 billion USD, of which 1.1 billion (approximately 8.47 billion RMB in 2010) was financed by 
numerous local governments’ investment in exchange for having plants established in their areas. 
The remaining 0.4 billion USD was funded by the London Branch of the Chinese Construction 
Bank and the selling party, Ford (0.2 billion USD each). The local governments involved in this 
project are subprovincial, largely at the prefectural or county level.50 At the beginning, the 
county-level government of the Beijing Economic and Technological Development Area (BDA, 
Beijing jingji jishu kaifaqu) promised to invest 4–5 billion RMB, but the provincial-level SOE, 
BAIC, complained directly to the provincial-level Beijing municipal government, requesting its 
full support of BAIC’s upcoming initial public offering and the cancellation of the county 
government’s offer to Geely. The prefecture-level Daqing city government of Heilongjiang 
seized this opportunity and invested 3 billion RMB. The county-level Shanghai Jiading district 
government also financed 1 billion RMB. Finally, the prefecture-level Chengdu city government 
of Sichuan also invested 2 billion RMB (Cui 2010a, 2010b; Zhao 2010). These subprovincial 
governments offered their investments with the condition that auto manufacturing plants be 
established in their territories. As of 2015, after fierce haggling, Geely finally put its production 
plants in Daqing, Chengdu, and Shanghai and located its headquarters and R&D center in the 
Jiading district of Shanghai. 
 
                                                 
50 The structural hierarchy of Chinese administrative divisions consists of (1) 33 province-level regions, (2) 333 
prefecture-level regions, (3) 2,862 county-level regions, (4) 41,636 township-level regions, and (5) even more 
village-level regions. 
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5.3.2 Transforming manufacturing SOEs into investment companies 
The second pattern of change that followed the TSS occurred in regions where local 
governments could not afford to financially support their local SOEs. Instead of trying to nurture 
the independent development of the SOEs, these governments tacitly transformed the auto 
manufacturers into investment companies. This pattern was typical at financially poor provincial-
level SOEs, such as the Tianjin Automotive Industry Corporation Group (TAIC).51 Tianjin Xiali, 
a subsidiary of the TAIC, was well known as a manufacturer of small sedans during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The Xiali sedan, which was originally based on the Japanese Daihatsu 
car, was so famous it led to a popular saying, “Yellow Daihatsu in front of Tiananmen Square, 
red Xiali at the banks of Shanghai” (Wei 2007). When maintaining its own SOEs became too 
costly, the Tianjin municipal government moved to attract taxable firms, instead of directly 
supporting the manufacturing companies.  
In 2002, the TAIC merged with the FAW, as central-level SOEs. Merger and acquisition 
(M&A) in the market economy usually combines two companies into one, but in China M&A 
between different companies added to the number of enterprises. In the case of the Tianjin-FAW 
M&A, Tianjin Xiali was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Market in 1997 and established a JV with 
Toyota in 2000. The FAW acquired a 50.98% share of Tianjin Xiali, and the TAIC became the 
second largest shareholder. The FAW succeeded to the management rights for Tianjin Xiali and 
automatically became a JV partner with Toyota. While the central government’s AIP promoted 
transregional merges between dispersed auto manufacturing SOEs in order to remedy the low 
level of centralization, the Tianjin-FAW M&A case demonstrated the AIP’s limited effect. If the 
AIP’s original intention had been fulfilled, the TAIC would have been kicked out from the auto 
industry. However, this merger through a stock transaction only changed the TAIC’s business 
                                                 
51 Beijing and Tianjin are both provincial-level (shengji) municipalities (zhixiashi). 
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activities, as it went from being a manufacturing corporation to an investment corporation. Even 
after the Tianjin-FAW merger, the TAIC group as a whole has continued to operate in the red. 
The main income of the TAIC has been coming from the dividends of the Tianjin-FAW-Toyota 
JV. While the TAIC is under the supervision of the Tianjin SASAC, the Tianjin municipal 
government has no intention of closing it down, for two main reasons. First of all, the TAIC and 
the FAW agreed to register the merged company within Tianjin, so Tianjin is entitled to collect 
taxes from the new company. In the case of crossprovincial M&As, where the firm is registered 
determines which government has the right to collect the local taxes. Similarly, when the Beijing 
municipal government relocated the polluting factories of Capital Steel (Shougang) to Hebei 
province, it maintained its registration in Beijing to maintain the right to collect taxes from the 
company (interview with a local government official, October 26, 2013, Tianjin). Second, the 
TAIC still holds the automobile production license for its subsidiary company under the name of 
TAIC Meiya, and it has a plant with a 50,000-unit production capacity. The TAIC has made a 
variety of attempts, so far without success, to lease its production license to private firms for 
independent production of an SUV model (interviews with current Tianjin municipal 
government officials who were working at the TAIC during the Tianjin-FAW M&A, October 26, 
2013 and November 4, 2013, Tianjin). The Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation (BAIC) is 
also showing signs of losing interest in developing its own models and instead focusing on 
expanding its operations through JV projects and M&As.     
 
5.3.3 Playing with the “shell resources” 
The previous section described a pattern in which SOEs became investment companies but held 
onto the minimum capacity to produce cars. These were provincial-level SOEs, so their local 
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government owners had much more power to attract central SOEs, as in the Tianjin case, and 
JVs, as in the Beijing case. Many subprovincial auto SOEs, however, built just enough vehicles 
to maintain their production license, never approaching even a minimal economy of scale. 
Especially since 2000, a large number of investors have come to see the huge potential for 
growth of the domestic car market. Although they want to get into the passenger car industry, the 
state’s strict entry control has led them to circumvent government regulations by acquiring 
companies that hold production licenses. In this context, subprovincial governments attempt to 
exploit the scarcity value of their auto production licenses, which have been called “shell 
resources” (keziyuan). It has been reported that Chang’an, Ford and the Hangzhou city 
government purchased the production license of Kunming Chahua Auto at the price of 450 
million RMB (equivalent to 70 million USD) to build a JV plant for Chang’an-Ford-Mazda 
(Zhongxinwang 2012). The JV team announced that they would invest 4.9 billion RMB (760 
million USD) to build the 250,000-unit capacity plant; the price for the license therefore was 
equivalent to almost 10% of the amount of the fixed asset investment. A person familiar with the 
“shell resource” trade commented:  
 
If the deal is completed at that high price, then those who pay will be not only the 
enterprise, but the Hangzhou Municipal Government may also bear a substantial 
burden. … Local governments think large vehicle plant projects, particularly joint 
ventures, are very important, because they have tremendous GDP and tax pulling 
effects. Hence, in addition to land and tax concessions, the local government 
directly helps companies with “lots of money” to solve the “shell resource” 
problem. (Zhou 2012; my translation)  
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In the Chahua Auto case, both prefectural governments, Hangzhou and Kunming, benefitted 
from the trade. Hangzhou now can host the JV plant, which will expand its local GDP, 
employment, and tax bases. The Kunming prefectural government had already made a great deal 
of money by selling the factory site; it raked in an additional 450 million RMB by selling the 
production license. 
In another prefectural city, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu province, legal disputes erupted over the 
production license. In 2004, the Zhejiang Jinggong Group, a private company in the neighboring 
Zhejiang province, merged with the Zhenjiang Auto Manufacturing Company and established 
the Zhenjiang Jinggong Auto Company. In a situation where truck sales were poor, the new 
owner sought to resell its automobile production license in Chongqing and Erdos, Neimenggu 
province. In the meantime, the new company’s continuing deficit and unsolved labor problems 
made the city government determined to recover the “shell resource.” In this situation, the 
Jiangsu Tianyang Group approached Zhenjiang city, and they agreed to Tianyang’s overall 
acquisition including all debts, assets, and employees at 20 million RMB. After the deal was 
closed, Tianyang found that the most important resource of the company, the automobile 
production license, had already been transferred to the Zhenjiang Jinggong Group. Tianyang 
filed a lawsuit against Jinggong to recover the production license with the following legal 
rationale: “The production license is a state asset, so it is not eligible for transfer or sale. But as 
far as the joint venture remains a state-owned holding company, the change of license will be 
effective” (Fazhi Zhoumo, May 25, 2012).  
 A media report about Zhenjiang SASAC’s research materials for the legal case shows the 
Zhenjiang government’s stance towards the issue. Their primary interest was to “find ways to 
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ensure that the car production license, a scarce resource, does not drain away to other localities” 
(Liu Binbin 2013). The legal dispute, however, was solved through bargaining rather than going 
to court. Facing the uncertain situation of perhaps not being able to obtain an auto production 
license, the Tianyang Group took a traditional strategy of “climbing” (panshang) to a higher 
authority. For the prefecture-level players, a player from the capital, Beijing, looks 
overwhelming. So Tianyang attracted the attention of BAIC, a Beijing province-level SOE, and 
arranged to matchmake with the Zhenjiang government. While the specific details have not been 
confirmed, BAIC and the Zhenjiang government signed a strategic cooperation agreement in 
Nanjing on August 7, 2013, and announced BAIC’s merger with Zhenjiang Auto and its plan to 
invest 15 billion RMB (Liu 2013).    
 
5.4 Emerging Coalitions and Constraints on Auto Industrial Policy Implementation 
One of the major goals of the auto industrial policy was to nurture a sizable number of big 
players who could compete in the world market. The initially designated candidates were 
exclusively large SOEs, and the barriers to market entry for other players were raised to protect 
them. As expected, the auto industrial policy was much more favorable to these SOEs than to 
others. Nonetheless, the large SOEs did not realize the expected goals such as developing their 
own models and becoming major exporters, but instead became more dependent on their foreign 
JV partners for technology and capital. In contrast, private actors were not initially allowed to 
enter the auto manufacturing industry, but once they obtained their production licenses, they 
became indigenous developers who are now exporting their own models and brands.  
As Table 5-3 indicates, the different incentive structures caused by the multidirectional 
reforms that have taken place since China embarked on the socialist market economy created two 
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competing coalition structures. The dominant coalition consists of central-level SOEs (yangqi) 
and large provincial-level SOEs. They are backed up by the central government agencies in 
charge of industrial policy. Most of them have already established multiple JVs with global auto 
manufacturers. The challenging coalition is composed of subprovincial level SOEs and private 
enterprises. They are supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology, which emphasizes 
indigenous innovation. While few companies in this coalition have started to form JVs, their 
foreign partners tend to be much smaller and their patterns of cooperation are much more diverse.  
 
Table 5-3. Formation of Competing Coalitions in the Auto Industry 
Competing Coalitions Central Government 
Ministries 
Character of Enterprise JVs with 
MNCs 
Dominant Coalition NDRC, MIIT central-level SOEs (yangqi) all 
provincial-level SOEs most 
Challenging Coalition Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
prefectural-level SOEs some 
private very few 
 
 This chapter analyzes the impacts of the TSS fiscal reform on the relationship between 
local governments and businesses. Unlike the previous tax-contracting system, the tax-sharing 
system suppressed local governments’ interest in directly owing firms, especially the lower-level 
governments. The effects of the 1994 tax-sharing reform on the relationships between 
governments and SOEs were not uniform but varied according to the level of government as well 
as the size of the SOE. At higher governmental levels and with larger SOEs, the relationship 
between the two was more likely to grow closer. By establishing the SASAC in 2002, the central 
government strengthened its role as an asset owner over the central-level SOEs. On the other 
hand, if the level of government was lower and the size of the SOE smaller, the government’s 
interest in directly owning the firm tended to plunge. One provincial-level deputy director of an 
 133 
economic operations department suggested that, by their nature, the central SOEs tended to have 
stronger political purposes than the local SOEs. Local governments are in charge of the 
economic operation of local SOEs, so local-level SOEs must care more about economic factors 
(interview, October 14, 2013, Tianjin).  
 The varying effects of fiscal reform on state-business relations rendered the logic of 
behavior and approaches to business operations quite distinct between the large, extant SOEs and 
the diverse ownership types employed by the new entrants. The tax-sharing system allowed the 
central government to secure the lion’s share of fiscal revenue. The central government’s 
strengthened fiscal capacity also reinforced the central government’s control over the large 
central SOEs. The relative affluence of the central government freed it from the need to pursue 
immediate economic concerns and allowed it to seek more abstract goals, such as “building a 
national team.” Under the auspices of central and provincial governments, extant large SOEs 
were able to expand into large business groups (daxing qiye jituan). In 2014, one hundred 
Chinese companies appeared on the Fortune Global 500 list 
(http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-07/08/content_17673632.htm). Among those 
listed, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) (85), FAW (111), and Dongfeng (113) 
are all large central and provincial auto SOEs.52 The scaling up of these SOEs was made possible 
by actively promoting the mixed ownership system (hunhe suoyouzhi). However, large SOEs 
rarely merged with private enterprises (Department of Industrial Policy, NDRC 2008, 889–893). 
While topped by wholly owned business groups, ownership diversification was realized only at 
the subsidiary level through initial public offerings (IPOs), formation of JVs, M&As of small and 
medium SOEs, and so on. Through such diversification, the big three expanded their business 
areas to become nationwide, but owing to different motivations and goals, the large SOEs’ 
                                                 
52 Numbers in parenthesis show each company’s rank in the 2014 Fortune Global 500 list.  
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activity hardly overlapped with that of the new entrants. A research report by the NDRC also 
pointed out that SOEs still absolutely dominate the automobile industry, and the dominant 
coalition remains largely separate from the challenging coalition (889–893). As new entrants are 
never allowed to trespass in the large SOEs’ areas, the new entrants have gone through endless 
trial and error to establish their own positions. And although they initially seemed hopelessly 
disadvantaged, the economic reforms that have followed the establishment of the socialist market 
economy have opened up new chances.  
The major issue of contestation between these two coalitions has been to what extent the 
state can allow the operation of nonpublic actors in the pillar industries. The primary rationale 
for holding state ownership in the pillar industries is that a certain amount of economic and 
material capacity in the form of SOEs is the base structure that undergirds the socialist 
superstructure (Jiang 2006). But when state-owned auto companies degenerated into parts 
producers for their JV partners, fledging domestic firms that held their own intellectual property 
rights were able to win much broader public support. The Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MST) is one of the foremost supporters of indigenous companies in the central government. In 
2004, the MST commissioned research projects on scientific innovation policy, and the resulting 
reports strongly backed up indigenous makers’ development model (Lu and Feng 2004; Mei and 
Feng 2005). In 2005, the MST also based the National Automobile Engineering Technology 
Research Center of Energy Saving and Environmental Protection at Chery Auto (Chu 2011, 
1257). In addition to this support from a central ministry, two leading figures, He Guangyuan, a 
former minister of the Ministry of Machine Building, and Long Yongtu, a former chief 
representative for trade negotiations for accession to the WTO, have also carried on a proxy war 
on behalf of the alliances about the meaning of “indigenous brands” since 2005 (China Business 
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and Trade 2014). Such support from a central ministry and the media exposure of indigenous 
brands’ success stories have empowered the challenging coalition.  
The established coalition structure has started to exert influence over policy making 
processes. A new AIP was originally scheduled for release around 2014, and was on the agenda 
at the MIIT as a major task for that year. However, controversies over issues such as entry 
control, the 50% foreign ownership limit for joint ventures, new vehicle energy policies, and the 
cancellation of “import control” prevented reaching consensus (Zhang 2014). The conflicts in 
producing previous AIPs were between alliances centered on traditional SOEs and nontraditional 
businesses, but the battlefronts are much more complicated now. Abolishing entry control means 
completely opening the industry to any domestic player; thus, both coalitions will oppose it 
stubbornly. By securing a production license, the indigenous companies have already become 
large beneficiaries of government support. For example, the three forerunner companies in the 
challenging coalition, Geely, BYD, and Chery, have relied heavily on government subsidies. In 
the first half of 2012, governments granted 634 million RMB to Geely; that is 50.3% of its pre-
tax profit or 62.2% of its after-tax profit. In 2011, BYD received 300 million RMB in 
government support, which accounted for 21.7% of its net profit (1.38 billion RMB). At Chery, 
the amount of the government subsidies grew to exceed net profits between 2007 and 2009. 
Chery’s government subsidies grew from 280 million in 2007 to 470 million in 2008 and to 630 
million in 2009, while its net profits decreased from 1.43 billion to 310 million, and then to 70 
million in the same years (Ding 2012). As for the proposal to lift the limitation of a maximum of 
50% ownership of JVs by MNCs, such a move would indicate the full opening of the Chinese 
automobile industry to the world. It would also break the backbone of the dominant alliance 
between the large SOEs and the JVs. While the current coalition structure cannot predict future 
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policy, the coalition politics that are fought out over policy decisions will be the engine of policy 
change in the future.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the impacts of fiscal reform on the local economic development model and 
its subsequent influences on the formation of competing coalitional structures in the auto 
industry. The tax-sharing reform initiated in 1994 replaced the previous tax-contracting system. 
This change led to a transformation from “local state corporatism” (Oi 1992) to the “local 
corporate state.” In “local state corporatism,” local governments acted as boards of directors, so 
externally they bargained with the governments one level above them to make better fiscal 
contracts. The central government made deals with the provincial-level governments, and the 
provincial governments made agreements with the prefectural-level governments. The chain of 
tax contracts went down to the township governments. Due to such bilateral contracts over tax 
revenue, the roles of central and local states were undifferentiated. The higher-level governments, 
even the central government, did not intervene in local administration, as far as local states were 
able to fulfill the terms of their contracts. The TSS, however, separated the roles of central and 
local governments by collecting taxes according to tax types. The central government collected 
the taxes assigned to the central government as well as the bigger portion of the taxes shared 
between the central and local governments. The central government’s improved fiscal capacity 
enabled it to take a more active role in protecting the underdogs created by the market reforms. 
In the realm of economic governance, the central government enhanced its role as an “asset 
owner” by establishing the SASAC. In contrast, local governments strengthened their roles as 
“tax collectors” and “institutional investors.”  
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 The transition to “local corporate states” also changed local development models 
internally. As the cost of directly owning firms increased, the local governments started to 
diversify their development strategies. Every local government had similar incentives, but their 
different endowments, which mostly corresponded to their place in the hierarchy, affected the 
strategies they chose. Once owning firms was no longer lucrative for most of the local states, 
private auto firms who secured auto production licenses during the massive SOE reforms 
enjoyed unprecedented leverage on investment-seeking local governments. Even the local 
governments who held production licenses allowed their SOEs to become investment companies 
or exploited the value of the license itself. These internal changes of local state development 
models consolidated the competing coalition structures in the auto industry. While the AIP 
initially was designed to selectively nurture a small number of large SOEs to become “national 
champions,” the smaller enterprises that spun off from the SOE reform eventually secured firm 
support from local governments.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Uneven Endowments, State Intervention, and Varied Forms of Market Competition: 
Comparison of the Automobile, Petroleum, and Machinery Industries 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapters, I analyzed how interactions between market transitional reforms 
and industrial policy have shaped specific modes of market competition in the auto industry. The 
policy making for the auto industry, as a pilot industry in China’s industrial reform, focused 
narrowly on the traditional actors in the planning period. The AIP exclusively favored a small, 
designated number of these actors. The gap between the abundant benefits they received and 
their failure to reach the expected goals invited new actors to try to enter the auto industry. 
Recurring government reforms relaxed vigilance, mass SOE reform opened the door to new 
actors, and fiscal reform rendered the patronage of new actors attractive to lower-level local 
governments. While industrial policy was actively promoted as a new tool for macroeconomic 
control in the socialist market economy, complex interactions between the AIP and 
accompanying macro institutional changes produced unintended outcomes that arose from highly 
polarized policy coalitions. In transitional China, where the market and the government are being 
built simultaneously, it is very natural that there are uneven institutional developments across 
different sectors. Although it was only commonsensical to expect such institutional variation, the 
Chinese central government attempted to intervene in its designated pillar industries, that is, the 
machinery, electronics, automobile, petroleum, and construction industries, in a uniform way. In 
April 1994, the State Council issued “Guideline for National Industrial Policy during the 1990s” 
(henceforth, the Guideline), which set the main direction of forthcoming industrial policy making. 
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The Guideline pointed out similar problems in all the pillar industries such as low technology 
levels, poor product quality, and the dispersion of production capacity, and it proposed the 
enactment of unified industrial policies for these industries. The auto industrial policy was 
promulgated in 1994 as the first systematic sectoral industrial policy. Industrial policies 
separately covering the electronics and machinery sectors, however, did not develop beyond the 
draft stage, and no attempt was made to enact industrial policies for the petroleum and 
construction sectors. Furthermore, after two decades of industrial development, these sectors 
now have totally different market competition structures. The previous chapters’ in-depth case 
study of the auto industry shows that the central state’s intervention through auto industrial 
policies unexpectedly faced fierce coalitional politics, which were ignited by macro institutional 
reforms. The auto industry itself grew rapidly, but this growth was the outcome of unintended 
coalition politics rather than effective implementation of the AIP. According to the Guideline, 
each pillar industry had an equal level of strategic value, and the same growth-promoting 
policies, in theory, should apply. But in reality, the level of policy enactment and the resulting 
outcomes vary significantly across the industries. Why was industrial policy not promulgated in 
the other pillar industries when the automobile industry policy was introduced? Why do the 
market competition structures of the automobile industry and the other industries differ? By 
comparing the automobile, machinery, and petroleum industries to answer these questions, this 
chapter attempts to uncover an understudied industrial governance mechanism of Chinese state 
capitalism. 
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6.2 State Intervention and Market Competition 
Previous literature tackles the puzzle of China’s rapid industrialization from two different 
approaches. The first approach attempts to suggest alternative governance mechanisms that 
possibly induce high growth (Breznitz and Murphee 2011; Heilmann and Perry 2011; Rothstein 
2015). For example, Rothstein (2015) defined an organizational feature of the Chinese 
government that is more apt to promote economic development in a transitional context, 
compared to a Weberian bureaucracy. In the Weberian system, the problem of delegation is 
solved through the precise application of rules by a civil service. Thus, predictable, rule-of-law-
oriented, nonpolitical, and impersonal features are valued in officials. From the perspective of 
the Weberian bureaucracy, Chinese officials lack these features. Chinese local civil servants 
selectively implement central rules (O’Brien and Li 1999; Su 2004), and concrete measures of 
policy implementation are usually open to local experimentation (Heilmann 2008). Furthermore, 
the pervasiveness of public officials’ involvement in corruption and rent-seeking activities have 
invited suspicion about the reality and sustainability of the Chinese miracle (Ngo and Wu 2009; 
Wedeman 2012). Rothstein (2015) proposed that China’s rapid industrial growth could be 
explained by the distinctive administrative organizational structure referred to as the cadre 
system. As an ideal type in the same manner as a Weberian ideal type, the cadre system is also 
known as the “missionary model” or the “clan model” in the management literature (540). The 
cadre bureaucracy is a “system in which performance goals and hierarchically ordered mandates 
are set centrally giving local cadres fairly large discretionary power over how to reach the targets” 
(538). Thus, for public officials in a cadre system, commitment, flexibility, mandate fulfillment, 
and performance rationality are the most valuable features. The officials in the cadre system have 
much more opportunity to make private use of public authority compared to officials in the 
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Weberian system, but they likely perform better in new and flexible situations. The problem with 
this explanation is that it only postulates cadres who fulfill their mandates without violating 
central regulations. However, highly motivated cadres not only creatively interpret central 
mandates but also frequently breach central orders. Motivated local cadres are frequently 
uncontrollable; so, collective action dilemmas are one of the salient features of Chinese 
industrialization (Noble 1998). A common Chinese saying about government organization can be 
translated as: “When power is centralized, it ends in deadlock; when power is delegated, it ends 
in disorder.” As the saying implies, high economic performance at the local level does not easily 
translate into economic development at the national level, due to coordination failure (Huang 
2002). The cadre system is more likely to aggravate the problem of coordination failure than to 
alleviate it.       
The second approach explains China’s growth by emphasizing the central state’s 
“institutional capacity.” For example, China’s automotive modernization was mainly driven by 
the central state’s capacity over multinational corporations and state-owned enterprises in the 
automotive industry (Chin 2010). Hsueh (2011; 2015) argued that the Chinese central state 
deregulates industries with low “strategic value,” such as textiles, while tightening its regulatory 
power over high “strategic value” industries like telecommunications. While the aggregate 
characterization of the state as “strong” is useful for crossnational comparisons, as Haggard and 
Moon (1990) pointed out, it cannot explain variations in state capacity across industries, or vis-à-
vis different social groups within a single country. If the state were “autonomous” only from 
certain marginal groups, policy outcomes could be parsimoniously explained by the preferences 
of a dominant coalition. The critical test of a strong state’s institutional capacity is whether the 
state structure can insulate pressures from vested interest groups. To explain the Chinese central 
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government’s strong bargaining leverage with MNCs, Thun (2004) identified two different types 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China: (1) that which relocates manufacturing operations to 
take advantage of low production costs and (2) that which seeks access to the large Chinese 
market. FDI in the auto industry is of the second type and in this case, MNCs tend to be more 
vulnerable to host government pressure in initial negotiations. Thun argued that Chinese-style 
industrial policy uses “external strength to compensate for certain internal weaknesses” (455) in 
this regard.         
Despite their different points of emphasis, both of these approaches are preoccupied with 
institutions or institutional capacity. State apparatus and industrial policy, however, are the 
results of certain political and social processes rather than stand-alone independent variables 
(Haggard 2004; Kim 2009; Moon and Prasad 1994). Rather than directly affecting economic 
performance, state intervention can only induce certain forms of market competition, and the 
forms of market competition subsequently result in development performance.53 The case of the 
auto industry as examined in the previous chapters shows the illogic of attributing its rapid 
growth to the nature of the state apparatus or its industrial policy: The relevant governmental 
organizations have been continuously reshuffled and the auto industrial policy failed to achieve 
its original goals. Nonetheless, macro institutional reforms facilitated an unexpected rise of 
competition between two coalitions, the SOE-led incumbents and the private and subprovincial 
newcomers. It is this competition that has resulted in the Chinese auto industry’s rapid growth. 
From the case of the Chinese auto industry, we can infer that between a laissez-faire 
market and a state-led development, there still exists a huge amount of room, which is what 
made development possible. As Dani Rodrick (2007) suggested, there might be “many recipes” 
                                                 
53 At the risk of excluding various antecedent and intervening variables, we can posit a linear causal chain for the 
interaction between state intervention and development, as follows: political/social process  state apparatus and its 
industrial policy  forms of market competition  economic performance.  
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for development rather than a single “best practice.” The different recipes, of course, lead to 
different performances. For example, in the state-dominant South Korean development case, the 
state’s effective maintenance of performance standards for evaluating “national champions” by 
pegging performance to export achievement made it easier to winnow out the losers in a given 
industry. South Korea’s institutional setting also led the national champions to focus their 
attention on competing with foreign incumbents in international markets, rather than competing 
to seize the domestic market (Amsden 1989). The market competition that arose in the Chinese 
automobile industry is one mechanism that was located in the space between the dominant state 
and the laissez-faire market. To draw a more sophisticated picture of the relationship between 
state intervention and market competition in transitioning China, this chapter expands its focus 
beyond the auto industry.  
 
6.3 Case Selection and Analysis Strategy 
6.3.1 Case selection 
The State Council issued “Guidelines for National Industrial Policy during the 1990s ” in April 
1994. The Guideline diagnosed similar industrial problems in all the pillar industries; hence, it 
proposed enacting unified industrial policies for them. For example, the Guideline recognized 
problems in the machine building, petrochemical, and automobile sectors as follows:54  
 
Machinery industry: 
With key basic machinery, basic components, and major complete technology sets 
of equipment as the focus, the machinery industry should promote optimization of 
                                                 
54 For a more complete diagnosis on each pillar industry by the SPC-led project team, see Zheng 1995.  
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production structure, and improve the levels of industrial technology and 
competitiveness.  
Petrochemical Industry: 
The petrochemical industry should actively promote large-scale production, 
improve the technical level, and deepen processing techniques.  
Automobile Industry: 
The automobile industry should reduce the number of factories as soon as 
possible, [and focus on] a high-volume production system, orderly competition in 
the market structure, improving its domestic market share, and international 
competitiveness. 
 
As tangible targets, the Guideline also suggests that the industries should: (1) improve 
production concentration rates, (2) strengthen self-development capacity, and (3) improve 
international competiveness and exports. Despite the State Council’s uniform view of the pillar 
industries, the actual enactment of industrial policies in these industries has varied significantly. 
As we know, the automobile industry was the first for which a sectoral industrial policy was 
promulgated. In contrast, in 1994, a draft version of a machine industrial policy sent to the SPC 
and later to the State Council, but the draft was abandoned without passing review. Only in 2006 
did the State Council release an opinion, with much narrower scope, regarding the equipment 
manufacturing industry.55 In the electronics industry, as of 2000, major policy makers spent 
seven years attempting and failing to draft an industrial policy. On the other hand, industrial 
policy making for the petroleum and construction industries has not even been attempted. (See 
                                                 
55 “Several Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Rejuvenation of the Equipment Manufacturing 
Industry” (February 13, 2016). http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2008-03/28/content_3083.htm 
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Table 6-1.) Li Shousheng, deputy director of the Department of Industrial Policy at the SETC, 
summarized three difficulties of industrial policy: it is “difficult to enact (zhidingnan), coordinate 
(xietiaonan) and promulgate (chutainan)” (Li 2000, 51).  
 
Table 6-1. Status of Industrial Policy Drafting, Reviewing, and Promulgation 
Automobile Automotive Industrial Policy (1994) 
Automotive Industry Development Policy (2004) 
Machinery A draft of a Machinery Industrial Policy was sent to the SPC in 1994 
and later to the State Council for review, but abandoned in the review 
process. 
In 2006, the State Council released an opinion regarding the 
equipment manufacturing industry (zhuangbei chanye). 
Electronics As of 2000, over seven years spent on a failed attempt to draft a 
policy. 
Petroleum, Construction Never attempted. 
Summarized by author from Li (2000).  
 
Furthermore, after two decades of market reforms, each industry has been reorganized 
into a very different form. Because industrial policy aims at restructuring the supply-side of 
production capacity, the sources of investments in fixed assets in the pillar industries would be 
more or less similar if the pillar industries had been restructured according to the Guideline. As 
Table 6-2 shows, however, investment in fixed assets varies across sectors. The fixed asset 
investment in the upstream petrochemical and gas extraction sector is dominated by central 
SOEs. Centrally managed and state-holding firms account for 79.5% and 93% of total fixed-
assets investment shares. On the other hand, the most privatized sector is that which 
manufactures special purpose machinery, a high value-added sector of the machinery industry. 
Centrally managed firms account for only 2.1% and private-holding firms for 75.2% of total 
fixed-asset investment in this sector. 
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Table 6-2. Investment in Fixed Assets (Excluding Rural Households) by Sector, Jurisdiction of 
Management, and Holding Type (2012) 
 Jurisdiction State-
Holding 
Collecti
ve 
Holding 
Private-
Holding 
Funds 
from 
HMT* 
Foreign 
Funds  Central Local 
Petroleum/Gas Extraction (B07) 79.5 20.5 93 0.4 3.7 1.3 1.2 
Petroleum/Nuclear Processing 
(C25) 
22.7 77.3 32.8 3.9 52.5 1.6 8 
Automobile Manufacturing 
(C36) 
5 95 18.6 5.3 56.5 2.6 15.2 
Special Purpose Machinery 
(C34) 
2.1 97.9 8.7 4.6 75.2 1.7 5 
Computers, Communications 
and Other Electronic Equipment 
(B39) 
1.2 98.8 15.9 2.3 51 12.3 14.4 
Construction (E47-E50) 5.2 94.8 58.3 9 22.4 0.8 0.4 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2013 (170–171). Calculated by author. 
Notes: Unit: %. Industrial classification code numbers according to the GB/T 4754-2011 are in 
parenthesis.   
* Funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
 
This chapter will conduct a comparative analysis on the machinery, petroleum, and auto 
industries. These industries were selected as cases because of methodological and empirical 
considerations. First, by selecting cases with large variation in the actual enactment of industrial 
policy, this chapter first answers why the efforts to apply similar industrial policies have been 
different. Analyzing the industries in which the enactment of policy was as different as possible 
helps control for the effects of industrial policy. Second, these three industries’ market 
competition structures vary significantly as well. Among the pillar industries, the machinery 
sector is the most privatized and the petroleum sector is the least privatized. By investigating the 
industries at these two extremes, this chapter attempts to draw a more elaborate picture of state-
market relations in Chinese state capitalism.  
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The classification of industry in China has changed continuously.56 To ensure comparable 
figures across industries, this chapter defines each industry according to the most up-to-date 
Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities (GB/T 4754-2011), which is standard 
for all national statistics in China.57 For the convenience of analysis, only the petroleum sector of 
the petrochemical industries is analyzed. The machinery industry covers a broad range of activity, 
so it is difficult to limit its scope. For example, even the equipment manufacturing industry, 
which the State Council’s 2006 opinion targeted as having a much narrower scope, includes the 
manufacture of: (1) metal products (B33); (2) general purpose machinery (B34); (3) special 
purpose machinery (B35); (4) railway, ship, aerospace, and other transport (B37); (5) electrical 
machinery and apparatus (B38); and (6) measuring instruments and apparatus (B40).58 A new 
term for the equipment manufacturing industry, the “high-end equipment manufacturing industry” 
(gaoduan zhuangbei zhizao chanye), has been used as part of the new designation of “strategic 
emerging industries” (zhanluexing xinxing chanye).59 The national Bureau of Statistics also 
released new classification standards for strategic emerging industries in 2012.60 While the high-
end equipment manufacturing industry spans various categories such as the manufacture of 
railway, aerospace, and other transport equipment (category B37) and of measuring instruments 
and machinery (category B40), it is concentrated in the manufacture of special purpose 
machinery (category B35). Hence, this chapter focuses on the special purpose machinery 
manufacturing sector as a proxy to measure the performance of the machinery industry.  
                                                 
56 This classification standard for industry was first set up in 1994 (GB/T 4754-1994), and revised twice, in 2002 
and 2011.  
57 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/hyflbz/  
58 Equivalent industrial classification code numbers are in parenthesis. 
59 The term “strategic emerging industries” has been in use since 2010 (http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-
10/18/content_1724848.htm). On the State Council’s most recent direction regarding the strategic emerging 
industries for the period of the 13th Five-Year Plan, see http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-
12/19/content_5150090.htm.  
60 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/201301/U020131021375903103360.pdf  
 148 
 
6.3.2 Analysis strategy 
It has been argued in the political economy literature that sectoral characteristics cause variations 
in the state’s roles and policies, not vice versa. According to Evans (1995, 81), “sectors are more 
than just arenas for observing specific kinds of state involvement, because their techniques of 
production, forms of industrial organization, and modes of governance vary systematically.” 
Among many other factors in sectoral variation, D. Michael Shafer (1994) emphasized the 
specific economic organization embedded in sectors. Despite their distinct sectoral 
characteristics, the Chinese central government, however, adopted industrial policy as a unitary 
method for promoting the pillar industries. When the same method is applied to different sectors, 
it is very natural to have different outcomes. As Steven Vogel (1996) pointed out, while ideas 
and institutions are interrelated, each has evolved at a different pace and has independent effects 
on policy outcomes. Although Chinese industrializing elites adopted an idea to enact industrial 
policy to promote the pillar industries in the early 1990s, each industrial sector had distinct 
institutional endowments. The institutional gaps between the different pillar industries inevitably 
resulted in different patterns of coalitional politics and market competition.   
What can we learn by comparing three sectors that we expect to have different policy 
outcomes? Despite different sectoral characteristics, each industry has gone through similar 
macro institutional reforms. The unique forms of industrial organization embedded in the sectors 
have changed along with these same institutional reforms. This chapter does not deny the 
important role of sectoral characteristics in shaping modes of industrial governance, but 
demonstrates that certain forms of market competition in each sector are also shaped by 
interaction between interventionist industrial policy and macro institutional reforms. In other 
words, sectoral characteristics alone do not determine current forms of governance or modes of 
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governance. As shown in the previous chapters, industrial growth has usually occurred in tandem 
with increased concentration ratios due to the effects of economies of scale in the auto industry. 
However, the majority of Chinese auto firms are still operating at much lower levels than the 
minimum needed for economy of scale (Huang 2002). Instead of emerging from common 
sectoral traits, the deviating performances of Chinese auto firms largely resulted from their 
unique experiences of the Chinese market transition. The automobile industry’s case suggests the 
possibility that the sectoral variation in policy enactment and market competition in these three 
pillar industries could be caused by the same interactive mechanism between industrial policy 
and macro institutional reforms, despite sectoral differences. Hence, as a comparison strategy, 
this chapter takes the critical mechanism affecting the auto industry that the previous chapters 
described, and tests its validity for the other two sectors.  
From the case study of the automobile industry, we learned how the macro institutional 
changes that accompanied the establishment of the socialist market economy exerted decisive 
effects on the implementation of the auto industrial policy and its results. First of all, 
administrative reform to separate state and business (zhengqi fenkai) determined the industrial 
players who would have decisive power on the path of future reform. Among numerous 
administrative reforms, the establishment of an administrative corporation (AC, zonggongsi) was 
particular important. As shown in chapter 3, the establishment of the CNAIC (China National 
Automotive Industry Corporation), the administrative corporation in the auto sector, gave the 
industry’s business management, which previously had been done by administrative 
organizations, to economic organizations for the first time. These ACs were short-lived 
institutions, but their establishment rearranged the major veto players in the industries at the 
central state level. Second, state-owned enterprise reforms, especially during the Zhu Rongji 
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period’s program known as “grasp the large, let go of the small” (zhuada fangxiao), actively 
drew boundaries that established where nontraditional actors could operate. What industries and 
companies the central state was trying to grasp had a decisive impact on who would take the lead 
in the specific industries. Finally, central-local fiscal reforms along with banking reforms 
rearranged what had once been very closed subprovincial state and local SOE relations. After the 
1994 Tax Sharing reform, rather than “acting as the equivalent of a board of directors” for all 
SOEs, local governments began to focus on industries that had potential for high GDP growth, 
tax revenue, employment, and profit-generating effects. Given the importance of local 
governments’ stances in the central government’s policy implementation, the stance of local 
governments toward particular industries had a significant impact on the central government’s 
industrial policy making. Table 6-3 summarizes these three mechanisms in regard to each sector.  
 
Table 6-3. Automotive, Petroleum, and Machinery Industries: Number of Central Veto Players, 
Level of Central State Control, and Local Governments’ Stance towards the Sector 
Sectors Number of Central Veto 
Players 
Level of Central State 
Control 
Local Governments’ 
Stance towards sector 
Automobile 1 Relatively Strong Continuous active 
involvement 
Petroleum 3 Absolute Changed from active 
involvement to indirect 
participation around 1996  
Machinery 0 Weak in overall sector, 
relatively strong in the 
equipment manufacturing 
sector 
Changed from neutral to 
eager to sell machinery 
SOEs around mid-2000s 
 
 
Owing to China’s unique tiao-kuai system, it is the number of veto players that primarily 
affects the outcome of policy enactment. China’s unique delegation system led to a pattern of 
detaching economic organizations important in industrial policy enactment, such as ACs, from 
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the government during the 1980s. Susan Shirk, in her classic study of Chinese institutional 
reforms, called this unique system “delegation by consensus”: 
 
The CCP delegates to the State Council the authority to make specific economic 
decisions. The State Council leaders at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy 
delegate to their subordinates the authority to make decisions if the agents can 
agree. If the agents reach consensus, the decision is automatically ratified by the 
higher level; if the agents cannot agree, then the authorities step in to make the 
decision, or the matter is dropped or tabled until consensus can be achieved. 
Delegation by consensus is practiced at each level of the organizational hierarchy. 
State Council to commissions, commissions to ministries and provinces, 
ministries and provinces to bureaus and cities, and so on. (Shirk 1993, 116)  
 
Policy-making under a system of delegation by consensus tend to be very time consuming and 
incremental. As a corollary, according to Shirk, “when the authorities are divided and their 
preferences uncertain, agents are less willing to comprise and agreement on policies is more 
difficult to achieve” (128). Because the ACs that had functioned as central veto players worked 
on behalf of the sectors’ interests in the early period of the SME, the pattern of AC formation is 
critical to the question of industrial policy enactment. Once policy has been enacted, the central 
government has participated in the policy implementation process only indirectly; for example, 
as a macroeconomic regulator through the NDRC or the largest shareholder of the central SOEs 
through the SASAC. Thus, the quality of policy implementation is largely determined by 
ongoing SOE reform and the stance of local governments towards the sectors.   
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6.4 The Petroleum Industry 
The petroleum industry has been criticized as one of the most monopolized in China. Since 1998, 
the Chinese petroleum industry has reorganized into an oligopolistic market dominated by three 
giant national oil companies (NOCs). The CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) 
focuses on exploration and development of crude oil and natural gas in offshore China. The two 
large integrated onshore giants, CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation; parent company 
of PetroChina) and China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC; parent company of Sinopec), 
operate in business areas that range from upstream oil and gas exploration to downstream 
refining and retailing, roughly demarcated along the territorial boundary of the Yellow River 
(Lin 2008, 68). Out of about a hundred central SOEs, these three NOCs accounted for about 65% 
of SASAC firms’ total profit as of 2010.61 From the upstream business of exploration and mining, 
to the middle stream of gasoline and diesel refining, and to the downstream of wholesale and 
retail, the two listed arms of the NOCs, PetroChina and Sinopec, are making huge profits from 
their oligopolistic positions. In the absence of an independent regulatory agency, the NOCs are 
functioning as de facto regulators by controlling import and export quotas and pricing 
mechanisms (Shi, Weng, Lin, and Zhu 2012).  
The oligopolistic status of the NOCs is sustained by two important mechanisms. Critics 
of the NOCs’ oligopoly in the petroleum industry have pointed out that if the monopoly on crude 
oil is a “glass door” that prevents private companies from entering the market, the pricing 
mechanism is a “revolving door” that drives out private companies who are already operating in 
                                                 
61 As of 2010, CNPC, CPC, and CNOOC recorded net profits of 85.227 billion CNY, 12.418 billion CNY, and 
7.212 billion CNY, respectively, out of a total 160.135 billion CNY. For central SOE profit data, see: 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/2009rdzt/fj.htm; 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86302/n326735/n326745/c1009299/content.html; and 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n258203/n259490/13878095.html.   
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the oil industry (Shi et al. 2012). First, the three NOCs are controlling the supply-side of crude 
oil. Oil and gas exploration rights are exclusively distributed to these three NOCs based on 
geographical boundaries, that is, offshore, onshore north, and onshore south. All domestic crude 
oil production is distributed exclusively through them. As a WTO commitment, China was 
required to allocate trade import quotas to nonstate companies of 4 million tons of refined oil and 
7.2 million tons of crude oil in 2002, both of which were intended to increase by 15% annually 
for the next 10 years. The former SETC, however, announced that imported crude oil, which fell 
under the nonstate quotas, should be refined in facilities run by Sinopec or PetroChina. Because 
all imported crude oil should be refined and distributed domestically through the channels of the 
NOCs, the profit margins of private companies in overseas exploration or crude oil imports are 
very low (Shi et al. 2012).  
Second, after the announcement of the “Proposal for the Reform of Crude and Refined 
Oil Prices,”62 in June 1998, the Chinese central government changed the benchmarks of price 
fluctuations several times, but the principle that the government sets the prices has never 
changed. Regulatory systems vary greatly across sectors in the contemporary China (Pearson 
2005; Tsai 2011); in the petroleum industry, government management functions such as pricing 
were handed over to the corporatized NOCs. As shown in Table 6-4, the three current NOCs 
developed from administrative corporations (zonggongsi). Between 1978 and 1988, the Ministry 
of Petroleum (MoP) was in charge of the petroleum industry. Besides the MoP, however, the 
Ministry of Chemical Industries (1978–1998) and the Ministry of Textiles (19787–1993) also 
had petroleum-related firms under their control. In 1982, the CNOOC was established as the AC 
responsible for the drilling of offshore oil resources. In 1988, the China Petrochemical 
Corporation, the second AC in the petroleum sector, was established by merging 39 oil-related 
                                                 
62 http://www.nea.gov.cn/2011-08/16/c_131051983.htm 
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firms from the Ministries of Chemical Industries and Textiles. Finally, in 1988, the MoP was 
abolished and the remaining production firms under its control were converted to the CNPC. For 
more than a decade since 1998, China’s oil industry was sustained by three major ACs: CNOOC 
for offshore exploration, China Petrochemical Corporation largely for refining, and CNPC for 
onshore exploration and refining. The last two ACs also controlled important government 
functions, such as pricing, so there was no incentive for creating an industrial policy that would 
cover the entire sector.63  
 
Table 6-4. The Formation of the Three National Oil Corporations  
Parent Company Listed 
Arm 
Institutional Background 
CNOOC 
(China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation) 
CNOOC 
Limited 
Established in 1982 as an AC 
Listed in Hong Kong in 1999 and New York in 2001 
 
CNPC 
(China National Petroleum 
Corporation) 
PetroChina Established in 1988 as an AC; the production units of 
MoP were converted to the CNPC 
Corporatized to the CNCP in 1998 
China Petrochemical 
Corporation 
Sinopec Established in 1983 as an AC from merging 39 
petrochemical firms  
Corporatized to China Petrochemical Corporation in 
1998  
 
Despite the current oligopoly of central SOEs in the petroleum sector, the central state’s 
early efforts to take back central control in 1993 faced strong resistance from major oil 
companies and local governments.64 In 1994, the Guideline suggested enacting industrial policy 
to overhaul the petroleum industry, but no attempt to draft a unified industrial policy covering 
the petroleum industry as a whole has been made. The failure of centralization efforts in 1993 
                                                 
63 On government organizational reforms affecting the petroleum industry, see Ji (2014, 56–61). And for a brief 
history of 39 years of reform in the petroleum industry, see: 
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/syzs/ktkf/201309/9f9d9248d46a4723bb43a6ad98efb1de.shtml, 
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/syzs/ktkf/201309/02555e4f98a6400597e1b239d33a8728.shtml.   
64 For a more detailed analysis of centralization efforts in 1993, see Lin (2008, 58–67). 
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and the absence of industrial policy making largely resulted from the mode of industrial 
governance at that time. At the central level, the three NOCs partitioned the market on a 
geographical basis. At the local level, provincial governments also actively participated in oil 
extraction, refining, and distribution. High profit margins caused by the shortage economy at that 
time satisfied all participants and maintained the equilibrium of decentralized industrial 
governance.  
A change in the status quo, however, was facilitated by a structural imbalance caused by 
a plunge in crude oil prices and China’s shift to an economy of surplus. In the chronic shortage 
economy, central and local SOEs as well as local governments exploited rent-seeking 
opportunities by arbitrating between the plan and the market prices. However, in 1996, China’s 
shift from an economy of shortage to one of surplus drastically reduced rent-seeking 
opportunities and led to heavy indebtedness of SOEs and local governments. (For a detailed 
discussion of the situation of the petroleum industry during this period, see Lin 2008, 67–76.) 
Only in the late 1990s, when local governments experienced serious losses in the oil industry, 
could centralized attempts to manage the petroleum sector be undertaken. If the petroleum 
industry had continued to be highly profitable, and the NOCs and local governments had been 
able to secure these high profits, then breaking the decentralized industrial governance structure 
might have been impossible. In contrast to the rise in debt-ratios of the NOCs and local 
governments, the central government had improved its fiscal capability through the 1994 tax-
sharing reform. These conditions helped to break the existing equilibrium. The previous three 
large administrative groups corporatized into vertically integrated business groups that controlled 
every aspect of the industry from crude oil production to refining and distribution.   
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6.5 The Machinery Industry 
The machinery and automotive industries have been traditionally controlled by the same central 
ministry. When the auto industrial policy was released in 1994, there were also calls to draft a 
machinery industrial policy. For example, an official in the division of industrial development in 
the Ministry of Machine Industry published an article, “Why Should We Formulate a Machinery 
Industrial Policy?” (Zheng 1994). As had been done with the AIP, a review draft of a machinery 
industrial policy was sent to the SPC in 1994. The specific goals specified in the review draft 
were also very similar to those in the AIP.65 In 1993’s government organizational reform, the 
Ministry of Machine and Electronics Industries (1988–1993) was divided into the Ministry of 
Machine Industry and the Ministry of Electronics Industry. Since 1993, however, the direction of 
reforms to separate government and business shifted to reducing the central government’s 
intervention in industry and establishing administrative corporations. Unlike in the automobile 
and petroleum industries, no AC was established in the machinery industry. Due to the absence 
of an institution to act as a sponsor of industrial policy making, the machinery industrial policy 
that had been drafted and reported to the State Council did not get past the last hurdle.  
 The situation of lacking an institutional base for industrial governance in the machinery 
industry continued. In 1998, the Ministry of Machine Industry was relegated to the Bureau of 
Machinery under the newly established SETC, but as shown in chapter 3, the Bureau did not 
have any capacity to govern the industry beyond the relocation of personnel. When the Bureau 
was finally abolished in 2001, the remaining industrial management functions were transferred to 
                                                 
65 Some of these specific goals are:  
1. Increase the production concentration ratio from the current 18% to 25%. Nurture large corporations with 
international competitiveness and cultivate 5 business groups with sales of more than 10 billion CNY, and 30 groups 
with sales of more than 1 billion CNY.  
2. Improve self-innovation capabilities. Increase domestic sources of technology from 25% to 40%.  
3. Improve the competitiveness of the machinery industry in the international market. Make machinery industry 
exports account for more than 20% of total exports and become China’s largest export industry (Zhao 2012, 156–
157).  
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the China Machinery Industry Federation.66 In the absence of an institutional base to represent 
the interests of the machinery industry, the machinery industry began to be classified as a 
“competitive industry.” This situation led to active mergers and acquisitions of state-owned 
machinery firms by foreign and private capital. Except in a very few strategic areas, state-owned 
holdings are no longer the main forces of the machinery industry. Already in 2006, non-SOEs 
accounted for 75% of the total output of the machinery industry (Zhao 2012, 197–198). 
 If the Guideline had been uniformly applied to the machinery industry or if there had 
been a strong institutional sponsor to pass and enforce the machinery industrial policy, then there 
might also have been active government efforts to foster national champions with careful 
protection from foreign capital. The Chinese central government’s intervention, however, was far 
from active, but was reactive. When, in 2006, forerunner Chinese machine firms became the 
targets of mergers and acquisitions by foreign capital, the Chinese central government rushed to 
designate an “equipment industry” (zhuangbei chanye), defined as “basic industries that provide 
technical equipment for national economic development and national defense construction.”67 In 
2005 and 2006, the German FAG had purchased 49% of the stakes owned by Xibei Bearing 
Group in their JV, the American Carlyle Group attempted to merge with the Xuzhou 
Construction Machinery Group (Xugong Group: XCMG), the German Schaeffler tried to 
purchase Luoyang Bearing, the American Caterpillar planned to acquire Xiagong, and so on. The 
deals made between local governments and foreign capital, however, were soon to be probed by 
the State Council. One executive involved in the German Luoyang deal said: 
 
There is a fundamental debate going on in China at the moment about which 
                                                 
66 http://cmif.mei.net.cn/ 
67 “The State Council’s Several Opinions on Accelerating and Revitalizing the Equipment Manufacturing Industry,” 
released on June 29, 2006 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-06/28/content_4763768.htm).  
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industries should be protected as they are in the national interest. The 
investigation is not so much about the deal itself but this wider debate and the 
talks are being held at a very high level. (Dyer and Milne 2006)  
 
In the absence of regulations on the entry of foreign capital into the Chinese market, local 
governments who were experiencing financial difficulties negotiated directly with foreign MNCs. 
Increased competition from private companies required more investments in local machinery 
SOEs to make technological upgrades. For example, Xiagong, one of Xiamen’s largest SOEs and 
China’s largest heavy machinery makers, also recorded a decrease of net revenue from 79.41 
million CNY (US $9.9 million) in 2003 to 33.28 million CNY (US $4.16 million) in 2005. In 
addition, the company’s huge bank loans to expand their production capacity negatively affected 
their return rate (Ji n.d.). Financially troubled local governments began to sell their local 
machinery SOEs, because the machinery sector was not profitable, and central regulation of 
market entry was loose. In the Caterpillar-Xiagong deal, the former insisted on only purchasing 
Xiagong’s share in the listed-arm, but the Xiamen government pressed it to a buy-out of the 
entire group.   
 The series of deals to sell the Xugong Group, one of China’s largest construction 
machinery makers, to Carlyle triggered widespread concerns over national security in China. 
Xiang Wenbo, the CEO of SANY, which also made a bid to merge with Xugong, circulated his 
criticism on the internet, arguing that the deal meant the “loss of state-owned assets” through the 
selling off of Xugong at a low price. To lessen the opposition, the Carlyle Group revised its 
bidding conditions, but this event eventually led to the involvement of the Departments of 
Commerce of both the United States and China. The U.S. undersecretary of commerce, Frank 
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Lavin, urged China to approve the Carlyle-Xugong takeover deal. China’s Ministry of 
Commerce also held a hearing about the deal, but the Chinese government concluded that this 
foreign capital investment in the machine industry would have a negative impact on national 
security and national economic security. Finally, on August 9, 2006, the Ministry of Commerce 
released “Provisions on the Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors” and invalidated takeover deals between local governments and foreign capital.68 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
By analyzing two more pillar industries, this chapter attempts to draw a more nuanced picture of 
Chinese industrial governance. Comparing the petroleum, machinery, and auto sectors offers 
three important lessons. First, China’s central state could not lead industrial development in the 
direction they wanted. The central reformers adopted the idea that promoting industrial policies 
would be a suitable way to develop the pillar industries, but even the policy making was not done 
as they had hoped. In the industrial restructuring of the last few decades, even in the petroleum 
industry, which best represents the “advancement of the state” (guojin), the central state’s 
centralization scheme failed initially, only succeeding after the local states’ incentive structures 
had changed. As analyzed in previous chapters, the rapid growth of the auto industry also arose 
despite the industrial policy, from unintended competition between two coalitions. Machinery 
was designated a protected industry only after attempts at mergers and acquisitions of large local 
SOEs by foreign capital became visible; the central state reacted, but only by protecting a small 
sector within the machine industry, which was given the new label of high-end equipment 
manufacturing (gaoduan zhaungbei  chanye). These cases confirm that the state-led development 
model in the literature on the developmental state, which is mainly drawn from the cases of 
                                                 
68 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/c/200608/20060802839585.html 
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Japan, South Korean, and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s, cannot explain Chinese industrial 
growth.   
 Second, in China’s transitional economy, institutional conditions at critical junctures 
inherited from the planning period have also shaped the subsequent paths of market reform. 
While the 1994 Guideline suggested promulgating industrial policies in all the pillar industries, it 
only happened in the auto sector. As analyzed in the previous sections, too many veto players in 
the petroleum industry and no sponsoring institution in the machinery industry both led to the 
failure of industrial policy promulgation. Only in the auto sector, which had a single 
administrative corporation, was there a successful release of a sectoral industrial policy. The 
establishment of administrative corporations in the auto and petroleum sectors was mainly 
determined by the organizational structures inherited from the planning period.  
Finally, this dissertation’s case studies on the automobile, petroleum, and machinery 
sectors warn against both economic and state deterministic approaches to economic development. 
As shown by Karl Polanyi and succeeding institutional scholars, state-building and market-
building are not mutually exclusive, but interconnected processes. Hence, institutional conditions 
constrain both the available means of state intervention in the economy and the formation of 
market structures. For example, China’s central state’s initial scheme to enact industrial policy in 
all the pillar industries was frustrated by institutional conditions. No government possesses the 
means to always accomplish its will. Furthermore, markets are not created in an institutional 
vacuum. In the real world, there is no “big bang” that completely annihilates an existing 
institutional framework—which is why it is necessary to examine how the state and market 
interact rather than trying to decide which of them is definitive.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
 
Drawing on primary archival sources and in-depth interviews from eighteen months of field 
research in China, this dissertation demonstrates that China’s attempt to promote industrial 
policy as a new mode of macroeconomic management to build the socialist market economy 
ended up failing. Even with the deficient functioning of market mechanisms or state institutions, 
if a state’s policy intervention can dismantle the previous status quo and bring in even limited 
market competition, it can open up some space for development. In the auto industry, the 
promulgation of industrial policy settled the “credible commitment problem” of doing business 
in China. At the same time, macro institutional reforms led to important institutional changes 
such as central government organizational structures, state-business relations, and central-local 
fiscal relationships. Strengthened control by the central government through macro institutional 
reforms, ironically, unleashed market mechanisms that had been suppressed by the local 
governments, eventually enabling expanded market behaviors. As a result, a new type of 
business actor and local governments were freed to form a new coalition that challenged the 
existing structure of China’s auto industry. The rise of market competition between rival 
coalitions, although limited, had the unintended effect of promoting rapid growth. 
Three decades after its initial implementation, China’s auto industrial policy has had 
mixed results. As a whole, the auto market avoided encroachment by imported vehicles, but the 
central state’s intervention inflated automobile prices, which subsequently stimulated various 
new actors seeking high profit rates to enter the auto sector. Localization requirements intended 
to achieve import substitution increased local parts production dramatically, but also drove 
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China’s major auto enterprises to focus on developing parts supplies instead of developing 
independent models (Thun 2006). Large SOEs, which benefited from preferential policies, 
reaped their profits mainly from JVs and failed to realize the goals set by the industrial policy. 
Meanwhile, various new actors were able to enter the auto industry by purchasing 
nontransferable “production licenses” from the small and medium SOEs that spun off from 
former SOEs. In the meantime, the designated large SOEs that remained to enjoy the most 
preferential policies degenerated into parts producers for their JV partners, but the fledgling 
domestic actors, who violated industrial policy to access the lucrative auto sector, eventually 
became the main forces in auto exports with their own brands. In other words, growth-promoting 
industrial policies failed to realize the policies’ intentions but nonetheless produced rapid 
industrialization outside the policies’ scope. 
This case study of the Chinese auto industry shows that in a transitional economy where 
the state and the market are still forming, and the relationship between the two is being re-
established, emphasis on either market efficiency or state capacity can be misleading in an 
explanation of industrial development. China’s socialist market economy has never allowed the 
“spontaneous order” of the market suggested by Hayek (1973), instead only allowing the market 
to function where the public economy is not working. Industrial policy in China’s SME defines 
the extent to which the state can allow the operation of nonpublic actors in the pillar industries. 
The primary rationale for state ownership in the pillar industries is that a certain amount of 
economic and material capacity in the form of SOEs is the base structure that undergirds the 
socialist superstructure. But when state-owned auto companies degenerated into parts producers 
for their JV partners, the fledgling domestic firms that held their own intellectual property rights 
were able to win much broader public support. In the discussion of development problems, 
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controversy swirls around whether government failure or market failure produces the more 
rampant and critical obstacles. In the case of the Chinese auto industry, however, both 
government and market failures were extensive, despite the rapid growth. Although the auto 
industrial policy created more government failure problems by allocating higher rents to a few 
designated firms, it unintentionally enhanced market competition to some extent by enabling 
challenges from the new coalition. When lack of investment is a major cause of 
underdevelopment, any state action that can bring in sufficient investment and market 
competition can kick off development. 
Based on my empirical research on China’s growth in the auto industry and my 
comparison of industrial governance in the auto, petroleum, and machinery sectors since 1993, in 
this chapter I will discuss the dynamics of the relationship between state and market, with 
particular reference to the political process framework. In the following sections, I will first 
clarify this study’s theoretical and methodological implications, and I will then illustrate some 
features of the substantive working mechanisms in China’s state capitalism.   
 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
Theoretically, the case of the Chinese auto industry’s rapid growth amid failed policies 
challenges both market efficiency and state-led development proponents. Both approaches have 
argued for a version of the “golden straitjacket” to which individual states must put on in order to 
achieve economic prosperity. However, as Dani Rodrik (2007) suggested, it seems that there is 
no single recipe for economic development. All late-developing countries confront similar 
institutional problems in the industrialization process, but because every society involves 
different social contexts, “one size fits all” institutional solutions can hardly be expected to bring 
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fruitful results. In the case of the Chinese auto industry, despite huge differences in institutional 
settings, the Chinese central government followed the lessons of the East Asian developmental 
states and promoted DS-style industrial policy. China’s auto industrial policy has failed, as 
expected, but the industry itself, unexpectedly, has grown rapidly, despite the fact that the recipe 
for state-led development never worked in China as it did in Japan and South Korea.  
 This dissertation’s findings also challenge market proponents, particularly the “plan to 
market” narrative or “transition orthodoxy,” in regard to the relations between the state and the 
market. The historical process of Chinese market building, especially after the socialist market 
economy was initiated, confirms the positive, mutually supporting relationship, between state 
intervention and market expansion. The Chinese central government’s continuous intervention 
has facilitated rather than constrained market functions in overall resource allocation. The 
situation corresponds to Steven Vogel’s (1996) “freer market, more rules” proposition. Even in 
an advanced market economy, running a freer market requires more backing from rules that must 
be made by the state’s action. Before the socialist market economy, the central government let 
local governments do whatever they wanted as long as they met their fiscal contracts. Because 
the local governments functioned as de facto boards of directors in their territories, their presence 
suppressed market mechanisms during the early reform period. Since embarking on the socialist 
market economy, the central government has enhanced its fiscal capacity, more consistently 
exercised macroeconomic control, and strengthened its control over the central SOEs as the 
largest shareholder. Ironically, this strengthened control by the central government unbound 
market mechanisms that had been suppressed by the local governments, and finally enabled 
expanded market behaviors by local governments, subprovincial local SOEs, and private actors.    
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7.2 Methodological Implications 
This dissertation employs a political process framework that captures the unexpectedly dynamic 
coalitional politics revolving around the central state’s industrial policies. Contrary to the 
proponents of state-led development and institutional approaches that specify the effects of state 
institutional structures on economic performance, this approach allowed me to investigate how 
auto industrial policy worked in combination with other institutional changes to build the 
socialist market economy. While previous debates about China’s automobile industry have 
focused on normative aspects by asking whether effective industrial policy making and 
implementation is possible in China (Chin 2010; Chu 2011; Eun and Lee 2002), this study opens 
empirical space for the real politics that accompanied the auto industrial policy.   
Because the industrial policy was adopted as part of a package that included other 
institutional changes to establish the socialist market economy, the approach taken in this study 
is better suited to the fast-changing Chinese terrain than any ahistorical approach could be. 
Furthermore, this study’s political process framework better captures the “nested, hierarchical 
setting” of central-local relations in China (Wong 2009, 111). Previous studies on China’s 
central-local relations mostly neglect the hierarchically nested character of Chinese 
administrative systems. Scholars tend to emphasize either the role of the center or the role of the 
local without considering the nested structure of the local states. For example, Chin (2010) 
emphasized the Chinese central state’s strong capacity over MNCs compared to many South 
American countries such as Brazil and Argentina. In contrast, Thun’s (2006) study of the 
development of the Chinese auto industry, which considers the huge variations among auto SOEs 
in terms of supply procurement, highlighted how the role of local states resulted from China’s 
bureaucratic organization and dominant form of interfirm relations. However, as the case studies 
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in chapter 5 demonstrate, local states’ endowments vary according to their place in the hierarchy, 
and this hierarchically uneven distribution of endowments led to different local development 
strategies.  
  
7.3 Chinese State Capitalism  
Although it is not generalizable to all Chinese industries, this dissertation’s case study of the auto 
industry and comparison of the auto to the petroleum and machinery industries demonstrates 
some features of Chinese state capitalism. As shown in chapter 4, Chinese economic reform is 
modeled on the dualistic Marxist structure comprising a superstructure and a substructure. This 
dualistic structure is ingrained in business groups and overall industry in China. The large SOEs, 
particularly the traditional Big Three that ranked in the 2015 Fortune Global 500—SAIC (66), 
FAW (107), and Dongfeng (109)69—are, in the eyes of the SASAC, the backbone of the CCP’s 
reign. Therefore, the SASAC initiated several reforms to enhance its control over these large 
central SOEs through corporatization and financialization. Recently, the SASAC launched an 
experiment in establishing boards of directors to improve corporate governance (Yeo 2013). To 
tighten its control, the SASAC began to dispatch outside directors to parent companies. For 
instance, the FAW’s board of directors was first established in April 2013. Of its seven board 
members, three were selected from the FAW leadership and four were outside members 
appointed by the SASAC. Despite this kind of corporate governance reform, corruption scandals 
among high executives are unceasing. For example, in 2014, the CCP Central Discipline 
Inspection Commission announced three top officials’ involvement in corrupt behaviors (Legal 
Evening News [Fazhi Wanbao] 2014, April 8). One year later, Xu Jianyi, the chairman and the 
CCP secretary of the FAW, also faced judicial action for corruption (Xinhuawang 2015, August 
                                                 
69 The numbers in parenthesis show rank in the 2015 Fortune Global 500.   
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13). In sum, Chinese state capitalism succeeded in making selected SOEs into mega-enterprises, 
but these are still far from having an institutionalized and sustainable corporate governance 
structure.  
 The dissertation also has implications for our understanding of the relationship between 
the state and private firms in contemporary China. China’s private entrepreneurs tend to be 
“allies of the state,” rather than posing a threat to the incumbent authoritarian regime (Chen and 
Dickson 2008, 2010; Dickson 2003). The private entrepreneurs in China’s auto industry are 
bound by two different level of constraints. In the auto industry, where the central state still holds 
rent-making power through its control of production licenses, private actors are gaining 
legitimate positions by becoming the entities that realize the original intentions of the AIP. The 
new players in the auto industry such as Geely, Chery, BYD, and Changcheng have performed 
much better at indigenous innovation than the firms in the dominant coalition. In a situation 
where the central state has control of the rules of the game, such as entry control, then private 
actors can hardly go against central policies. Their positions are too vulnerable to the central 
state’s final approval. Hence, rather than resist rules set by the central government, private 
entrepreneurs compete fiercely for recognition within these rules. In addition, they have 
developed under local states’ patronage. Due to the fierce competition among subprovincial local 
governments to “invite business and attract investments,” private actors have gained much more 
leverage in negotiations with local governments than they once had. Nonetheless, as shown in 
Geely’s Volvo merger, discussed in chapter 5, private companies cannot expand their business 
without financial support from local governments. As a result, private actors are tied to the 
central government to gain recognition as legitimate actors in the industry and they are 
financially dependent on local governments.   
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